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BRITISH POLICY IN THE FAR EAST 1937-1939. 
P.A. Herriman. 
Abstract. 
Intrcrluction. Britain's naval power in the world and the Far East 
and her commercial and political stake in China. Britain's attitude 
tovJards Japanese aggression in relation to American isolationism 
and the deteriorating European situation in 1937. 
Part I ( 1937-193$). Britain's reaction to the Sino-Japanese conflict 
is connected with America's.refusal to contemplate joint action of 
which the Brussel' s Conference is an example. Increasing Japanese 
attacks on foreign interests alarmed both Britain and America and 
staff conversations took place in January 1938. Collective security 
through the League of Nations failed in 1937-38, and Britain 
separately considered means of aiding China. The situation at 
Shanghai and Tientsin indicate the danger to British political and 
economic interests in the face of Japanese attacks. 
Part II (1938-1939). The European situation, the American attitude and 
the progress of British rearmament conditio~ed British policy in the 
Far East during 1938-39. The conflicting views of the British Embass-
ies in C.hina and Japan increased Lord Halifax's difficulties. During 
193$-39 League action again failed and Britain became increasingly 
concerned with the Anti-Comintern negotiations at Shanghai,Tientsin 
and Hankow and throughout China Britain economically and politically 
lost ground. The British also considered the possibility of further 
credits to China, of sanctions against Japan and the desirability of 
a Chinese declaration of war. 
Part III The situation at Tientsin is taken to the Tokyo 
talks in July 1939. The Anglo-Japanese formula and the denunciation 
of the American-Japanese trade treaty by America brought reactions in 
Britain and Japan. The negotiations at Tokyo are divided into 
questions relating to public order and currency matters. The Nazi-
Soviet non-aggression pact created new circumstances in the Far East 
for Britain. 
Conclusion. Appeasement had left Britain weak. American 
isolation and German aggression gave Britain no choice but to 
constantly negotiate with Japan until the British rearmament 
programme was complete. 
1 
BRITISH POLICY TOWARDS THE FAR EAST 1937-1239. 
P.A.HERRIMAN. 
INTRODUCTION. 
Britain was successfully able to.resist aggression, 
before and during the First World War, by.means of.her naval 
power. Her ability to continue to do so, ho\117ever, decreased 
w'ith the shift of the centre of gravity of naval power. 
With the growth of the Ame~ican and Japanese navies the Pacific 
and not the Atlantic or the Mediterranean played an increasingly 
large part in her strategic policy. 
As a result of the peace settlement after the v<~ar Japan 
ttprovided a potential threat to the security of the sea 
communications between Great B'ritain, India, Australia and 
New Zealand. It therefore became desirable that a British 
fleet should be stationed in the Far East." 1 With this in mind 
a great naval base was planned at Singapore which became .the 
key to the British defence of the East. Britain's fleet however . 
remained in European waters on the assumption that war was 
unlikely for the next ten years. At the srune time she strove to 
keep the balance of naval power in her f~vour by the Washington 
Treaty of 1921 which re-established her strength over Japan: 
by the Four Power Treaty: and the Nine ~ower Treaty relating to 
the integrity of China. These treaties, however, failed in their 
main objective. In reality Japan found that neither Britain 
nor America could build naval bases nearer to Japan than Singapore 
and Hawaii. Furthermore they drove her into the arms of 
Germany. 2 Therefore, although after the Manchurian 
1 • 
2. 
S.W.Kirby. History of the Second World War: 
Japan, Vol~1,p.2. 
ibid., p.5. 
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Crisis in 1932 the British chiefs of staff declared "it would 
be the height of folly to perpetuate our defenceless-state in 
the Far East~3it was not until 1934, with Germany as a potential 
aggressor and Japan on the march that Britain decided to rearm~ 
Singapore's defence made slow headway due to the difference of 
opinion between the navy-army group and the airforce protagonists. 
The event which changed the face of British strategic policy 
in the Far East was the Anglo-German treaty of June 1935. This 
gave Germany the right to build up to thirty-five percent of· the 
surface tonnage of the British navy. 
"It completely altered the strategic position in the Far 
East, for the rebirth of Germany's navy meant that, when her 
building programme was completed; the greater part of the British 
fleet would have to be retained in home waters regardless of 
events in the Far East'!5 
Later in the same year the London Naval Conference met 
without Japan, agreeing to a qualitative but not quantitative 
limitation ratio of 5: 5: 3: for British, American and Japanese 
ships respectively. They added an escape clause however 
enabling powers to depart from the clauses of the treaty if 
another power contravened the limitations. 
Japan began a naval building programme. 
Almost immediately 
In November 1936 Japan joined the Anti-Comintern pact: 
"International relations in all parts of the world became 
more closely knit and intertwined. What Italy did involved two 
continents. What Germany did and planned embraced the Western 
3 • ibid • p • 11 • 
4. ibid .p. 12. 
5. ibid ·P .13. 
3 
world. What Japan did and planned comprised the Easte~ world. 
What the three planned together included the whole world,"6 and 
was a threat to its stability. 
In 1937 the British chiefs of staff gave Japan second to 
Germany. as a possible enemy. "They pointed out that in a war with 
Germany, even with France as an ally, a British fleet at least 
equal to the German navy would have to be retained in.home waters. 
The strength of the fleet which could be sent to the Far East would 
have to be governed by home requirements."? The security of the 
United Kingdom and Singapore were cardinal factors in British.policy. 
Loss of Singapore woulQ endange~ all the British Commonwealth. 
The British government, however, because it did not believe Japan 
would risk war unless Britain became involved in a European war, 
therefore kept the fleet in European waters, as "the retention of the 
fleet in European waters would tend to be a factor in the preservation 
of peace in the East~"S 
At the time of the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese conflict the 
fortifications of Singapore were still unable to protect that city 
for more than seventy days.9 Britain's vast interests in China and 
Hong Kong were protected by no more than token forces.· The safety 
of Singapore and Britain's Chinese i~sts both therefore rested on 
her ability to send a fleet. Britain had to make a choice: To 
sacrifice her interests in the East and avoid war?: To take a·firm 
attitude?: Or play for time until British rearmament enabled her to 
play a stronger hand against Japan. All alternatives especially the 
last.two depended upon the degree of American support Britain could 
gain. 10 
6~ Cordell Hull- Memoirs vol.1. p.397. 
7~ Kirby S.W. op.cit. p.17. 
8 • ibid. p. 18 ~ 
9 • ibid .p ~ 17. · 
10. 326 HC. Deb. 5.s.~-l3544. 
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Sritain's political position in China was built up on her 
financial stake in trade and investment. Her share in China's import 
and export trade was enor.mous. 11 She also controlled a large amount of 
China's resources besides being in herself one of the three ~est 
endowed political/ economic units in the world. She controlled half 
the foreign investments ip China (forty-nine percent including 
investments in Hong Kong), and nearly half the shipping (forty 
point one percent): •12 These investments and trade would be 
weakened by the Japanese encroachment in China. 13 Alre~dy by 1937 
Japan monopolized the trade and investments of Manchukuo, whilst her 
share ip Chinese investments and shipping was second only to Great 
Britain, and in Chinese trade second only to America. The first 
step towards the development of a Japanese economic bloc was taken 
in 1938 with the establishment of the North China and Central China 
Development Companies. It was however admitted that juqged in terms 
of resources the position of the Far Eastern bloc (Japan, Manchukuo 
and Ch~na) would certainly be weaker than that of the British 
Empire, the United States, or probably the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics. Hence Chamberlain's statement in the House of Comnons 
on 1st November that a reconstructed China under Japan could not 
possibly survive without British financial aid. 14 
Amer!can investments in China were only one-sixth of Great 
Britain's, but their investments in Japan were balanced. , The chief 
American interest in the Far East was in trade from Japan. It is 
interesting to note th~t America.was primarily interested, from a 
material point of view, in Japan, whereas the British stake was in 
China. Britain therefore had more to lose than America. 15 
11 ~· 
12. 
13. 
14~ 
15. no.21. 
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Apart.from the larger share Britain held in Chinese business 
investment, she also held various Concessions throughout China 
which were administered by British Law. The Chinese government 
were also obliga;.~.e~ to her under four. headings: 1. Loan secured 
on the Maritime Custom,s, 2. Loans secured on the Salt, Gabelle, 
3. Railway loans carrying the government guarantee, 4. Unsecured 
loans. With the exception of the loan secured on the Maritime 
Customs payment was either partially or wholly in default. 16 
.Japan's aim was to establish an economic bloc to take the 
place of her absolute dependence on exports from the British 
Empire and America. The process began with the rape of Manchuria 
and the gradual infiltration into Northern China. (The Marco Polo 
Bridge incident of July 1937 was the logical outcome of Japanese 
policy). The colonial powers were not blind to the prevailing 
discontent which had been brough~ into the limelight by the Italian 
policy of expansion in Abyssi~ia, and of the desires of Japan for 
colonies. Great Britain had, in fact, already made an official 
pronouncement on the subject in the statement by Sir Samuel Hoare 
to the League on 11th September 1935. Referring to the preponderant he 
advantages which certain countries had/said that it was "not 
unnatural that such a state of affairs should give rise to fear lest 
exclusive monopolies be set up at the expense of those countries that 
do not possess colonial empires ••• The view of His Majesty's 
government is that the problem is economic rather than political 
and territorial." He suggested a free distribution ftom colonial 
areas and added, "the government that I represent will, I know, 
be prepared to take their share in any collective attempt to deal 
in a fair and effective way with a problem that is certainly 
troubling many people at present and may trouble them even more in 
the future.n 17 Hoare's reference to 'collective attempt' and 
'trouble in the future' were to prove prophetic. 
16~ ibid. --
17. R.I.I.A. ,Raw··Materials $rd. Information Dept.Paper no.1S,p.12. Coion1.es. 
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This remained British policy in 1937, and with the 
formation of the Hayashi cab~net in Tokyo which seemed to 
presag~ a new deal for China, an unofficial trade mission visited 
London, America and Europe.. Its aim was to try and lift Japan 
from her economic isolation. It was followed by an approach 
to Britain for a better mutual understanding and resulted in. 
diplomatic pourparlers in London in the early summer of 1937 •. 
Japan feared ~rade blockade and a decline in her export trade, 
while B+itain, in return for concessions to.Japan in. her colonial 
markets, wanted a naval armaments agreement, and respect for her 
Chinese interests. Unfortunately the Japanese anny in China . 
showed no sign of ameliorating their attitude, and by July 5th, 
when fighting broke out, no definite date had been fi:xed and 
Eden said in the House of Commons on 21st October, 1937, . 
"Th.ese conversa~ions were interrupted at once on the outbreak 
of the conflict, and their resumption is clearly impossible in 
the present conditions". 18 The outbreak of fighting also 
scotched an Australian proposal for a pact of non-aggression 
among contries in tne.Pacific made at the Imperial Conference 
in Lon9on in May 1937. 
China's reaction to.a rapprochement between Japan and Great 
Britain was one of alarm, as she knew it was virtually impossible 
for the two to agree without some measure of British recognition 
of Japan's new order in Manchukuo and North China. She also 
doubted whether any_agreement would stop further Japanese 
aggression. China, too, although closely implicated in.the 
proposed talks had not been consulted, and her fears were not 
allayed by the British assurance that no actions detrimental to 
China were envisaged. 
18. 327 H.C. Deb. 5&.col63. 
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Cordell-Hull says that by mid 1935 it was clear that, 
"Japan was consolidating her position in Manchuria and 
exerting every effort to keep China disunited until Japan was 
ready for another broadscale military move.n 19 
The United States both in naivety over the Nye Committee 
of 1934 and isolationism helped the Japanese in their conviction 
that no one would intervene in any attack on China. 20 Japan 
had just gained a diplomatic victory over the Russians concerning 
the Amur River dispute. The Japanese army also believed that 
the recent purges had incapacitated the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics. Britain preoccupied in Europe was considered too 
weak to resist Japanese aggression in China by herself. 
In the world theatre the portents were not encouraging. 
The Spanish conflict was still continuing. Hitler had occupied 
the Rhineland in March of the previous year, and had already torn 
up the military clauses of the Versailles Treaty. His efforts 
were obviously to consolidate Gen:nany's position on her western and 
eastern frontiers in order, as was suspected, and later proved, 
to free her hands for action in the south. There was the 
general stocktaking which took place in Central and Eastern 
Europe, faced witp the grim realities of a discredited League, 
a rearmed Germany, and an aggressive Italy. There were international 
problems concerning Palestine and Syria in the Middle East. 
Summing up for the year 1937 the keynote was one of general 
apprehension regarding the future. 
In Britain the Conservatives were in power led by 
Neville Chamberlain who became Prime l"vlinister in May 1937. The 
policy of appeasement in Europe was about to reach its zenith. 
19. Hull, op.cit. p.397. 
20. ibid. pp.397-404. 
8 
America was isolationist. A united front might have stopped 
Japan. But this was not forthcoming. Chamberlain at the 
end of May had sounded Hull on the possibility of an 
Anglo-American-Japanese agreement in the Far East, thus hoping 
to prevent the possibility of a war on two frqnt s. The 
United States of America on 1st June, however, returned an 
unfavourable reply. 21 Chamberlain was probably prepared for this, 
for as early as June 1934 he had noted "we ought ot know by this 
time that the United States of America .will give us no undertaking 
to resist by force any action by Japan, short of an attack on 
Hawaii or Honolulu.22 
American opinion was motivated to a large extent by a 
suspicion of British policy dating back to the Manchurian incident, 
in February 1932 when Sir John Simon.reputedly blocked American 
proposals m~de by Secretary of State, Stimson.23 Whether this is 
true or not, prior to July 1937 American opinion was less 
isolationist towards the Far East than towards Europe, because of 
self-interest. Even Roosevelt and Hull saw their best chance of 
collaboration with Britain in the F~r East: ··but with the outbreak 
of war the Roosevelt administration, warned by the isolationist 
temper ofpublic opinion remained neutral. The only time it was to 
step out of line was at the time of Roosevelt's Chicago speech and it 
soon retracted its horns. As far as Americans generally were concerned 
the~ policy was one of .isolation, the Monroe doctrine, freedom of the 
seas, ~nd the open door.24 Co~operation or joint undertakings 
abroad, especially with Britain, were anathema. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
F.C.Jones, Japan's New Order in East Asia,pp.38-39,and 
Hull, op.cit., pp.$31-533. · .. · 
K.Feiling, Life of Neville Chamberlain p.253. 
H.L. Stimson, Far Eastern Crisis, pp.1l2-164; R.L.Willbur and 
A.H.Hyde in "The Hoover Policies" however disag~ee. 
C.Howland, Survey of American Foreign Relations. Chapter 2. 
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~ 
THE BRITISH REACTION TO THE OUTBREAK OF FIGHTING IN CHINA. 
JULY 1937 - AUGUST 1938. 
Although Eden said at the time "all the indications 
encourage us to believe that the present situation in North 
China was not deliberately provoked by either Government", 1 
it soon became obvious who the aggressor was. The Japanese 
took P.eiping on 28th/ 19th July and Tientsin on the 29th July. 
By 16th October the Japanese had conquered Inner Mongoli~ and 
were free to advance southwards along_the Peiping~Hankow, 
Tientsin-Pukow railways. The result, however, of China's appeal 
to the League and to the signatories of the Washington Nine Power 
Conference did not give force to the moral opinion of the 
democracies. 
On 20th July tne British government asked the United States 
to join with Great Britain and France in a joint recommendati.on 
to the Japanese.and Chinese governments to suspend all further 
troop movements. This would be followed by Anglo-American proposals 
for a settlement of the Sino-Japanese conflict. But this was 
rejected by Hull on 21st July on the grounds that joint mediation 
would be castigated as interference by the Japanese military, 
and arouse Isolationist sentiment in the United States of America. 
-America was also sensitive to British diplomatic tactics. Hull says 
in· his Memoirs that on the day following Eden's proposals that he 
showed Ambassador Lindsay "various cables I had r~ceived containing 
publicity his government had given to statements implying that, with 
the British and French governments already in accord for joint action, 
proceeding with the British proposal would depend on Whether we joined 
in. I said my government trusted that henceforth there would be no 
change or pub~icity attributing to the American government responsib-
ility for the failure of the British project." 2 They were not ·however 
1. 326 HC Deb.5s·p•1$00.19th July. 
2. Hull, op.cit.,p.538-9. 
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averse to parallel action.3 
No do~bt joint intervention would have aroused a storm 
in America, but Japan was not ready for protracted war,4 and 
could not have-expected help from her Anti-Comintern partners 
bec~use Germany feared loss of trade with China as a result of 
war, and a weakening of Japan vis-a-Vis the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics.5 Germany in fact made efforts to bring 
the beillgerents t~ peace,6 although a British approach to 
Germany and Italy for joint mediation met with no success • 
. 
American intervention at an early stage might thus have arrested 
Japanese aggression. 
American participation in the Far East was constantly in 
the mind of Anthony Eden the British foreign secretary. At the 
outset of the.dispute he had raised the possibilities of sanctions 
against Japan. The United States however replied that they 
considered this proposal amounted to a boycott against Japan. 
They also considered that if it led·to hostilities they wou~d 
be aligning themselves with GreatBritain and "would bear the 
brunt as we alone possess a f~eet that could be sent into Far 
Eastern ~aters."7 Eden dou~tless knew what the American reply 
would b~. Chamberlain certainly "hoped Bingham's (it was he 
who suggested sanctions to Eden) proposals would not go any further. 
It smacked ·very much of sanctions; it would certainly antagonize 
Japan' and might so far damage our relations with her that it 
would cost us millions in defensive measures in the Far East." 
He considered the earlier British proposal for mediation was not 
open to any of these objections.S 
3. ibid • 
4~ ~T.F.E. record· pp. 20671-3 
5. German Foreign Ministry to Various German Diplomatic Missions, 
20th July 1937. D. Germa~·r·P.Series n. i pp.733-4. 6. G .D. Vol I. Nos .463 and ( • 
7. Moffat Papers p.154. 
8. Avon Op .cit. p.532. 
1 1 
Eden was however prepared to go to greater lengths 
to achieve American co-operation than same of his colleagues. 
When, therefore, at the end of September, he made a second 
attempt at joint Anglo-American intervention and cessation of 
trade with Japan he said, 
"We could not ask the Americans about their attitude 
without informing them of our own. Therefore my t elegrarn stated 
that we should be ready to consider any action likely to shorten 
the war if we were convinced of its effectiveness.n9 
This kind of approach brought him into conflict with 
Chamberlain whose views on foreign policy were becoming rapidly 
divergent from Eden's. Chamberlain redrafted the last sentence 
to read, 
"To the effect that we were not convinced that economic 
action would be effective, but we should be quite prepared to 
examine it further if the United States got ernment considered 
it worth pursuing." 
Eden was not consulted over this and, as he says in his 
Memoirs, "it was therefore no surprise when on October 5th the 
State Department sent a reply replete with emollient phrases.n10 
Eden was well aware -of the risk of war, but to discourage economic 
action as Chamberlain had done only encouraged a further American 
pyschological withdrawal." 
"Counsels of moderation were hardly likely to be heeded 
(in Japan), especially when not concerted between Great. Britain 
and Washington.n 12 Some Americans might consider it "curious 
that England should be prepared to propose to us a stand she is 
unwilling to assume with the League powers in Geneva.n 13 In fact 
9. ibid.p.534 
10. -rora. 
11. ibid.p.535 
12. :05IQ. p.531 
13. ~fat Papers p.154. 
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it was not surprising as England knew that the United States 
could not take action from the activities of the League as. she was 
not a member. But she was a signatory of the Nine Power pact. 
This is the reason why Eden attached such importance to American 
consultation • 
. In reality Britain had no more commitments in China than 
America: ttnnless the provision for consultation contained in 
article 17 of the Nine Power Treaty is-classed as a commitment, 
neither that treaty nor the Kellog pact is classed as a commitment 
of his Majesty's Government in the present dispute. Nor has any 
arisen under the covenant of the League." It was certainly not 
in British interests to appear to be intervening even though 
British interests were indirectly at stake, expecially .without 
American support. This is what happened when Britain had put 
forward her peace proposals to Tokyo in July. 15 Consequently 
Eden told the House of Commons on 19th July that Britain was not 
going to propose a Nine Power meeting to·settle the dispute; 16 
neither did she consider it opportune, at that time to re-open 
Anglo-Japanese conversations. 17 The same applied to the question 
of bringing the dispute before the League Council as Great Britain 
was in constant touch with other Powers anyway. 18 This was a 
way of hiding the truth that a meeting of the League would achieve 
nothing. The only·way to bring America into the conflict was by 
a meeting of the Washington Treaty Powers. Britain had to play a 
waiting game, 19 hoping America would propose this herself. 
14. 326 H.C.Deb. 5s p. 2182. 
15. Avon. op.cit. p.531. 
16. 326 H.C.beS. 5s p.1765 
17. ibid .p.2182 
1S.~and pp. 3315-6 and pp.1S00-1 
19. ~·PP• 2426-7. 
BRITAIN AND THE BRUSSELS' CONFERENCE. 
When China appealed to the League on 12th September 1937 
under Article~ 10,11 and 12 of the Qovenant, it was not only 
Great Britain, but France and China, who approached America to 
ascertain her attitude towards consulting with the League. 
Hull was cautious and "felt it necessary to guard against a 
repetition of an effort made in the past by several League States to 
get us committed to a certain course and then use our commitment as a 
lever to move the other league states into position."20 His 
caution was not ill-founded as the Council of the League referred 
the matter to the Special Advisory Committee responsible for 
Far Eastern affairs. This decided that the best way was for 
all the interested powers to meet. 21 "This proposal to convene 
the Washington Treaty Powers was obviously intended to bring in 
the United States ••• Great Britain and France, who were faced with the 
growing power and ambitions of Germany and It~ly, and with the tense 
situation arising out of the Spanish conflict, could not risk 
involvement in the Far East without assurances of American support.n22 
Hopes of a firmer American policy towards the totalitarian 
states were raised by President Roosevelt's Chicago speech on 
5th October with its famous quarantine clause and its limited 
recourse to retaliation and sanctions. The reports of the 
Advisory Committee were adopted on 5th October by the Advisory 
Committee and by the League assembly on the following day •23 
14 
As Moffat says in his diary, 
i'~The genesis of the /Brussels/ Conference was r~ally the 
Roosevelt speech of 5th October. Up to that moment, there had 
been few indications that the matter would not remain in the hands 
of the L~ague. However, with its strong tone and ambiguous 
phrasing, it caused an immediate change of plans in Europe,and 
Great Britain (on 6th) promptly informed us (America) that it 
considered a Nine Power Conference essential." 
The American government agreed and suggested Brussels as a 
venue. 25 Roosevelt's~eech was not popular in the United States of 
America, but i!). Europe the effect was electric. It led to a 
false optimism, and i"las widely represented that in the event af 
war America's only safe economic intercourse was with Britain. 
This led to the assumption in Brit ai. n that America despite her 
bellicose isolation would intervene to save Great Britain from 
defeat. Chamberlain on 8th October in a speech at Scarborougp 
declared Hritain wholeheartedly behind Roosevelt's call for 
concerted action in the cause for peace. 
But no sooner had the conference been mooted than America 
began to soft-pedal. On October 12th Roosevelt took great 
care to say that their role at the conference was chiefly 
mepiatory. 26 On the British side a similar attitude was adopted 
by the Earl of Portsmouth speal$:ing for the government in the 
House of Lords on 21st October, "Above all", he said, nr vJant to 
emphasize this fact - that the primary object of the conference is 
to find a vJay of restoring peace by general agreement .n Thus 
before it began the conference was stillborn no matter if Eden said 
he would ntravel not only from Geneva to Brussels but from Iv1elbourne 
to Alaskan to secure effective American support. 27 Although he 
. 24. Moffat Papers October 28th 1937. p.156. 
25. Hull - op.cit. p~550. 
26. l\1offat Papers. p.157 and Avon op.cit.p.535. 
27. 328 H.C. Deb. 5s.p.583 - 1st November. 
15 
considered "the prospect of effective Anglo-American policy in the 
Far East appeared to have diminished appreciably since Roosevelt 
quarantine speech," he added that the conference could "build 
confidence between us by a constant repetition of this maxim.".28 
Neither did he believe the Japanese would attend29- which they did 
not. 30 
Following his previous policy Eden strove to show some 
willingness to back United States action. On October 2Sth, 
therefore, Viscount Cranbourne, Under-Secretary for foreign afairs 
said, 
"His Majesty's Government should go as far as the United 
States but no farther.n3 1 
Eden on November 1st also stated that "the initiative for 
holding the conference at Brussels never came from Britain at all 
but from the United States government~ 32 These statements were 
misread by many who thought Eden "was claiming that America.had 
taken the initiative in calling the conference, not merely in 
selecting its place. 33 It also raised American fears that 
Britain was pushing America to the front "to pull the British 
chestnuts out of the fire." Norman Davies, however, believed 
with greater accuracy "that the speech was merely an instance of the 
British desire to have us co-operate on a full basis, and that Eden 
with his insularity had either misjudged or paid no attention to 
our (American) psychology.n34. Eden later told America that he had 
taken this step because Britain was being singled out for vituperation 
by Japan.35 American support would enable ·Britain not to give way 
2S. Avon. op .cit .p. 536 
29. ibidfp.535. 
30. R.I .• A. Survey 12J7, i. p.2S5. 
31. 328 R.c. Deb.5s. p.299 
32. 32S H.C.Deb. 5s. p5S3. 
33. Moffat Papers p.162. 
34. ibid. 
3 5 • ibid p • 164. 
16 
to Japanese demands that she close Hong Kong to the traffic of 
arms as Craigie suggestea.36 
I£ the conference met what might it hope to achieve? 
Very little. Sir Robert Craigie in fact saw the chances of 
mediation fading with the calling of the conference.37 Eden 
told Washington on 19th October that there were three possible 
courses: to do nothing: to bring moral condemnation of Japan: 
or to aid China and bring economic pressure on Japan. He under-
lined the dangers of the latter, and c~ncluded nsanctions would 
have to be preceded by mutual assurances of military support and 
guarantees of the territorial integrity of the other nations.n3S 
The Department of S~ate replied that "consideration of the sanctions 
did not arise in a conference whose objective was to find' a 
solution of the conflict by agreement.n39 
It was as Eden said "useless to ignore the European situation, 
and we could take no action in the Far East while the present 
conditions persisted in Europe, except in.full co-operation with 
the United States.n40 The conference was, .therefore, doomed from 
the start. A British request on 1 Sth November that America would 
join with them in a combined effer of good offices to Tokyo and 
Chungking was repudiated. On November 2nd Davies told Eden that 
it would be impossible from a political point of view, to take 
joint action with Great Britain; that this, however, did not 
preclude America taking independent action which paralleled that 
of Great Britain. 41 Thus although Britain and France on 
10th Novemher both promised co-operation in collective action, there 
was no sign of an American undertaking.42 Likewise a renewed 
attempt to coax Japan to the conference met with the obvious refusal 
on 12th November.43 China's attempt to get the conference to withhold 
36. 
37. 
3$0 
39. 
40. 
41. 
op.cit.p.539. 
S1r~R.Craigie - Behind the 
Hull - op.cit. pp.550-1 
Ulid. 
42. Avon op.cit.p539 
Japanese Mask.p.51 43. u.s.Dept of State 
Conference of 
Brussels .pp. 
53-54. Avon- oE.cit. p.537 · 
Hull -*'Sept. 28th 37. U.S .Dept of State.For.Rel.Japan i p376. 
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war materials from Japan and their request for aid were also bound 
to fail when conducted on a collective basis. In their speeches 
the delegates of Great Britain, the United States and France, 
, studiously avoided these problems, and a declaration drawn up on 
~ these · ~15th November byjthree delegates satisfied everyone but the 
Chinese and Russians. They failed to label Japan as the aggressor 
and merely requested that members should eschew action detrimental 
to Chinese interests, and consider how they could extend aid to· 
China. 
Now the Conference had so obviously failed it was essential 
from the British point of view, to have it adjourn in such a way 
that the Chinese would not be justified in asking that the 
problems be returned to Geneva. One way of preventing that was 
to introduce some new element. The British government therefore 
approached the United States with the proposal that they should 
announce their willingness to jointly offer mediation. "On the 
basis of this announcement the c·onference could adjourn and any 
appearance of failure might be avoided.n44 But the United States 
regarded this suggestion as impractical.45 Thus the Conference 
adjourned sine dei on 24th November with "anodyne resolution 
deprecating the·use of force,n46 and the League unconvened. 
The year ended in the failure of collective action. 
In a report to King George VI Eden sa:i.d-tblt the main object 
. 
of the Conference had been constant· co-operation with America. 
Noa>operation emerged, but because so much depended on it "mo 
effort should be spared to consolidate it·.n47 This had its· 
results Eden added in that by the end of the Conference Davies 
was working with him and the suspicion from the Manchurian events 
44. Moff~t Papers - Nov.20th.p.185. 
45. ibid. pp. 185-6. 
46. Avon - op.cit. p.540. 
47. ibid. 
-
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of 1932 was to some extent eliminated.4$ Eden says, in his 
Memoirs, that he "found many at the Brussels Conference who 
lthoug~t Japan was going to her 1$12 in China. This may not be so, but we should do what we can cautiously to make it possible.n49 
I 
The reason for the failure of the Conference was expressed 
for Britain by Eden on 21st December in the Commons. He 
underlined the ineffectiveness of sanctions unless backed by 
naval force. Force which, he added, neither "ourselves or France 
has got ••• it ~st be perfectly clear to everyone that that over-
whelming force does not exist.n50 This also implied a criticism 
of the United States of America. What the Chicago Sunday Tribune 
said on 21st November was substantially correct~The Europeans contend 
that the real fiasco of the conference - the reason why it has damaged 
the prestige of the western democracies greviously - is not that it 
failed to do anything, but that it talked about doing something and then 
backed down at the cruciai.moment. This they say definitely is the 
fault of the United States, which insisted on a strong moral stand 
against Japan." This resulted in Britain's inability to exert 
economic sanctions, and was to become the main reason for her 
policy of enforced compromise towards Japan. 
4$. ibid. . 
49. ibid. p.539 and Moffat Papers pp.181-2 .and R.I.I.A.Docs.1937 
pp.703-754- statements made by delegates at the Brussel's 
conference. 
50. 330 H.C.Deb.5s.p.1883. 
DAMAGE TO BRITISH INTERESTS IN CHINA IN 1937 CAUSED BY THE 
JAPANESE ADVANCE-· RESULTS· ON BRITISH POLICY. 
The British position in the Settlements and Concessions was 
of paramount inportance. Hence it was she who bore the brunt 
of Japanese ill will. As the struggle moved southwards 
considerable loss to the foreign community both in property and 
disclocation of trade resulted. Consequently interference with 
British interests increased. 
After occupying various islands of the South China coast, 
which aroused fears for the safety of Hainan - important in its 
geographical sense in the safety of Hong Kong and Indo-China -
the Japanese blockaded the Chinese coast from 6th September. 
As a result of this many British merchantmen· complied with the 
Chinese request to paint their colours on their decks to prevent 
air attacks. In the next fortnight the Japanese declared their 
right of search, to verify a vessels nationality. With this in 
view the British authorities proposed on 11th September that if a 
. 
British ship was stopped both parties should report the incident 
to the naval authorities. They also suggested that if a British 
warship was in the vicinity it should examine the ships papers 
if the Japanese required it. Tokyo accepted this solution as 
it did not impair their right of search. Neither was Hong Kong 
exempted from Japanese attention. Although there was no blockade 
the Japanese carried out action against Chinese junks issuing from 
Hong Kong. So far did they take· these measures that the British 
government was forced to protest on 11th December concerning the 
Japanese action against the customs carrier Che-Hsing shelled in 
Hong Kong waters, as a violation of British territorial waters. 
The Japanese "expressed regret that British territorial waters 
were entered without consent and have issued instructions to 
20 
prevent a re-occurence.n5 1 
In the fighting up to December there were many such incidents 
which brought loss to Britain and America alike. Dislocation of 
trade was one result. The Chinese, for example, from fear of 
the Japanese, erected booms on the main rivers - Min, Yangtse, 
Whangpo and Pearl, and it was only at Canton/~h-€ffit>r€r~t€o the 
Chinese, but later to the Japanese - that brought about an 
amelioration in conditions, and small craft were allowed to ply 
at specified hours. Some incidents, like the Chinese attacks 
on H.M.S. Cumberland on 15th August, and the American liner 
President Hoover on 30th August were obvious mistakes, as were 
the Japanese shelling and killing of foreign soldiers stationed 
in the Shanghai defence sectors, and the loss of goods 
in the prolonged fighting around the Wbangpo river. But thepe 
were also attacks which did not come within the range of accidental 
loss of. life caused by unavoidable acts of war and bore the ~mprint 
of deliberate planning. 
One of these acts was the sho·oting of Sir Hugh Knatchbull-
Hughesson, British ambassador to China, while on his way to 
S}langhi on 26th August. The British protested on 29th August, 
in Tokyo, and, after expressing the "deep distress and concern 
of His Ma,jesty' s Government at the news of this deplorable event, n 
passed on to a general discussion of the application of the rules 
-of international law to attacks on non-combatants.52 More attention 
was drawn to the illegality of firing upon non-combatant's than of 
the fact that it was the British ambassador. After the new 
British ambassador _in Tokyo, Sir Robert Craigie, had sat on a fact 
finding commission, the Japanese tardily apologised. Great 
Britain .accepted their apology. 53 It did not however prevent a 
51. 331 ~HC.Deb.5s. p~1$60. · . 
52. Sir.R.Craigie op.cit. pp.42-43. 
53. ibid.,p.45. arid R.f.I.A.Docs. 1937 pp.665-669. 
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Far Ea:;;t in co-operation with other interested pO'V'lers. 56 
It was, he told the Ameri9ans exactly "this kind of incident which 
I had feared might happen, if no restraint were imposed upon the 
Japanese government by evidence of joint Anglo-American determination 
to resist the increasingly over-bearing attitude of the Japanese 
military.n57 Eden wanted not only consultation but also co-operation. 
"More important is the question whether the United States government 
will be taking simultaneous action of a more menacing character such as 
the mobilization of their fle~t ••• in that case we should probably 
desire to take similar action, although of course our own ships 
could not reach Eastern waters as soon as the United States ships.n58 
But the United States were not prepared for any kind of 
joint actio~. In his Memoirs Hull asserts that American policy 
at the time, "while advocating international co-operation at all 
times was faced with the extremely delicate task of being careful 
not to present and urge measures in such numbers as to alarm the 
people and precipitate isolation as an acute political issue in 
the nation.n59 The Un~ted States therefore acted independently, 
to Eden's disappointment, by a separate note to Japan on 
13th December,while Britain's note went through Sir Robert Craigie.n60 
By the end of December 1937 the situation had resolved 
itself into several obvious choices for Great Britain. As 
Sir Alex~nder Sinclair said in the House of Commons on 21st 
December, the British could.either clear out of China or reach 
an understanding with Japan, which would involve a breach with 
the United States. Both these solutions were unfeasible. The 
other two choices were neutrality or fulfilment of Britain's 
Nine Power Treaty obl~gations. "Let us make no doubt about it. 
56~ Avon. op.cit. pp.540-1 
57. Aven.op.cit~p.542. 
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second.Japanese attack on B'-ritish embassy cars on the road from 
Nanking to Shanghai on 12th October 1937. In this case also the 
Japanese.official.apology for the incident was accepted. The 
Japanese, however, felt safe in their kno"V~ledge that British 
weakness prevented her from taking a stronger line. 
It was in December when the Japanese were ~dvancing towards 
Nanking that the most serious outrages occurred, in the form of 
attacks on British and American ~arships and merchantmen on the 
Yangtse. Minor incidents apart, events were overshadowed by 
the attacks of 12th December which produced a severe crisis in the 
relations between Japan and the two western powers concerned. 
H.J.VI.S. Ladybird together with H.M.Ss. Cricket and Scarab were 
attacked between Nanking and Wuhu. The Japanese apologised on 
14th December but it was not until 28th December that a 
comprehensive reply was delivered to Britain. The diplomatic 
correspondence ended with a British note of 31st Decem~er which 
expressed British satisfaction with Japanese undertakings.54 
( 
I 
But even this event was dwarfed by the sinking of the U.S.Panay on 12th 
for which the Japanese apologised immediately and acknowledged 
responsibility on 24th December. The Americans accepted this 
on 27th December. As a result 9f the apologies the friction 
introduced by the Panay incident, like the Ladybird, had disappeared 
by the end of 1937. But the suspicion of deliberate army complicity 
remained. There was every indication that the Japanese did not 
think anything would happen as they did not stop their plans for 
completing their operation for entering Southern.China.55 
Eden was, at the time· of the Panay incident, trying to 
interest the Unit.ed States in taking 'effective action' in the 
. . 
54~ 
55. 
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The respect that the militarists of Japan will. show for 
British interests will be in direct ratio to our capacity and 
resolve to defend them.n 61 Eden put it differently. 
He quoted British policy as being to restore peace honourably, 
to fulfil Britain'sshare of international obligations, and to 
protect her interests and territory. "We are constantly and 
daily in close consultation with the government of the United States 
• • • Over and over again vve have taken either parallel or similar 
action.n62 This dirl not, however, help solve his problem and he 
would have been forced to admit with Hull that a policy, 11 of threats 
· and demonstrations without the forces necessary to back them 
up, which, the aggressor rulers, fully advised of our inadequate 
preparations and the state of public opinion in the United States 
of America would rightly characterize as bluf·f," was useless. 63 
"It is impossible for foreign policy to be other than very closely 
related to the condition of our armaments" as "international law 
is no longer respected.n64 Britain knew that the Japanese 
could only be stopped by international action. But "international 
action depended upon international co-operation.u65 
D 
ANGLO-A!VIERIC AN STAFF CONVERSATIONS. 
Staff conversations had been proposed to the United States 
by Britain before the Panay incident through Lindsay in 
Washington. 66 This came as a result of a series of incidents 
against British life and property in China - notably the wounding 
of the British ambassador, and the seizure of the custom's vessels 
61. 330 H.C.Deb.5s. p.1818. 
62. 21st Dec.330 H.C.5s. 1886. 
63. Hull - op.cit. pp.564-5. 
64. 327 H.C.Deb.5s. p.66. 
65. Eden - 16th Feb. 327 H.C.Deb.5s.p.77. 
66. Avon- op.cit.p.541. 
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by the Japanese in Shanghai and Tientsin in the last week of 
November. Eden knew Britain could not detach a large force 
of her Mediterranean fleet to the Far East. "Large parts of the 
British and French fleets were patrolling the Mediterranean, as 
agreed at N~m. Lord Chatfield felt that the despatch of two 
capital ships tothe Far East would merely weaken us at home, 
without giving overwhelming strength against Japan ••• I had 
hopes, however, that our firmness in the Mediterranean would soon 
enable Great Britain to present a stronger front to Japan.n67 
A week before the sinking of the Panay Eden tried to show 
that Britain was in earnest, and mentioned that Britain might be 
able to send eight or nine capital ships to any general naval 
display in the Far· East, if America sent an equivalent number. 
He added that such a fleet could be ready in three or four weeks. 
Failing this he suggested getting the fleets into. a state of 
greater ·preparedness, together with staff conversations. By 
makfng suggest ions of his own Eden hoped to encourage the 
United States into action.6g Meanwhile the Panay incident 
occurred. Eden hoped for a possible mobilization of the American 
fleet. But although Roosevelt'· in conversation with Lindsay 
showed himself interested in the idea of staff conversations, he 
was against the demonstration oftoth navies because he thought 
it would have an adverse effect on the Japanese military. He 
did however advance the date of Pacific manoeuvres by two or 
three weeks so as to begin in mid-February.69 
The result of Lindsay's meeting with Roosevelt was t~~g 
arrival of Cap~ain Ingersoll in London on New Years day,jfor 
talks with the Admiralty,"to carry matters a stage further by 
67. ibid. p.540 
6$. ibid. pp.543-4. 
69. ibid. p546 
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exchanging information in order to co-ordinate our plans more 
closely.n?O On the more practical side Britain invited the 
United States fleet to visit Singapore, and on 10th January 
the President told Britain that three cruisers would proceed 
there. Eden remarks in his Memoirs that "all this, though not 
decisive, was helpful and encouraging to me in my pursuit of 
closer Anglo-American co-operation as the only effective 
deterrent to Japan in the Pacific. Japan's partners in Europe, 
Hitler and Mussolini might also note that the power of the 
democracies was being aligned·." 71 
It did appear in the early months of January, 1938 that 
the United States were offering Jiritain more moral support in 
Central Europe by parallel action. In January, Sumner Welles, 
American Under Secretary for State reported that Roosevelt 
wanted to hold an international peace conference at the 
White House on 22nd January. He would only do this however if 
he had Chamberlain's agreement by 17th January. Lindsay urged 
acceptance of this initiative.72 But Chamberlain viewed this 
move with greatest concern, as the plan cut directly across his 
own plans for forthcoming discussions with G.ermany and Italy. 
He, therefore, sent ·his reply without consulting Eden, and asked 
Roosevelt "to consider whether it would not be wiser to hold 
his hand for a short while." This 'douche of cold water' had 
unhappy consequences, and as far as Eden was concerned destroyed 
the confidential discussions which had been growing between 
America and England. The resignation of Eden on 18th February, 
1938 led many Americans to believe that Chamberlain's decision 
"to play ball with Hitler and Mussolini has reached a concrete 
stage." Great Britain was seen as deserting collective security 
and Eastern Europe for the safety of her own interests.73 
70. ibid. 
71. ibid. 
72 • ..,j.ill. p. 550. 
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America also feared that Great Britain would sell China out 
by making some sort of deal with Japan at her expense. This 
was a point Lord Halifax the new British foreign secretary 
had to take into account when dealing with Sir Robert Craigie's 
requests for compromise towards Japan. 
Nevertheless, despite these adverse circumstances the 
staff conversations had ~reated an atmosphere conducive to the 
exchange of naval ideas.74 When America presented her note to 
Tokyo on 5th February, 1938 requesting a Japanese assurance 
that she wa~ not constructing ships over the London Conference 
limitations, Britain and France sent identic notes. When 
Hirota gave an unsatisfactory answer, the three powers after 
consultation announced their intent ion of departing !rom the 
treaty limitations.75 
E. 
THE. SALE OF ARMS TO CHINA - THE BRITISH ATTITUDE TO . 
JAPANESE BOMBING RAIDS. 
The Japanese saw Britain as the chief bulwark against their 
ambitions in the East. 76 Among other things they accused 
Britain of being the chief instigator behind Chinese resistance. 
In fact, although the majority of arms came through Hong Kong 
only a small proportion were of British origin. During the 
first six months of the conflict only 5% were of British origin. 
Most of the munitions for China came from Germany, Italy and 
Czechoslovakia.77 But the Japanese did not quell their press 
protests, probably hoping that it would force the Brit ish to 
close the Hong Kong route to arms shipments. Protest achieving 
little the Japanese began to bomb the railways, especially frsm 
75 .• i];WJ.. p.56$ and 333 H.C.Deb.5s. pp.625-6.R.I.I.A.Docs.1938. 
vol.1. pp.510-51$ for British French and American relations 
regarding the naval treaties. 
76. Avon - op.cit. p.539 & Oct.30th 1937 - Qrew II 
77. 334.HC.Deb 5s.p.920. and The Times 5th Feb.1938. 
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Kowloon- Canton and Canton - Hankow. This, while not 
stopping supplies, brought the attendant evils of bombing 
open cities especially Canton, Nanking, Changsa and Nanchang. 
Thi~ in turn brought loss to third parties. 
On 19th September, 1937 the Japanese issued a warning to 
third power nationals concerning property and lives, and 
requested them to leave. This called forth an oral protest 
from the British, American and French ambassadors in Tokyo. 
Even Germany protested on 22nd September. Hirqta gave 
unsatisfactory undertakings to respect foreign interests. This 
did not prevent the bombing of Canton.on 22nd Septanber, and 
Great Britain, America, France, Italy, Germany and Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics protested on 23rd September. This together 
with the parallel notes of 29th September from the three western 
democracies caused a moderation of Japanese tactics for a time, 
except for a raid on Canton in November. But The Times statement 
that Japan would carry out no more air raids on the unrestricted 
scale of 22nd September, 7S was hardly true. Bombings continued 
during 1938 and elicited the usual British protests. 79 On 
29th June Butler stated in the Conmons that "No joint representation: 
have been made to the Japanese government ••• Separate representa-
tions have however been made by the British and other representa-
tives in Tokyo."eo_ This in itself, meant that the representations 
without joint action were a failure. 
R .• 
BRITAIN AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS. 
The failure of collective security in 1937 did not prevent 
the League from meeting in 1938. But, as in 1937, they burked 
the issue of Japan's breach of privileges enshrined in the League 
78'. The Times. 1st Oct.1937. 
79. 336.HC.Deb.5s.p.2411 and R.I.I.A.Docs.1937 pp.6S2-686 for 
international condemnation of the bombing of open towns. 
eo. 337. HC.Deb. 5s. p.1eee 
Covenant. Two 'anodyne resolutions' were passed; one on 
2nd February by the British, French, Russian and Chinese 
representatives; and another on 14th May. They both reiterated 
the rec.onmendations of 6th October, 1937 and the hope that members 
would see ~heir way to extend individual aid to China. 81 Viscount 
Cranbourne put theBritish dilemma aptly in the House of Lords on 
28th October. "The attitude of the United States ( regaTding 
League action against Japan) is a factor of essential importance .• " 
The Oppos~tion in Parliament criticized. Great Britain for backing 
out of her League commitments. They also blamed the League for 
not making a recommendation to its members to act -on their own 
without .. the assistance ofnon-members, or supporting individual 
economic action. Replying to this criticism Cranbourne said: 
"That suggestion ignores an essential factor. It is only when the 
extent of the co-operation to be expected is known that you can tell 
whether any gi~n action is likely to be effective.n82 In reality 
Great Britain and the western democracies had to act for the most 
part independently, and deal with each situation as it arose. 
It was a policy which was not likely to be favoured with 
much success. ·chamberlain underlined this when on 26th July, 
1938 he said in the House of Commons that League ~ction was not 
likely to be successful. "In the meantime," he continued, "we 
are resolved to do our utmost to see that British interests shall 
not suffer in a conflict £or which we have no responsibility and in 
which we have no dir'ect concern·" This was the same language as he 
used when he referred to Czechoslovakia as a far off country in which 
Britain had no interest. It was Chamberlain's policy of trying to 
improve international relations by removing tne barriers to 
aggression and giving way in the face of overwhelming odds.83 
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G.: 
FURTHER DAMAGE TO BRITISH INTERESTS IN CHINA 1937-38 
During 1938 the Japanese systematically attacked British 
preserves in China. They reorganized t~e railway system of the 
North China and the Peking -Mukden line,84 and prevented British 
railway effie ia·ls from inspecting the Shanghai - Nanking line. 
The Shanghai - Nanking Railway Company failed to pay interest to 
the British bondholders.85 Protests were made in both these 
cases but with little result. Another interesting point was that 
the Japanese in the majority of cases sought to break the Anglo-
American alliance by pretending that it was not American interests 
they were attacking. Benn reported in the House of Commons on 
3rd June, 1938 that the United States ~as given immediate 
restitution for their protests as opposed to Britain and her inability 
to press her cl~ims. 86 
It was in the Yangtse that the most serious conflict between 
Britain and Japan arose because of Japanese efforts to close the 
river to trade. The post of Tsingtao, wrecked by the retreating 
Chinese, was working again by May 1938, but the Japanese still kept 
it closed to foreigners on the plea of military necessity.87 
The Japanese also extended their interference to public international 
bodies such as the Whangpo Co~servancy Board. In November 1937 
they confiscated its equipment, anQ made its release, requested 
by the British ambassador in Tokyo, conditional upon a Japanese 
Board of Contro1.88 As these terms were unacceptable to the 
British the situation remained unrelieved at the end of 1938. 
Attempts were made.to bring about a comprehensive liquidation 
of outstanding disputes, such as the Craigie/Ugaki talks during the 
84. 337 .HC. Deb. 5s ~ pp. 1500-1 June 27th.· 
85. 335 HC. Deb.5s. p.1215 and 336 HC.5s pp. 831-32. 
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summer of 1938, but met with no success. The keynote, therefore, 
for the year 1937-3$ which saw the collapse of collective security, 
was independent action by Britain in a world in which problems 
were international. The China incident increasingly influenced 
and was influenced by world politics. Gradually Britain began 
to consider how she might 'individually extend aid to China.' 
H 
BRITISH AID TO CHINA 1937-1938. 
There were several ways of extending aid towards China. 
One was to diminish outside assistance to Japan in the 
prosecution of her war in China. This was probably the most 
• dangerous as Britain had to be wary of doing anything which 
smacked of sanctions. The British government could not just 
stop the sale of v-1ar supplies to Japan because of the difficulties 
involved in connexion with the Anglo-Japanese trade treaty. 
But Viscount Cranbourne was able to stateon 23rd December, 1937 
that only one licence had been granted in the last three months. 89 
The United States carried out a similar policy of discouraging 
trade. But British trade with Japan showed no appreciable decline 
as a result of public discouragement of trade with Japan.9° 
Britain could also help the Chinese by the method ofgLving 
more direct aid to China. On the minor scale an English speaking 
mobile medical unit was sent to China to combat epedemics.91 
More important was Britains ability to keep the lines of 
communication into China open. The Haiphong - Kunming railway 
was of great use to the Chinese after the fall of Canton and 
consequent blockade from Hong Kong. But this route vJas virrtually 
debilitated because of Japanese pressure. on the French by 
threatening Hainan. One of the remaining ways open to the Chinese 
89. 330 HC.Deb.5s p.2162. . 
90. For.Rel. of U.S.1938 Vol II pp.613-626 and 329 HC.Deb.5s p.205. 
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for the import of war materials (besides the Russian route) 
was through the Burmese frontier. In 1937-3$ the road from the 
Burmese frontier to Kunming was not complete. But British 
participation in the creation of the new road, and its obvious 
future advantages played a considerable part in the anti.,.British 
campaign in Japan. Japanese agitation, however, had little 
effect at this stage. On 3rd December the Burmese government 
declared its intention of not interfering with the traffic. 
A further method of helping China, and one which proved the 
most successful was financial support by Great Britain and America. 
Financial action was of course entirely independent. As Eden 
pointed out in the House of Commons on 22nd November, 1937 
"It is a matter of individual,action ••• not of co-operation with 
other countries ••• though His Majesty's Government ••• Keep 
in close touch with -the United States government .n92 The 
Silver Purchasing Agreement between the United States and China, 
renewed in July 1938, and the ~25 million credit of December 1938 
advanced through the American Export-Import Bank, helped to 
further the British government's determination of granting loans 
to China.93 Their own initial export credit of £45,000, following 
the American lead, was small but served as a precedent.94 
Throughout 1937-3$ they had resisted the urgings of representatives 
of business organizations and Members of Parliament to give their 
approval to financial assistance to China, and had refused to ask 
Parliament to sanction thegrant of a government ban on government 
guarantees for private loans. Even when they decided to advise 
themselves on the possibility of Export Credit Guarantee Department 
cover they continued to regard it as a commercial rather than a 
a political loan, for which the Chinese could offer no reasonable 
financial/commercial securities. 95 
92. 329 HC~ Deb.5s p.S31. 
93. 336 HC.Deb.5s. pp.1179-SO. 
94. F.C.Jort~s 6p.cit~p:139. 
95. 338 HC.Deb.5s pp. 2940-42 and p.2961. 
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l 
THE BRITISH POSITION IN SHANGHAI - JULY 1937- AUGUST 1938. 
In 1937 the international settlement at Shanghai was faced 
with the most serious threat, not only to its security, but to 
its very existence. The Japanese victory had, here as elsewhere 
in China raised the perplexing question of the position of the 
extra-territorial powers in China. Talks concerning 
extra-territoriality had been_in progress between Britain and 
China, but had been discontinued with the outbreak of hostilities.96 
The Chinese were able to use the international settl~ment of 
Shanghai to prevent a flank attack by the Japanese: But more 
important still Shanghai and the other British Concessions 
throughout China were seen by them as a bulwark against Japanese 
domination. Britain therefore bore the brunt of Japanese ill 
will. The city of Shanghai assumes a special importance when it 
is realized that no less than two thirds of the total foreign 
investments in China were invested in Sh~nghai. Professor Remer 
gives the chief creditor countries as follows,in the year preceding 
the outbreak of war:- Business invested in Shanghai in £ millions. 
G'reat Britain 1 52 
Japan 44 
United States of 97 
. America 20 
The Japanese attack on Shanghai placed this business in 
jeopardy, and Britain had to protect her interests. 
On 11th August Britain in conjunction with the American.,·: 
French, German and Italian ambassadors urged on China and Japan the 
co-operation of all parties in maintaining the peace· of Shanghai. 
Japan agreed if China would observe the validity of the 1932 
agreement, which she lmew was unlikely. These moves came to 
96. 326 HC. Deb.5s pp.2180-1. 
97. R.I.I.A. Inf.Dept.Paper No.21 -China and Japan. 
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nothing with the outbreak of fighting in Shanghai on 13th August. 9~ 
On 18th August the Britis~ government proposed that both combatants 
should withdraw their forces from Shanghai and leave all civilian 
~esidents to be protected by the forces of neutr.al powers from 
the international settlement.99 Japan ho~eve~ rejected this. 
offer, declaring that she was_responsible· for the safety of her 
own nationals. 100 
\'lhen the Chinese finally rebrea~ed from Shanghai on 
8th-9th November, 1937 the Japanese were ·left in cont~ol of the 
Hong Kew and Yangtsepoo districts of the inte~ationa+ s~ttlement, 
where most of the large-scale industries were situat~d. In 
addition Britain had lost a substantial part ,of the water frontage 
on the Whangpo. 101 The legitimate Chinese ·representatives had 
fled to Hankow and from thence ~o ChungKing, andthere was there-
fore no one to negotiate with t·he foreign settlements. Great 
Britain had assumed that the Japanese would. return the areas- to 
the Municipial.Councils jurisdiction. But this, in spite of 
102 . frequent protests, they. "refused to do. · As a result however 
of repeated representations in Tokyo by the. British and American 
ambassadors and their consuls of Shanghai! 03 they did allow 
foreign residents to return on 15th December 1937, and on. 27th 
·December proclaimed the reopening of areas north of Soochow ·creek._ 
to the business of non-Chinese. But ce~tain portions of Hong Kew 
and Yangtsepoo remained closed on the plea of military necessity. 
On 15th February the Earl of Plymouth said in the House of Lords 
that "His Majesty's government are doing everything _they possibly 
can by means of representations, both locally and at Tokyo to. 
have restrictions removed at the earliest possible moment • " 
But restrictions remained. Protests had not made the Japanese 
return the Moller Engineering works by June 193S, 10~·or to allow 
free access of British merchants in occupied areas. 105 The 
98. F.C.Jones op.cit~ p.49. 104. 336 HC~Deb.5s p~2011. 
99~ 327 HC.Deb.5s pp-.63-64-. 105. 333 HC.Deb.5s p.$27. 
100~ R.I•I.A.Docs.1937.pp.662-3 
101. F.C.Jones Shanghai and Tientsin. 
102. 338 HC.Deb.5s p~2230. 
103. 329 HC.Deb.5s p.1197. 
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free.circulation of employees of the British owned Shanghai 
Electric Construction Company in the Hong Kew and Yangtsepoo 
districts was prevented, 106 and the British· owned Sungsing Cotton 
Mill machinery was seized. 107 The latter was later returned 
because of representations by the British. 10g 
These.restrictions were only a few of the vast number which 
occurred in Shanghai. They brought with them financial loss, and 
the British consuls general were told to file all claims received 
by them. 109 Despite ~his the Japanese continued to invoke 
belligerent rights,. and destroy industrial competition by 
destroying Chinese. mills. They also claimed the sovereign rights 
of the Chinese government, and on the ending of the Chinese 
censhoship on mails, cables, wireless they took over their 
functions. Although Britain protested on 2Sth January, 193S 
in collaboration with America nothing was done. Attacks on 
British subjects were also a source of trouble and Britain 
protested to Japan concerning the ill-treatment of her nationals 
on 31st December, 1937, 31st March, 5th, 6th and 11th April,193S. 110 
The Japanese did not aim their attention entirely at the 
occupied areas. .On 11th November the Japanese military warned 
the municipal authorities against allowing ant~-Japanese agitation, 
· and threatened to· take over the settlement. On 1st December 
Britain denied the Japanese right to take unilaterai. action. 111 
There was, however, no doubt that anti-Japanese activities were 
being ca~ed out by. the Chinese organizations inside the · 
international settlement. The Japanese used the actions of these 
groups as a lever to attack the municipal authorities for ineffici-
e~cy and embarrass the British. The settlement authorities did 
106. 336 HC.Deb.5s p.1632 
107. ibid. p.2412. 
10S. )37'HC.Deb. 5s pp.6S3-4. 
109. 332 HC.Deb.5s p~V30 
333 HC~Deb~5s p.1969. 
110. 336 ·HC .Deb.5s p.3.70 
111. 329 HC.Deb.5s pp.2046-7. 
~ 
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all they could to prevent these anti-Japanese activities. 
It was against these groups that a curfew was imposed by the 
municipal authorities on 15th August and 17th August '1937. 
They also imposed general restrictions on the Chinese population. 112 
On t~e advice of the municipal police the Chinese press closed 
down, and on 21st October all printed publications were required 
to register ~th the council. 11 3 
Often, however, the Japanese were to blame for provoking 
incidents out of which they capitalized. In August a Japanese 
plane flew over the settlement and dropped leaflets attacking 
the Chinese National government and the western powers in 
·China. The council prQtested on 16th August, as did the British 
and American commanders, andthe Japanese apologised. On 
3rd December the Japanese insisted on holding a victory march 
through the international settlement in-spite of protests by the 
commanders of the British and American forces in Shanghai and 
the ambassadors of the two powers in Tokyo. Not surprisingly 
there was a bomb incident which resulted in fresh demands upon 
the municipal commissioner of police to which the municipal 
council refused to agree. There was a further incident on 
6th December when the Japanese arrested four Chinese in the 
settlement itself. Britain protested and they were released 
with a formal Japanese apology on 7th December. The Japanese 
used the incidents to undermine morale of the municipal police 
whom they castigated as in~ffective. On their side the council 
did warn people on 1st January 1938 that they would be liable 
to be handed over to the.Japanese if they committed an offence 
against the armed forces, and reissued the warning on 19th July. 
On 4th January the Japanese presented demands including 
increased Japaneseparticipation·in the police force, which the 
council handed to the western governments. It had become obvious 
112. Shanghai Municipal Council Report of 1937.p.96. 
113. F.C.Jones Shanghai and Tientsin. 
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that -
by this time¥' the Japanese were using the incidents to increase 
their participation in the municipal government. Two choices 
were open to them~ They could increase their share in public 
bodies like the police, ·and so gain virtual control: Or they 
could use intimidation against powers holding individual 
.Concessions (viz Tientsin). As_ Shanghai was an international 
settlement they used the first method in order to prevent an 
alliance of powers against them. 
Their demands of 4th January met with a cool response from 
the governments concerned. Britain made it known that after 
consultation with other powers "all had agreed that they should 
support the council in opposing any attempt on the part of the 
Japanese to interfere with the functions and the character of its 
administration." 11 4 But she did go on to say that there was a 
certain force behind the Japanese contention that they did not 
have enough representation on the council. They offered no 
solution however and had already refused to modify the land 
regulations, which were the conditions under which the settlement 
was administered. 11 5 The_ council, assured of diplomatic support 
refused the Japanese authorities demands on 1Sth March, 116 mean-
t-1hile proposing a scheme for increasing the Japanese personnel 
in the police force. Although the Japanese were disappointed 
with the result they let the matter rest, and the question of her 
admission into a larger share in the proceedings of the council 
remained until the end of 193S. 
J 
THE BRITISH POSITION IN TIENTSIN - JULY 193Z-AUGUST 193S 
At Tientsin the dispute with Japan differed in that, whereas 
Shanghai was an international settlement, Tientsin was not. 
114. Under Sec. _for Foreign Affairs in House of Lords 15th Feb. 
115. 329 HC~Deb. 5s p.1568 and p.1672. 
116. 333 HC.Deb.5s p.1172. 
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Therefore the Japanese could employ different means, and bring 
individual action to bear on the powers separately. The British 
stake in Tientsin was by far the largest of the foreign powers, 11 7 
and at Tientsin she also owned a concession: Britain therefore 
had most to lose by the Japanese aggression. 
After the Japanese had seized Tientsin there were two main 
sources of dispute with the Bri~ish. Firstly, the Japanese were 
incensed at the British refusal, and that of the western financial 
and mercantile houses,to assist their banking and currency schemes. 
Secondly the Japanese claimed the inefficiency of the municipal 
authorities in quelling anti-Japanese acts. And, as in Shanghai 
they also claimed, through right of conquest, the sovereign ~ights 
of the Chinese government over the Chinese in the concession, and 
other organs such as the salt gabelle and the postal administration. 
The British and French denied the existence of such rights; 
particularly in view of the fact that no formal state of war 
existed between the Chinese and Japanese. The local authorities 
did tighten measures to prevent anti-Japanese acts, but refused 
to hand over for trial men accused by the Japanese of acts of 
terrorism, without prima facie evidence. In January 193$ the 
Japanese threatened to enter the British Municipal Area because 
the British authorities refused to hand over a Chinese allegedly 
guilty of anti-Japanese acts. But the officer commanding the 
British forces intimated that such an attempt would meet armed 
resistance, and the Japanese moderated their attitude. 118 The 
situation remained.tense, however, until the autumn. of 193$ when 
it again flared up, and the Japanese ordered their residents on 
31st August to leave the concession. 
117. F.C.Jones Shanghai and Tientsin. 
11$. ~· 
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K 
THE BRITISH ATTITUDE TO JAPM~ESE FISCAL POLICY. 
To see the Japanese fiscal policy.in its proper context 
one must return to the Chinesemonetary reforms of 1935 which 
inaugerated a managed currency and demonetarized silver. As 
this cut across the Japanese plan for economic and financial domina-
tion of North China the Japanese refused to co-operate. They 
put pressure on North China to stop the silver from Peking and 
Tientsin {$50/60 million) from being sent to the Central Bank of 
Shanghai. But the Chinese monetary policy was proved a success, 
and as a result the Japanese, especially after 1937 decided to 
introduce a new currency and force the yen out of circulation 
in North China to further their economic policy. 
Their first move was to introduce a new State Bank of issue, 
The Federal Reserve Bank, on 11th February 1938 at Peking with a 
capital of Chinese dollars 50 million. The Japanese had, of 
course, counted on securing as their main reserve the silver still 
stored in the British and French vaults at Tientsin and Peking. 
But the Chinese managers of these banks avoided pressure by 
fleeing to Hong Kong. The Japanese therefore looked for assistance 
to the foreign powers in whose banks the silver was kept. But 
this was withheld since the British savJ the Japanese fiscal policy 
as a danger to their own position in North China, as their trade 
was geared to the yen and Japanese fiscal policy was monopolistic. 
They also held that it would be a breach of. faith on their part 
to allow unauthorized access to this silver, or to compel its 
removal outside the foreign administered areas where it could be 
seized by the provincial government. The Japanese, however_, held 
that the silver belonged to the p_oople of North China and was the 
backing for their notes. Nationalist China's claim was that they 
had provided foreign exchange against North Chinese notes even 
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though the silver was held in the concessions in Japanese-
occupied territory. 
On 30th Junfrta.J93S the puppet provisional government at 
Peking.declareqlthe Tientsin branch of the currency reserve 
board, to which the silver had been entrusted by the Chinese 
government, had been replaced by the Peking-Tientsin silver 
custody committee. In communicating this to the British embassy 
at Peking the Japanese said they placed great importance on the 
transfer of the silver. The British however refused to comtemplate 
such a move. As Sir J. Brennan said later in a foreign office 
memorandum of 2nd November, 1939,whoever wanted the silver/wiats 
certain that none of the parties - the National government of 
China, the people of North China, or the two northern branches 
of the banks, whose notes were given in payment for the metal -
desires that the silver should be handed over to the Japanese 
authorities. 11 9 Had the Japanese gained possession of the silver 
they would have used it to support the Federal Reserve Bank 
currency and destroy the Chinese national currency, with the main 
object of concentrating economic control in their own hands and 
depriving the foreign, especially the British, mercantile community, 
of the only medium for conducting trade. 
The Federal Reserve bank made slow progress for the reasons 
above, and also because it did not have sufficient specie 
backing and was not freely convertible. Hence the Western 
Banks would mot accept their notes. Japanese efforts to procure 
foreign exchange were partially frustrated by the help of western 
f . . 1 . Ch. 120 . 1nanc1a organs 1n 1na. In the1r concessions at Tientsin the 
British and French municipal councils permitted ratepayers to pay 
their dues in the new currency to avoid trouble. But it was the 
British refusal to prohibit the use of the Chinese national 9urrency 
119. Documents on British Foreign'Policy 1919-1939 Third series 
· (hereafter referred to as BD.) IX App.3. · · 
120. F.C.Jones. Japans New Order in East Asia p.147. 
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notes in Tientsin which was 
between Britain and Japan. 
British-government take any 
one of the major sources of conflict 
But not unti+ Narch 1939 did the 
steps to aid the Chinese currency. 
L 
THE BRITISH ATTITUDE TO JAPANESE ECONOMIC POLICY. 
Japan's fiscal policy was part of her general economic policy 
in China. On 22nd January 1938 the provisional government of the 
Chinese Republic proclaimed a revision of all the import and export 
rates of the Chinese National governments tariff of 1934. Although 
there was no discrimination as to the country of origin the British 
ambassador in Tokyo was instructed to protest on the ground that 
the introduction of a special tariff for North China was contrary 
to the treaty provisions for a uniform tariff for all China, and 
prejudiced the integrity of the customs administration. 121 On 
24th March Butler stated that although the new rates tended to favour 
Japanese trade only one trade organization had co~plained of 
prejudice. He also said that the Japanese government, in their 
reply to the British note of protest had disclaimed responsibility 
for the revision of tariff rates enacted by the Peking government. 
Sh 1 d . d d. . . t. 122 e a so en1e 1scr1m1na 1on. 
Such might have been the case in January 1938. On 2$th Harch, 
however, the reformed government of the Republic of China was 
inaugurated at Nanking, and on 31st IvTay issued, with the Peking 
government, new tariff rates in areas under their control. 123 
The Oriental Economist however saw these new tariffs as the 
foundation stone for the new economic bloc. In respect to foreign 
goods The Oriental Economist declared Great Britain~ the United States 
and Germany enjoyed the full benefit of the revised tariffs, although 
not perhaps to the same extent that Japan would under_ordinary 
circumstances. 124 Tffhatever might be the case in law, however, in 
121. 331 HC.Deb.5s pp.394-6. 
122. 333 HC~Deb.5s p.1386. 
123. Finance and Commerce June 8th 1938 and 333 HC.Deb.5s p.2022. 
124. Oriental Economist, July 1938 p.417. 
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fact British trade as a result suffered. One result. of the acts 
was the establishment of Japanese monopolies. Its effects on the 
commercial interests of the British at Tientsin were great. The 
Japanese wool monopoly brought protests from Britain and America. 
The Japanese denied any restriction, but their effect resulted in 
the exclusion of British merchants from the export trade in cott~n, 
and only with great difficulties did they retain a portion of the 
wool trade. The Japanese North China Development Company was 
concerned with all the monopolistic practices, and British interests 
in North China were thus confronted with a large Japanese government 
controlled concern exploiting on a monopolistic basis. 125. 
M· 
THE BRITISH ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE CHINESE l~ITIME CUSTOMS AND 
THE ANGLO~JAPANESE CUSTOMS AGREEMENT. 
One of the main sources of dispute in North China was the 
Maritime Customs Administration. An international organization 
it was one of the greatest stabilizing influences in China: 
But being l~rgely British staffed (the Inspector General was 
British) it was distrusted by the Japanese. · Between November 1937 
and May 1938 the Japanese threatened to take over the customs both 
at Tientsin and Shanghai but held their hand as long as the Customs· 
co-operated with them under pressure~ At Shanghai the revenue was 
paid into the· Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank. But in Tientsin where 
Japan only faced the individual powers she was able to insist, from 
November 1937, that the Customs Revenue be deposited with the 
Yokohama Specie Bank to prevent the·, money reaching the Chinese 
National government. 
This was more than a local issue and involved Great Britain, 
as Japanese statements had raised doubts that, although they claimed 
the sovereign-Chinese rights over the Customs, they did not intend 
125. Far Eastern Survey Oct.12th 1938. 
126. 329 HC.Deb.5s p.204S. 
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to respect Chinese financial obligations. The British government 
therefore deemed it advisable to leave the Japanese in no doubt 
as to their claim to be consulted in any arrangement that might be 
made concerning the Chinese customs. After conferring with 
America and France they sent instructions to this effect to their 
ambassadors in Tokyo, 126 as did the other Powers. The Customs were 
the subject of frequent representations. 127 Although the Japanese 
assured the British at the end of November 1937 that "due consideration 
would be given to the views of foreign powers,» 128 their attitude 
towards the servicing of foreign loans secured on the customs revenue, 
was far from satisfactory. Shortly after their occupation of 
Chinese posts and Customs post the Japanese had stated that 
remittances would be paid to cover the proportion of this due from 
the Tientsin revenue. 129 But this did not prove to be the case. 13° 
As a result it was decided by the British government to try and 
remove this cause of friction by negotiation. Since February the 
British ambassador in Tokyo had "been carrying on unofficial 
conversations with the Japanese Minister for foreign affairs regarding 
the servicing of foreign obligations secured on the revenues of the 
Customs.n 131 On 3rd May, 1938 the Anglo-Japanese Customs Agreement 
was signed. This consisted in temporary measures lasting for the 
period of hostilities for the servicing of foreign loans. 132 On 
4th May Chamberlain said in Parliament that these arrangements 
appeared to the British government "to offer the best guarantee 
obtainable for safeguarding the interests of the holders of China's 
foreign obligations secured on the customs revenue and thereby to· 
assist in maintaining China's credit.n 133 
The Chinese were alarmed at this temporary agreement .between 'Great 
Britian and·Japan regarded it as co-operation. Such was not the 
127~ 333 HC~Deb~5s p.1387 and 334 HC.Deb.5s p.191. 
12$. 330 HC.Deb.5s p.362~· . 
129. Eden in Commons Nov.24th 1937. 
130. H o£ L 107.Feb.15th 1938. 
131. Sir R .Craigie op .cit.; p .53 and 335 HC .Deb~ 5s pp .$48-9. 
132~ For details- China Year Book (1939) p.97. 
133. 335 HC.Deb.5s p.S4S-9. 
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case as Butler pointed out on 12th May:. " • • • There is nothing in 
the arrangement recently negotiated in Tokyo to justify the 
suggestion ••• that His.· Majesty's Government have acquiesced in 
any interference with the customs service and its present international 
personnel. On the contrary His Ma:jesty' s Government have repeatedly 
impressed upon the Japanese government the interest which they take 
in maintaining ••• the integrity of the maritime custom's service 
••• n134 
It was assumed that China would agree, but this she refused to 
do. She pointed out that by singling out some obligations for 
favoured treatment, and by sanctioning the diversion of revenue from 
others - viz. domestic loans, it undermined the position of the 
customs as a security. But although the British agreement was 
inoperative because of the Chinese refusal it may well have 
prevented the seizure of the whole custom's administration, which 
would have been . detrimental to Chinese and B~ritish interests alike. 
134. ibid. pp.1732-3. 
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PART II 
A 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO BRITISH POLICY DURING 193$-1939. 
It was decided in the summer of 193$ that Sir Robert Craigie 
should have talks with the new Japanese Minister for foreign affairs 
General Ugaki on a semi-official and personal basis. 1 This idea was 
both in keeping with foreign office inclinations and Ugaki who wanted 
.the talks to cover "the whole field of British rights in China." 2 
Britain, faced with the increasingly dangerous Czechoslovak question, 
was more than anxious to keep in close touch with.Japan and try if 
possible to detach her sympathies from the dictator states. But the 
talks were accompanied by increased Japanese military operations 
around Hankow and in Southern China.3 This resulted in the closure 
of the Yangtse to international shipping and increased vituperation 
against Britain.4 
On 26th July Craigie handed Ugaki a list ·or f~ve •reasonable" 
demands concerning the Yangtse navigation.5 Japan did not ·answer 
the British note for a month, and the substance of their eventual 
reply was "profoundly disappointing". 6 Agreement failed over the 
questions of currency and more particualarly the Japanese demand that 
Britain should stop."supporting Chiang Kai Shek" and "co-operate 
with Japan."7 Unfortunately in this latter case Britain fell 
between two stools, neither placating Japan or sufficiently aiding 
China.8 Clarke-Kerr, the British ambassador in China, stated on 
many occasions that he not only had to keep the Chinese in a state 
of perpetual hope, but of actual unfulfilment. This was a source 
of embarrassment to Britain as the Chinese portrayed themselves as 
fighting Britain's war for her. Ugaki fell· from pm'ier in November 
1. 33$ HC.Deb.5s·p.3034 and p.3976_: Also Sir.R;Craigie op.cit. p.61 • 
. 2. F.C.Jones op.cit. P.135 and 33$ HC.Deb.5s p.26$7. 
3. B.D.VIII nos.99 and'86. 
4 ~· ibid .No 95 ~ 
5. ibid.No ·6 note 2. 
6. Ibid.No $6. 
7. sir R.Craigie op.cit. p.61. 
8. B.D. Vol.VIII No.$2 
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and the injury to Britain's interests in China increased, as did 
her protests. Craigie continued the talks with Arita and Tani, 
the new foreign and vice-foreign ministers, that had been interrupted 
by General Ugaki's resignation: But the talks were not on the same 
friendly basis. 
During 193S-1939 British policy towards the Far East depended 
upon three factors: The European situation: The attitude of the 
United States: and the progress of British rearmament (especially 
naval rearmament) • Brit ian believed that Japan had bitt en off 
more than she could readily digest in China. Therefore she waited. 
Clarke-Kerr frequently insisted that "with help from outside the 
Chinese could maintain their resistance long enough to make it 
effectual."9 Even Craigie reported that Japan's margin of safety 
was small and that she was peculiarly susceptible to economic 
pressure from outside. The problem therefore as seen in the British 
foreign office "was the extent to which, out of immediate and short-
term necessity His Majesty's government had to submit to Japanese 
attacks upon British interests, to withhold from China much of the 
aid which Britain was otherwise willing to give, and to wait until 
the three factors mentioned above had become more favourable·" 10 
For Craigie the way out of this maze'of d~fficulties was 
neither to· surrender to Japanese demands; nor to drive the Japanese 
into war by action which they could interpret as direct assistance to 
China; but to try for some: general settlement in the Far East, which 
would safeguard Chinese independence and foreign interests in China, 
and at the same time satisfy all reasonable Japanese claims. To 
the British foreign office the European situation, and, as a corollary, 
the need to keep in line with American action and opinion were the 
dominant consideration. "They had to take into account the arguments 
of Clarke-Kerr in favour of giving more help to China, and also 
those of Sir Robert Craigie in favour of showing a more conciliatory 
9. ibid.No~266. 
1 0. 'B':iJ.Vol. VIII p .IV. 
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attitude towards Japan, and preventing the Japanese from regard~ng 
the total exclusion of British interests from China as essential to 
the self-protection of Japan. This task of reconciling opposites 
was not ·easy; it was rendered more difficult by the tone of public 
opinion in Britain," for which, by her actions, Japan was mostly to 
blame. "From the point of view, however, of conducting a foreign 
policy backed by insufficient resources, there was consxerable 
danger in the attitude of a public opinion which, in its demands for 
action on behalf of China, often forgot;tR;tultima ratio of such 
action might riot exist in British hands.n 11 
As far as Chamberlain was concerned little else could be done. 
As he said in the-House of Commons on 19th December 1938 "I should 
like to repeat my conviction that the foreign policy of His Majesty's 
Government during the last eighteen months has been right all along. 
If I had to live those eighteen months over again I would not change 
it by a jot. Whether it ultimately achieves its aim, remains to 
be seen, but that is not a matter which depends on us alone. Even 
if it were to fail, I shou~d still say that it was right to attempt 
it. For the only alternative was war, and I should never take that 
awful responsibility upon my shoulders unless it were forced upon me 
. 12 by the madness of others." 
America saw Great Britain as an important factor in Europe and 
the Far East. If Europe was the key to international action in the 
Far East, Great liritain was regarded as the keystone of Europe. 
Generally America considered that there was little prospect of 
British participation let alone initiative in any drastic economic 
move against Japan. Secondly that whatever course Great Britain 
might pursue she would be moved by her national and imperial interests 
and nothing else. It was moreover generally assumed that British 
policy in the Far East was aiming towards a stalemate. A British 
loan to China did not necessarily mean that Great Britain was 
11. B.D. Vol.VIII p.V and no·.149. · 
12. 342 HC.DEb.5s 19th Dec.1938 pp.2521-30. 
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backing a Chinese victory, but merely that she was no longer certain 
of a Japane9e victory. (On the face of it loans and credits coming 
as they did, at a time when everyone realized that a Japanese 
victory was still far off, if ever, did seem suspicious. Britain 
vvas seen as bolstering the Chinese who had done most of the 
fighting themselves. 13 
In Britain it was realized tnat the safest course was to ke~p 
Japan. talking. Viscount Halifax, the British foreign secretary, 
was aware that Japan was awaiting the outcome of the Czechoslovak 
crisispnd that neither government would go out on a limb unti~ 
this had resolved itself. 14 After Hitler's Nuremburg speech, ' 
however, vituperation against Brit a in increased. In Brit a in too 
the public demands for action increased. 15 The British government 
found it necessary from time to time to make public announcements. 
These were a source of embarrassment to the government as they were 
bound to annoy either the Japanese or the Chinese. The speeches 
of 26th and 27th July 193$ by the British Prime Minister and 
Secretary for State reaffirmed sympathy with China but aroused a 
furore in Japan. 16 Likewise the Prime Minister's speech of 
2nd November concerning British aid to any reconst:ructed China, 17 
and its subsequent misbroadcasting by the Japanese, aroused Chinese 
fears that Britain was anxious to see the conflict .terminated in order 
to lend money to Japan to enable the latter to complete her domination 
of China. Britain had to quell Chinese doubts. But at the same 
time it was realized in Britain that it would be impossible to return 
to the old Anglo-Japanese friendship vvithout recognizing some 
Japanese control of North China. 
Even in the context of negotiation the British government was 
open to th.e danger of being forced to compromise because of the l9-ck 
of force to back her words. The obvious, 
was co-operation with the United States. 
13 ~ Miriam S .Farle~ .... P.amph13t p .4$. 
14~ B.D. VIII Nos. 0,54 and 111. 
15~ ibid; no.149. · . 
16 ~ ibid. nos .41 and $6 •. 
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possibility she ran the risk of being accused of threats and 
bringing pressure to bear on Japan. 1$ Chamberlain's resultant 
policy was one of no responsibilit~es, and no liabilities. Only 
on the principle of her treaty rights to China would Britain stand 
firm, because she ran the risk of being accused of deserting her 
League Commitments by the United States and China. 19 Great 
Britain, was, within this framework, prepared for a "fair and 
comprehensive general settlement with Japan" in general peace e~forts 
on fair terms for a11. 20 If it had no tangible results, British 
policy at least stopped all British concerns from being attacked and 
bringing British trade to a standstill. 21 Hull in his Memoirs 
supports this policy "The policy pursued by the United States and 
other democracies did not, it is true, prevent Japan from continuing 
her war in China. But on the other hand it did prevent her from 
imposing her own peace on China. 
against her.n22 
It marshalled world opinion 
It became clear to the Japanese, that they could never hope to 
end the Incident by localizing the action. During 193$, therefore 
their objective was to try and break the back of Chinese resistance 
by capturing Hankow and Canton. Canton fell on 21st October and 
Hankow on 25th October 193$, but the Japanese postponed their 
invasion of South China possibly because of fear of complications 
with Great Britain, who owned Hong Kong and a territorial section 
of the Canton-Kowloon railway. In any case it was no coincidence 
that the Japanese invasion of Kwantung synchronized with the crisis 
in September 193$, when Britain was_preoccupied by an imminent danger 
war in Europe. Britain's inaction at this stage proved to the 
Japanese army that she was too strongly we~ded to peace, or unprepared 
for war, to oppose the Japanese attack on Canton, in spite of China's 
desperate need for aid. On the other hand Japan by her actions 
alienated the democracies who were steadily rearming. This, together 
18. ibid.No.25. 
19. ibid.No.64. 
20. ibid. 
21. Ibid.No.99· 
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with Russian recovery after the purges, and Japan~shuge financial 
drain in China, put Japan in a vulnerable position. 
During November and Decanber 1 938 the Japanese attitude 
continued to stiffen. · The Munich honeymoon had brought no lessening 
of tensi.on in Europe: In the East likewise it brought no relief. 23 
The second Konoye declaration of 22nd December enshrined western 
fears, and was in logical sequence to his other declaration of 
November. British protests increased especially concerning punitive 
measures taken against Tientsin. Chinese pleas for aid relayed 
through the British ambassador in China grew in volume, 24 especially 
after the fall of Canton. Outside the framework of the League they. 
emphasized the help which the .United States was giving them, to try 
to squeeze assistance out of Britain. Chiang Kai Shak emphasized 
to the West that Japan was vulnerable to embargoes, and would back 
down under the threat of war. "Great Britain" in Chinese eyes, 
"has ••• arrived at the 
longer be deferred."25 
put back until December 
moment when a decision on this point can no 
The date of the Kuomintang conference was 
to give Britain time to take a stronger line. 26 
Britain, declared Chiang, should dismiss the hope of saving anything 
from China, for it Japan won Asia Britain would save nothing at all. 27 
\lfuatever might have been the Chinese view, however, Chamberlain 
had no intention of radically altering British policy. As Halifax 
said on 19th October to Clarke-Kerr, "We do not at present anticipate 
that Japan will go to excessive lengths provided we maintain firm 
attitude." The Japanese invasion of South Western China he saw as 
. 
"an extension of an already existing situation and does not really 
confront us with a new problem.n 28 To Japan Britain on 14th January 
1939 declared the1r intention of adhering to the Nine Power Treaties, 
and that until Japan was more constructive in her proposals Britain 
was not prepared to modify her attitude. 29 It was, as Halifax said 
23. B.D. Vol.VIII No.338. 
24. ibid.No.1GO and 174. ·. 
25. ibilf. No.160. 
26. ibid. 
27. ibid.No.233 and ~96. 
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to Craigie on 5th January the very ambiguity of Konoye's remarks 
which alarmed both Britain and the United States.3° 
Britain hoped that because of the bad relations between 
America and Germany over the Jewish question the former would play 
a larger part in the Far East. Characteristic of the stiffer 
attitude displ~yed by the United· States was their discouragement 
of credits and the sale of munitions and planes to Japan.3 1 But 
concerted action was once again spoilt by the unilateral action 
which the Americans took over Japan~ proposed New Order. On 
6th October the United States sent a comprehensive note to Japan 
enclosing three demands concerning Japanese discriminations~ and 
hinted that if they were not complied with reprisals might follow.3 2 
The Americans received no official reply until 1Sth November,33 but . 
Japanese actions spoke louder than words.34 The development of their 
aggression had been systematic since the fall of Canton and Hankow in 
October. Britain's own note of 14th February followed the American 
note closely _35 
America's attitude towards joint action weakened British policy. 
This ,with the failure of Munich, lent support to Japanese belief 
that Britain would not stand up for herself. Against this there 
were signs of a more active British policy especially after the 
southward move of Japan. Britain had begun negotiations with America 
for a currency stabilization loan and credits for Japan in late 193S. 
This close contact continued.36 
During the early months of 1939 the worsening of the political 
scene in the Far East continued. The Japanese seized Ha,inan island 
in Febru~ry, and claimed the Spratley isles in March. This perturbed 
the Americans in the Philipines and the French in .. In:do-China. 
30. ibid. No.396. 
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The question which came under closer consideration in Britain, as 
a result, was the possibility of retaliation in the face of 
Japanese threats to Shanghai, Tientsin and the Yangtse trade. 
The most feasible form of retaliation was indirect in the shape 
of a currency stabilization loan on commercial credits to China. 
At the same time Britainoattempted to move the local talks being 
conducted between the Japanese army and the British consular 
authorities at Tientsin to the quieter atmosphere of Tokyo. 
Early in 1938 there were discussions in London between the 
United States Director of the War Plans division, Navy department, 
and his Brit ish counterpart. They had discussed the possibility 
of co-operation in the event of an Anglo-American war with Japan. 
At the time the Admiralty were prepared to send some ships to 
Singapore, but would not commit themselves to numbers.37 Unfortunately 
the state of Britain's naval preparedness prevented her from sending 
a large fleet to the East as it was needed in European waters. No 
British.fleet could go unless the danger of a simultaneous war with 
Germany had been eradicated. At the British foreign office the 
problem was seen as one between sending either part of her battle 
fleet to the Far East before aggression took place, or of sending 
it only after aggression had occurred. There were points against 
each solution. If the British fleet was split it might be over-
whelmed separately, as l3:'ritain could only send eleven capital ships 
against Japan's ten. Conversely if no fleet were sent until after 
aggression had taken place it could not be used to prevent the 
establishment of a new regime, and might be overwhelmed before it 
got there. It would moreover be in strange waters - always a 
disadvantage in naval warfare. Another argument put forward was 
that only a small number of ships in eastern waters would probably 
act as a deterrent to Japanese aggression.38 A small fleet was 
quite sufficient in view of the fact that Japan wo~ld not use all 
her fleet because 'of the fear of an American or Russian flank attack. 
37. Pearl Harbour Attack Pt.9. pp.4274-5. 
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The most obvious deterrent was obviously the possession of more 
capital ships, as with the number of ships available in the spring 
of 1939 the Far East could not be defended. Naval armament was 
therefore essential. 
American co-operation in naval matters was also essential. 
If as the Foreign office believed a small fleet at Singapore was 
the most effective deterrent, they also believed that an American 
contribution to naval strength, W1 ich seemed more than· possible 
in early 1939, would lessen the risks. The defence of the Far 
East they saw as a long term measure for the permanent defenye of 
British interests in the East, not merely as a means of "devising 
measures which would have any direct or immediate effect in 
inducing Japan to pay greater regard to British interests in China 
itself" as Craigie had inferred in a letter to the foreign office 
on 14th December 193$.39 In spite of the British ·desire for American, 
·naval support, and because of the threatening European situation, 
the British had to inform America on 22nd March 1939 that, while 
it had promised the Australian government to send a fleet to 
Singapore it now felt unable to do so. The Admiralty had decided 
it was impossible to send a fleet, however small, to the Far East, 
beca~se, even with their future strength, they had not sufficient 
naval power to equal the combined sbrength of Germany, Italy and 
Japan.40 The British decision was also influenced by the French 
government's assurance that if the British Mediterranean fleet 
was sent to the East it would not co-operate in any further opposition 
to Hitler in central and eastern Europe. Britain therefore asked 
America. if she would consider transferring her fleet back to the 
Pacific. On 15th April the United States ordered its fleet back 
to the Pacific. 
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.B' 
BRITAIN AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS. 
In June and July 1938 the Japanese secured the removal of the 
German military advisers from China. The Chinese, in view of their 
increasing impotence to resist the Japanese, and the reluctance of 
the western powers to contemplate anything smacking of embargoes 
appealed to the League in September. Britain had warned them 
against involving article 17 of the League Covenant as they knew 
the attitude of the League would be the same tm-vards China as it 
had been towards Abyssinia and Spain. Halifax counselled the 
Chinese to appeal to the League on grounds of humanitarian motives 
and request aid. This way British aid could be cloaked.41 
Britain also knew what Japan's reaction would be towards Britain's 
part at the League.42 She was in fact warned by Japan against · 
giving help to China under article 17, as this would damage any hopes 
of an Anglo-Japanese entente. As Halifax pointed out to Craigie 
on 1st September "the Japanese invariably affect surprise whenever 
an animal it attacks is so Yicious as to defend itself.43 On 
30th September, however, the League resolved that members were 
entitled to adopt individually the measures prescribed in article 
16. The Japanese immediately blamed Great Britain, and refused 
to co-operate with the League.44 
In reality the situation remained virtually unchanged. 
British policy was not affected. League action was fixed by the 
great powers and there was, as Halifax pointed out to Craigie on 
17th October no possibility of concerted ac~ion. While any member 
of the League was entitled to take action under article 16, no one 
was going to do so because there was no possibility of concerted 
action, which incidentally, Halifax added, it was the object of the 
1921 resolutions to secure.45 In any case on a purely academic 
4P. ibid. Nos.77 and 126. 41. ibid.No,.,77. 
43. I"bid.No.65. 
44. F.C.Jones op.cit. p.136. 
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point neither Japan or China had declared war, and without an 
official state of war existing article 16 could not be invoked.46 
In this way L·eague conunitment s were circumvented. 
On 17th January 1939 the Chinese again asked for more 
concrete steps to be taken under the previously accepted resolution~47 
~lthough Britain had again warned them of the result.4$ The Chinese, 
concious that too violent an appeal would have no response, made no 
mention of convening the Nine Power Conference or of the advisory 
committee of the League, but asked that a committee be set up to 
co-ordinate measures of assistance to China.49 Britain managed to 
resist the extension of the resolution to inc,lude the establishment 
of the commission for "co-ordinating such effective measures to 
repudiate the Japanese claim to set up a new order in the Far East.n50 
Britain's role was to endeavour to leave the position exactly as it 
was before. On 20th January the League council passed a resolution 
recalling previous resolutions, particularly those of 6th October 
1937 and 2nd February 1938.51 The very fact, however, that the 
League had met aroused Japanese resentment and she again blamed 
Britain. The army party used Britain's League commitments to 
accuse her of being behind the Chinese~sistence. 
In May the Chinese asked Britain and France to make a similar 
move to the American Pittman resolution.52 The Chinese Minister 
for foreign affairs also suggested to Clarke-Kerr that at t~e next 
session of the League council, due to meet on 22nd May 1939, "steps 
should be taken to set up a co-ordination committee composed of 
representatives of governments interested in the Far East, for 
instance ourselves (Britain) the French and Soviet to consider the 
question of imposing an embargo on supplies to Japan.n53 They 
pointed out that Japan's aims towards the western interests were 
clear, especially after the occupation of Hainan and the Spratley 
47,. B.D.VIII No.417. 53. ibid. 
48. ibid. No.425. 54. ibid.No 43 and For.Rel.of U.S. 1939 
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islands.54 But, as Howe pointed out to the Chinese ambassador. 
on 4th May "it was futile to expect the League to be able to take 
any positive concrete action in the sense desired ••• /the League/ 
••• was not in a position to adopt a policy of sanctions against 
any great power. The brunt ••• vmuld fall upon Britain ••• who 
would thus be exposed to the full fo~ of any counter-measures 
which a policy of sanctions might provoke." Great Britain was 
"not in a position to risk exposing herself to any such possibility. 
If the League had been in a position to take effective action against 
aggression, His Majesty's government would not now have been corr~.pelled 
to go outside the League framework in order to set up a barrier of 
anti-aggression forces which they were at present engaged in 
constructing. It. ·was also useless to consider any policy of 
sanctions against Japan in which the United States did not take part ."55 
And Britain's approach to America at this time proved their belief 
in the latters unwillingness for concerted action. 56 Thus although 
Britain was moving along the road to collective security, she would 
not do it through the League, and only in her own good time. Although 
the Japanese comp.lained of British and. American fortifications in 
the Pacific /at Singapore, Port Darwin, Alaska, the Wake, Midway, 
Johnston and Aleutian islands/; and although the two powers were 
inthe grips of a ne\'l situation, they had to tread carefully. All 
Britain could do at this stage was to reiterate her sympathetic 
consideration of Chinese requests in the League council. 
Nevertheless when the League did meet,the Chinese introduced 
a recow~endation asking "that a committee be set up to co-ordinate 
such measures already adopted.n57 Britain again restated her 
sympathy, but said that the time was inopportune for the establishment 
of a corrmitt ee. 5g Accordingly when the League passed its resolutions 
on 27th May they. merely restated the hope that Member states would 
55· ibid.Note 3. 
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consult with the Far East Advisory Connnittee and give effect to 
!resolutions already passed~59 The Chinese expressed disappointment, 
but "hoped that the action contemplated under the resolution would 
lead to more effective measures of assistance.n60 
During the conference the League also requested further 
information concerning the bombing of Chinese civilians by the 
Japanese. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics asked for 
publication of the details, and Britain agreed subject to the . 
approval of the government by whom the information was supplied.61 
Britain suspected China of trying to manoeuvre her "into becoming 
the spearhead of anti-Japanese propaganda," over supplying information 
on the bombing of China. 02 Halifax therefore, stipulated t~t 
Britain should not pass any more information than anyone else, and 
should concert with France and America on information. In Parlia~ent 
face-saving words were used declaring that Britain had warned Japan, 
of "the deplorable effects bombings would have on public opinion. n 
in Britain, and that she would "take such steps as ••• to bring 
the Japanese to recognize the futility of such bombardments.n63 
: C:i" 
BRITISH l'v1EDIATORY IviOVES IN THE SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT. 
One reason why the Chinese had been led to their invocation 
was · 
of articfe 17/by the renewed Japanese advance in Southern China, 
and the failure of moves for mediation which had started before 
the fall of Hankow~64 ·At that time the Chinese government had 
asked Britain for joint or parallel action to bring about'the 
cessation of hostilities. At the same time Tani, in charge of 
the Japanese ambassy in Shanghai, gave out unofficially what terms 
Japan might accept. 65 On this occasion Britain used her 'good offices~, 
90. ibid. No.125. 
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have 
not mediation as this might/ appeared as pressure to the Japanese. 66 
The British ambassador in Tokyo obje~ted to any joint offers of 
peace as he doubted American support, if the Japanese rejected 
British moves.67 In view of what Hull says in his Memoirs he was 
correct. 6g Craigie's own suggestion was one of private soundings. 
He also believed it w~s imperative to get the Chinese to ~gree to 
the Customs Agreement, and to give no further aid to tnem, if 
mediation with Japan was to be successful. In any case he was 
convinced that no rorm of mediation could save Hankow. 
Britain eventually did make private soundings.69 This, as the 
British ambassador in China pointed out, was not what China had 
originally asked for; theiz:- aim being a sharp public warning to 
Japan.7° Craigie, however, was not interested in sharp public warn-
ings but only conciliatory approaches. As it happened the British 
discovered that, although the Chin~se had stated·they had approached 
the United States in the sam~ vein, in fact, they had only asked 
Britain. Britain feared she would be made the spearhead for 
pressure on Japan and told China that the time was not opportune 
for mediatory proposals.71 
in October 193S 
With the fall of Hankow /hopes of mediation faded. Craigie 
had ·said that the Japanese would not talk peace until the· fall of 
Hankow.72 It was true1 to say that after its fall peace talks 
became even more unlikely. Britain therefore viewed Kano's peace 
proposals of October with scepticism especially the one referring 
to equality of opportunity in. China. 73 In view, however, of her 
inability to offer any alternative substitutes Britain, as Halifax 
said to Craigie on 26th October, had to follow up any peace proposals 
and keep the doors open to negotiation.74 Cons~quently BTitain 
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6'8.Hu~l op.cit.p.570. 
6·9.B.D.Vol.VIII No.21. 
?O.ibid .No .18. 
711.I'bid.No.21. 
7 2.i bid .No.171. 
7.3.ibid .No .178. 
?4.ibid. and 284. 
7·5.ibid.176. 
,. 
/ 5$ 
did follow up Kano's suggestion of an Anglo-German peace move,75 
but it came to nothing as the one of the previous year. Japan 
continued to declare that she was willing for peace,76 but her 
terms were couched in ambiguities like the Konoye declarations. 
As the British ambassador in Tokyo declared to the Japanese minister 
for foreign affairs on 17th February 1939 "the real bar to peace 
seemed to me to be in the character of the Japanese conditions of 
peace, and failure to reduce to more concrete terms the vague and 
ominous statements of 22nd December." It w<?.s he added · important 
to be more definite. 77 This was, of course, if the Japanese were 
sincere. 
.D 
BRITAIN AND THE ANTI-COMINTERN NEGOTIATIONS. 
Since the German-Japanese anti-comintern pact of 25th November 
1936 negotiations for a strengthening of this alliance had continued.?$ 
Negotiations, at first abortive, to join Italy and Japan together in 
a pact of this nature, materialized in a different form on 6th 
November 1937 when a protocol provided fort he accession of Italy 
to the German-Japanese pact. Agreement over "putting teeth into 
the pactn79 ~s prevented by th~ Japanese fear, felt particularly 
by her navy, that she would be dragged into a European war.80 Japan 
was prepared for any military agreement against 
Socialist Republics, but not against Britain. 
been particularly sensib~e of this. 81 
the Union of Soviet 
General Ugaki had 
The fall of Ugaki intensified rumours of an impending 
strengthening of the anti-comintern pact.82 Although ostensibly 
negotiations were directed against Russia, Britain was aware that 
Germany was trying to drag Japan into more general commitments. 
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On 4th October 1938 and 4th February 1939 Britain warned Japan 
what a strengthening of the anti-comintern would be taken to mean 
in the west, 83 and added that Japan would find a powerful opposition 
against her, against which the Germans and Italians would be useles~. 84 
Japan was aware of this danger, and realized that neither Italy nor 
Germany could afford her any help of military or naval significence 
in the Far East. This was underlined by the return of the 
American fleet to Pacific waters in April 1939. She denied, 
however, that the Pact was directed against Britain. At.the same 
time she realized the use of the threat, of signing an agreement with 
Germany, to induce the Democracies to abandon Chiang Kai-Shek. 
Britain was aware of the Japanese mentality regarding European 
commitments. But in view of the dangerous European situation and 
the active diplomacy of Ott and Oshima there was no guarantee that 
I the threat of a new alliance between Japan and Germany.would 
! remain a threat. 85 In: Tokyo· Craigie viewed the proposed alliance 
with alarm. It was his belief that as long as neither Great Britain 
or Japan conmitted an irrevocable act '!;;hey would become allies again. 
He s~w the proposed act as irrevocable, which would mean Japan would 
side with GermanyWhereas she had remained neutral at Munich. In 
his opinion Anglo-Japanese relations could not be left to drift until 
the China incident was over. He believed Britain was forced to 
adopt a definite conciliatory attitude towards Japan in the face of 
dangers elsewhere and lack of American support. This was a policy 
which dismayed Clarke~Kerr. The latter likewise believed that the 
contemplated Pact was of great danger. But he did not believe that 
the best way to prevent the alliance was to give way to Japan. 
This,he stressed, was the best wayto prove to Japan that Great 
Britain was not prepared to stand up for herself. But Craigie 
in a letter to Halifax on 2nd December 1938 said "it is difficult 
to judge from here which of these dangers - the entry of Japan into 
the triple alliance or the complete s,ubjugation of China to Japan's 
84. B.D.Vol.VIII Nos.473 and 491. 
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will - is the more actual or the more likely to be prejudicial 
to our ultimate security. Each danger appears to call for an 
opposite remedy. But at least this conculsion is inescapable, 
that, neither danger is likely to be averted by continuing along 
the present lines of alienating one party to this conflict without 
assisting the other.n86 The dangers of doing nothing would drive 
China towards Russia and Japan towards Germany. 
Halifax, while he agreed that the comtemplated pact was a 
danger in any form, doubted whether it was worthwhile paying a 
' 
sbustantial price, (like doing a deal over China) to dissuade 
Japan from entering into an alliance with Germany. Japan's policies 
were Eastern not European, and she would not want to be included in 
a European war. Any compromise, Halifax declared, would alienate 
America and arouse Chinese fears of abandonment.~? Point was given 
to his views by Arita's speech of 8th March 1938 regarding the 
necessity of western finance in China. The Tokyo correspondent 
of The Times remarking on this statement said: "The point of. this 
statement is the implicit declaration that Japan cannot sacrifice 
her relations with Great Britain, the United States and France, to 
the interests of her idealogical allies. The anti-comintern 
agreement serves certain aspects of her policy, but other aspects 
require the goodwill, or at least the acquiescence, of the Democracies. 
Japan, therefore, cannot equivo~ally enter the anti-democratic camp."8g 
Clarke-Kerr substantiated these views, and urged s~rong resistance 
to Japan. He also underlined the fact that the length of Chinese 
resistance depended on the support she could get from Britain.89 
The anti-comintern was a threat to Britain's possessions. 
and interests not only in Europe, but the Far East. She strove to 
break the alliance by trying to detach Italy from the Axis. These 
moves ended in failure in view of Mussolini's desire to show the 
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solidarity of the anti-comintern body after the Anglo-Italian talks.9° 
Chamberlain had also hoped that after Munich ·~he would be able to 
use the Germans and Italians, fresh from app~~,sement, 91 and mindful 
of the animosity of the United States over the. Jewish question, 92 
to. mediat·e in China. He also presumed that aermany, no less than 
Britain, did not desire an exclusive Japanese China.93 
On the other hand there were dangers in using G·ermany in the 
east, especially "at a moment when the American attitude towards 
Japan appears to be hardening .n94 Great Hritain had to balance 
mediation with Germany against the alienation of America and the 
latters SJ.spicions that we might "do a deal in the east." She sought 
to set the Americans at ease by assuring them that the recent 
reassuring messages implying a peaceful settlement were Shigemitsu's, 
who was out of touch with opinions at home.95 
Thus by the spring of 1939 Chamberlain's attempt to split the 
Axis had 'failed. In fact, because of Japan's fear of Russia and 
the clashes at Nomonhan in May 1939 the danger of a strengthening 
of the pact was more serious than ever. G·ennany, however, had 
tired of. waiting. On 22nd May it was announced that Italy and 
Germany intended to sign a political and military pact. But the 
German's still attempted to gain Japan's adherence to the agreement. 
Japan had still failed by the spring of 1939 in her ~rinciple 
objective which was to bring such pressure to bear on Britain through 
the threat of strengthening the pact, that she would be forced to 
collaborate with Japan in China. One of the reasons was that 
Britain still clung to the slim hope of Anglo-American co-operation. 
"Any compromise, moreover, which gave Japan what she wanted in 
North China and left us in possession of a substantial portion of 
our investments and tradein a weakened, but independent reminder, 
would, apart from other considerations, be out of the question, 
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unless it received the improbable concurrence of the United States, 
with whom we have been trying for some time to pursue a parallel 
policy.n96 
If .Japan threatened to join a strengthened anti-comintern 
pact.' in order to force Britain to co-operate in China, she viewed 
the Anglo-Russian talks, which started in April 1939, as a threat 
to her own safety in the east.97 Russia was the one power whose 
intervention in China she feared. The Czechoslovak question had 
dragged Russian into Europe, and into negotiation with Britain. 
Russia bridged Europe and Asia, and Japan feared that any entente 
between her and Britain would include the Far East~ Japan was 
caught between two stools. On the one hand she wanted to strengthen 
the anti-comintern; on the other she played down the German desire 
for a general military alliance aimed at the west, as this would 
have driven B~ritain and Russia together. This did not mean, however, 
that Britain could use the Russian talks as a bargaining counter in 
the Far East, as G:ermany exploited the talks for her own ends. 
Jcpan . .al.leged that it was Britain' s intent ion to extend the proposed 
Anglo-Soviet agreement and the non-aggression system to ·include 
th.~ Far East. 98 Germany promised that she would occupy Russia 
in Europe, and consequently leave the Japanese unmolested to solve 
such baffling problems as the international settlemen~99 
Japan's fears were not completely unfounded, as Russia wanted 
an agreement in the east as well as in Europe. But, as Hal if ax 
pointed out to Craigie on 26th April,at present the scope of 
negotiations dealt only with aggression in Europe and Great Britain 
was pressing her own proposals against the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics. "Great Britain had still not abandoned hope of friendly 
relations with Japan and were not li~ely to take any step calculated 
to prejudice this unless compelled to do so by force of circumstances. tt1C 
9?. B.D.Vol VIII No.586 and Vol.IX Nos.20,24: for Anglo-Russian Talks of B.D. 
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To the Japanese ambassador Halifax said on 16th May 1939 that any 
ultimate ttagreement will relate only to aggression in Europe and 
101 
not ••• the Far East·"· It was most important for Britain to 
make quite clear to Japan that this was not to be used as an 
argument for deterring Japan from joining the German-Italian 
alliance. 
.threats. 
Britain dare not lay herself open to the accusation of 
Unfortunately for Chamberlain the negotiations with Russia had 
their own complications, as he had by May 1939 given guarantees 
to Russia's weaker neighbours, Poland and Ruma.nia. As Halifax 
pointed out to the Japanese ambassador on 27th April Brit-ain "had 
been seeking a policy which would, on the one hand, not deprive the 
forces of resistance to aggression of Russian help, and, on the 
other hand, not to prejudice the position of the countries in 
question and not give Germany an-. excuse to say we were following 
a policy of encirclement. We had also to be careful not to 
... 
arouse wspicion in quarters which were suspicious of Russian help." 102 
Japan refused to sign the military alliance with Germany 
because it would involve them in the west. This did not mean how-
ever that she had dropped her ideas of strengthening her alliance 
against Russia. 103 Neither had Britain dropped the idea of a tie 
with Russia. Craigie counselled against it as he believed Britain 
would be "risking making a certain enemy of Japan (whose powers must 
not be und~$imated) only to gain a very uncertain friendship in 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics." 104 The obverse was of 
course true also. If Britain lost the friendship of Russia or 
the chan,qe of making an alliance, she w::>uld gain only a very uncertain 
friendship in Japan. But Craigie did not mention this. In fact 
it was Chamberlain's failure to come to any agreement with Russia 
which gave G.ermany·a free hand in the spring of 1939, and allowed 
the partition of Poland. Neither did the absence of any Russian 
agreement improve Anglo-Japanese relations. 
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The exasperation of the extremists in Japan at their 
failure to secure a full military pact with Germany led them to 
make a concerted drive against British interests in China especially 
on the Yangtse and in Shanghai. 105 The British foreign office attached 
some importance to rumours that the outcome of the struggle over 
British rights in China would decide whether Japan would or would 
not join the Axis alliance. 106 This explained in some part British 
determination not to give way if pos·sible. In a letter to Craigie, 
Sir A.Cadogan declared British policy spould therefore be one of 
indifference and Britain should not appear gratified or vica-versa. 
Britain should also hint that Italy's fleet could not contain the 
British fleet in the Mediterranean, ·nor German aid help her in the 
event of.war with Russia. 107 . 
It was,however, natural that t_q·e Japanese should keep their 
alliance as a perpetual threat to Great Britain. Consequently 
when the Tokyo talks showed signs of foundering Craigie on 
t 
11th August, reported renewed agitation on the part of the army 
for the alliance. 10g 
"But the event which was finally destined to take the alliance 
question oqt of Japanese politics for a whole year was the conclusion 
of the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact on 23rd A~gust, 1939.n 109 
In 'Britain It removed the corner stone of Japan's foreign policy. 
110 it raised hopes that the hands of the moderates would be strengthened, 
and America suggested that because Japan's disappointment would be 
strong, now was the time for Britain to get an agreement. 111 It was 
clear that the moment was opportune to try anddetach Japan from 
Germany. 112 The Nazi-Soviet pact while being a blow to British 
diplomacy, assisted her in the Far East. in that it made it unlikely 
that Japan would enter any European war, and create a war on two fronts. 
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On the other hand it must have been obvious to Japan that because 
of the pact BTitain would be unable to defend her interests in the 
east. Thus America's attitude assumed even greater importance in 
Japanese eyes, because Britain now depended upon her for protection 
in the east.. Ethically Japan might have felt offended by the 
Nazi-Soviet pact; and drawn towards the west: Practically it could, 
in fact was, used by the army to strengthen their efforts in China. 
E 
THE BRITISH POSITION IN HANKOW - OCTOBER 193$ 
- JUNE 1939. 
In her settlements and concessions throughout China B.ritain was 
faced with a hundred local situations. Local British policy was 
therefore somewhat disjointed as it struggled to find local expedients 
in the general framework of British policy. 
At Hankow the British authorities in 193$ found themselves in 
:3e-fa etc control of the former British concession. This was the 
special administrative district 3 (S.A.D.3) which had ~"t>een governed 
under joint Anglo-Chinese control. British forces had prevented 
the destruction of Hankow by the retreating Chinese. This did not, 
however, make the Japanese show any increased respect for foreign 
rights,and restrictions against trade and shipping were. promulgated. 
The situation, in fact, threatened to go the same way as Na~~ing, 11 3 
and the Japanese had policed the S.A.D.3 with their own military 
policy. 114 Britain protested in a note of 9th November 193$ that· 
this was in contravention of the 1927 agreement, 11 5 and requested 
the Japanese nto take such steps as may be necessary to ensur,e that 
nothing is done which would infringe these rights.n 116 ' Notwith-
standing Efritain' s firm attitude, 11 7 these rights were already 
11 g infringed as Britain had already agreed to the pass system. 
114.ibid.No.391. 11~. ibid.No 399. 
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As the Japanese consolidated their power around Hankow they 
demanded the removal of Dupree, the director of the bureau of the 
S.A.D.3. In his place they wanted a Chinese director who would 
be under their control. In return they promised to return 
control of the bureau's executive rights to the municipal police. 
If Britain had agreed it would have meant acquiescing in the 
deprivation by Japan of the bureau's executive powers- namely the 
police. Britain therefore considered reaching a 'modus vivendi' 
by accommodating ~apan with the voluntary resignation of Dupree~ 11 9 
But because they doubted Japanese assurances the local British 
authorities believed it was not worth the risk of conceding to 
their threat of force, or of making unilateral Japanese proposals, 
under the threat of force a basis of discussion. 120 It was also 
the foreign office opinion that to bargain with the Japanese 
compromised Britain towards accepting the puppet Chinese which she 
could never accept. Britain~ interests were to be best served by 
preserving her legal position and not negotiating. Because the 
whole affair concerned British merchant interests, it was decided 
.that, as they and the British consular authorities considered the 
Japa~ese terms inadequate, negotiations were to be abandoned. 121 
It was eventually, in June 1939,decided to await events. 122 
.R 
THE BRITISH POSITION IN SHANGHAI AUGUST 193$-1940 
By the autumn or 1938 conditions in the international settlement 
of Shanghai had deteriorated, 123 although the situation was not as 
bad as at Tientsin. Britain was afforded a certain protection as 
international interests were involved, and Japan had to use more 
caution. The Japanese had proposed a new· 'E' division which would. 
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have given them control over part of the waterfront. 124 While 
this differed from the councils original proposal the British 
consul at Shanghai considered that Britain must be prepared to 
consider it if negotiations on the commissioner's map failed. 
Meanwhile the Japanese pressed for "early negotiations.n 125 
At the same time the Japanese also demanded on 4th November 
a reorganization of the municipal police with increased Japanese 
participation. 126 It was _obvious that the Japanese would not 
leave t-he northern parts of· the international settlements which 
they occupied unless some consideration was given to their demands, 127 
although they had previously promised full return of the municipal 
councils perogatives. 128 There were good reasons why Britain should 
accept. Clarke-Kerr pointed out thatttin return for ••• police 
reorganization ••. already overdue ••• a defi~ step will be made 
towards reassertion of the councils' authority and restoration of 
confidence in an area where many Chinese have resumed residence, 
and foreigners, including British, are doing so in increasing 
numbers. This will moreover have been gained without any concession 
on other important issues such as that of the settlement courts.n 129 
It would also have meant, if Japanese promises were in good faith, 
the removal of restrictions. 
Until some form of agreement was reached there could be as 
Clarke-Kerr said no attempt at a general clearing up of the 
enclaves or the assumption of control by the municipal council. 
Any independent action in this respectwould have provoked a major 
storm. 13° What the Japanese were hoping for was "that the Shanghai 
municipal council may be enticed into co-operation with the puppet 
municipality.n 131 This is~ in fact, what was happening. 132 ·,The 
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British foreign office view was that co-operation with the puppet 
municipal authorities was a good idea from the standpoint of the 
welfare of the British in the concession, "provided the British 
authorities are not directly involved. 133 They considered that 
"the suggested arrangement would not appreciably affect the 
general course of the campaign, and the influence likely to be 
exercised by a hardening of the Anglo-American. attitude is too 
uncertain to justify the rejection of limited local measures for 
the immediate safeguarding of foreign interests.n 134 It was a:J_l 
the more urgent in the fac~ of renewed Japanese threats, 135 who 
were genuinely perturbed at the loss of members of the puppet 
Chinese government by political assassination. 136 
The Japanese believed, and there was probably some forc·e 
behind the belief, that "there was a strong suspicion that terrorist 
activities are being carried out to cause a direct clash between 
Japan and the municipal council and also with some third power -
especially Great Britain, and therefore both sides should be careful 
not to be trapped by such sinister strategy.n 137 In fact the 
Japanese had not as much to lose from these incidents as_Great 
Britain who suffered the most. On the suggestion of Clarke-Kerr 
the British corisul general at ChungKing approached Chiang Kai-Shek 
in February 1939 and requested "him to use his influence which 
proved to be effective last time, to persuade those responsible 
(for the murders) to 1 lay off'", and stdp embarrassing the British 
government. 13$ The Americans sent a similar request. 139 
140 . The murders did not stop however and the Japanese continued 
to use them as a pretext to accuse the settlement council of neglect. 
As a result the council decided in February that the situation "was 
becoming too big for the council to handle" and asked for support 
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141 from the interested powers. One of the powers, however, had 
already thrown in her hand. This was Italy who, in February, 
granted the Japanese the use of their concession at Shanghai. 142 
This the Japanese proceeded to use as a lever to force Britain to 
desert her obligations in China. Both Britain and America made 
oral representations on 2:$th February a-nd 26th respectively against 
force being used to deal with questions relating to the international 
settlement. 143 There was little doubt that the Japanese were 
trying to.gain by.forcible measures "a larger share in the administra-
tion ••• His Majesty's government take a very grave view of such 
action on their part~44 It was probably the realization that 
unilateral action in Shanghai would bring them into conflict with. 
the United States as well as Great Britain, that forced the 
Japanese milit~ry to negotiate,at.the same time keeping up the 
pressure on Britain. 145 . 
The municipal council agreed to bring the Japanese branch of 
the municipal police up to strength as soon as recruits could be 
obtained, but refused quite definitely to allow independent Japanese 
police action within the settlement. 146 Co-operation was essential, 
but not as a result of intimidation. . The Japanese refused to 
accept their reply and on 2$th February reinsisted on the same five 
demands together with Hideka's proposals of November and December 
193$. 14 7 They also demanded immediate implement~tion of their 
claim to have a senior Japaqese police officer in the municipal 
police force. Such was the threat that the council considered 
invoking the assistance .of the treaty power consuls, and backed by 
the British and American governments- they refused. On 4th March· 
"a working understanding for co-operation has bee.n reached which 
••• does not impair the authority of the council.n 14$ 
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This agreement caused the Japanese some trouble. They did 
not publicize the agreement with the municipal council because 
they feared the army extremists would accuse them of backing down. 
Consequently they fabricated reports stating that the Shanghai 
municipal council had reached an agreement with them, and that in 
future the Japanese authorities would try all persons committing 
anti-Japanese acts within·the settlement. This report alarmed 
the Chinese, 149 and Britain had to quieten their fears by stating 
that, while the council had promised to hand over criminals acting 
against the accused forces- no one else was included. 15° The 
Shanghai municipal council also issued a communique on 14th Marc~ 
to avoid misrepresentation, on denying agreement over such questions 
as the Land Regu~ations, and the right of the Japanese to search 
in the settlement. 151 These reports were said to be a "malicious 
fabrication." 152 
In Parliament the Earl of Plymouth said on 1st March 1939 
"that the British government were continuing to watch the situation 
closely and were prepared to afford the council such advice and · . 
. support as may .from time to time be possible." The British and 
American governments had already drawn the attention of the Japanese 
government to the fact that they were interested in the discu.ssions 
proceeding between the consular and Japanese authorities at 
Shanghai. 153 How closely the situation needed watching was 
exempBfiedwhen the British foreign office received a report on 
31st March that about thirty Japanese poli·ce were s~aying in the 
Yangtse·hotel, thereby setting up a virtual independent gendarmerie 
in the concession. The munbipal council protested against this 
violation of the recent agreement for co-operation, but the 
gendarmes .still remained. 154 
The Japanese had only agreed to a temporary settlement in 
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the first place as they believed that the time was not far distant 
when they would be able to take over control of the council by 
constitutional means, as a result of their increased voting strength 
because of the revision of the land regulations. As the European 
situation worsened the consequent diversion of attention away from 
th-e east encouraged Japan to accentuate her pressure on the intere·sts 
of the democratic powers, particularly Great Britain, who obstructed 
her.155 
On 2na May the Japanese renewed their demands for the 
suppression of anti-Japanese acts, and a Japanese officer to be 
in charge of the HongKew and Yangtsepoo police. 156 They also 
supported demands made by the Chinese puppet authorities at 
Shanghai that the settlement's Chinese courts as well as the title 
deeds to property and other documents of the Chinese land office 
be turned over to their regime. 157 On 3rd May the Japanese 
handed the British ambassador an aide memoire relating to their 
demands at Shanghai. A similar note was handed to the American 
ambassador on the same day. 158 Among ether desiderata~ they demanded 
the revision of the land re'gulations which formed the legal basis 
of the settlement's administration. 159 The Shanghai municipal 
council declared itself,.·. willing to agree to such demands, as did 
not encroach upon its administrative independence, issued a 
declaration forbidding political activities and proclaimed their 
neutrality in the Sino-Japanese ~onflict. 160 But they were not 
prep~red to revise the land regulations. 
The British government likewise rejected the Japanese demands 
on 19th May~61 similar to the American note on 18th May. 1Q2 .Joint 
action had,as usual, been ruled out by the Americans who were 
prepared to make "synchronized and similar- but not indentic"notes~ 6 3 
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Both governments held that the revision of the land regulations 
should await more stable conditions in Shanghai. Britain also 
said that she was prepared to consider only " constructive 
proposals free of any political ulterior motives," 164 and she 
would view seriously "any attempt on the part of any one interested 
power taking advantage of external conditions to prejudice the 
international character of the settlement.n 165 The Japanese 
rejected the British protest on 24th May and claimed the right to 
forcibly seize anti-Japanese persons in foreign concessions because 
the latter were Chinese, and China was occupied by Japan. 166 Both 
the Hritish and Americans verbally protested against this 
declaration. 167 
The danger of the Japanese taking over control of the Shanghai 
council by constitutional means became a serious threat in 1939. 
The British consul reported on 5th June that the present serious 
increase in voting strength would give them control of the settlement 
by April 1940. The only solution seemed to b~ a drastic one. 
This was put forward by Mr. Arnhold who suggested that the council 
should refuse to collect taxes from a line drawn to the west of 
Ward road gaol to the north of HongKew·park, and that the land 
regulations be declared no longer operative in these areas. This 
would have deprived the Japanese in t~-~eas of the right to vote 
in the council elections. 16$ There is little doubt that this would 
have aroused Japanese anger and the danger of force. As it was, 
as the year progressed, Shanghai became the subject of increased 
Japanese pressure, 169 and the only solution tothe increased lawless-
ness in the Japanese areas appeared to "be by the use of force. 
The British and American council members were against this however,_ 
and in any case the ultimate decision rested with His Majesty's 
government • 
168. ibid.No.92 (enclosure) 
16§. ibid.No.117 and China Association op.cit.p.54. 
16~. Ibid.Nos.152 and 165. 
16~. Ibid.No.151. 
169. ibid.No.234. 
17<?. ibid.Nos.63 (note 1) and 80. 
73 
The situation worsened gradually until the outbreak of, the 
European war. But it was not until August 1940 when British 
troops were withdrawn from Northern China that Britain also 
withdrew her troops from 'B' and 'D' sections of the international 
settlement. Japan was given 'D' ·section and America 'B' .. sectio.n. 
Things remained like this until the outbreak of the Pacific war. 
Kawai' s remarks of 24th May concerning the right to for.ci bly 
enter concessions were given substance by the delicate situatio.n 
which arose in the small international settlement on the island 
of Kulangsu. On 11th May 1939 Hung Li-Hsun, the pro-Japanese 
eha±nnan of the Amory chamber of commerce was assassinated. 17° On 
t~e following day two hundred Japanese marines landed to conduct 
a search for the culprits. Britain instructed Craigie to protest, 
either in concert with his French and American colleagues - or alone. 
Following this action the Japanese presented the Kulangsu municipal 
council with sweeping demands. 171 The council refused all these 
demands except the ones dealing with the suppression of terrorism, 172 
and protested against the Japanese action. 
It was obvious to all the interested powers that Japan was 
using, Kulangsu as a test case for ~hanghai, and the murder of 
Hung as a pretext for using force: If they could obtain their 
ends by force they might have tried the same tactics at Shanghai. 
Consequently apart from the protests made at Tokyo and to the 
Japanese authorities in China, Great Britain, America and France 
sent warships and landing parties t.o Kulangsu _on 17th May. The 
Japanese denounced this action as unfriendly. o In fact the Japanese 
were 'checkmated. They had been indirectly warned of the 'serious 
consequences to Anglo-Japanese relations which would follow if they 
tried a similar coup in the international-settlement of Shanghai. 173 
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The Japanese tried to force the Kulangsu council to yield by 
cutting off food supplies from the mainland, and by maintaining 
a virtual sta.te of seige. Since, however, they did not prevent 
supplies from reaching the island in foreign ships the council was 
able to hold out until the Japanese dropped their major demands. 
In their resistance they were backed by the British andAmerican 
governments. 174 An American suggestion that their landing party 
be withdrawn175 was fortunately defeated by United States iocal 
and naval opinion in August. 176 It would have had the unfortunate 
effect of leaving the British troops in Kulangsu to face Japan 
alone·, which Hritain had to avoid at all costs. 
· On the outbreak of the European war Great Britain and France 
ithdrew their landing parties from Kulangsu, but the United States 
ontigent remained. On 17th October 1939 agreement' was reached 
between the Kulangsu municipal council and the Japanese consul 
general, and approved by the consular body. The council agr~ed 
to appoint additional Japanese members to the police force and 
to co-operate with the Japanese in suppressing terrorism. But 
it maintaiped its administrative rights unimpaire·d. O,n the day of 
the signature of the agreement the United States and Japanese forces 
were simultaneously withdrawn.~ 77 
In prot~cting her interests in the international settlements 
Britain had to resort to ether means than the use of force. The 
British did however contemplate the retaliation as a .possible,if 
unfortunate eventuality. This raised the question of what British 
action would be, presuming that military resistance in the settlement 
was out of the question. 
Sir Robert Craigie in a letter to Sir A. Cadogan on 23rd May 
declared that "some sort of immediate retaliatory action would 
I 
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be essential." This had the advantage of doing something before 
Britain was faced with a fait accompli. 178 In ,considerations of 
this sort, however, America was the deciding factor, and it was 
clear that at that time she was averse to pressure. 179 This was 
due to the Japanese drive to put Japanese-American relations on a 
better footing in order to drive a wedge in the Anglo-American 
alliance. 180 Halifax doubted if any attempt to put pressure on 
the United States to follow a firmer line would have anyr effect. 
In the light of past e_vents it had been proved that the United 
States only helped those who helped themselves, and that in any 
action of this sort Britain would have to step out alone, as the 
best means of encouraging the United States to follow. 181 ·such 
action could never be contemplated by Britain except under extreme 
circumstances. 182 
There vJas fortunately an obverse side to the coin. America 
not have been prepared for joint action with Britain. On the 
her hand nei~her was she unaware of Japanese ambitions. By 
large "the Japanese failed to attain their major objectives 
Shanghai and Kulangsu because they encroached upon the interests 
all the other major treaty po\'Jers, and had met with collective 
In particular the United States was involved in the 
ence of the international settlements and the Japanese government 
of provoking her .n 183 
G 
THE BRITISH POSITION IN TIENTSIN AUGUST 1938-14th JUNE 1939. 
During 1937-38 the Japanese had been building up a body 
complaints against the governing bodies of the British and 
ench concessions at Tientsin. Th~ year 1938-39 reproduced the 
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gri·evances of the previous year only at a quicker pace. 184 . The 
problem which was to be the immediate cause of conflict - the 
ques.tion of handing over men to the Japanese authorities - brought 
into relief the differing ideas of Britain and Japan, concerning 
justice and human rights. With increased Japanese pressure came 
loss of trade. This, in itself, raised the question of retaliatio~~ 5 
N-ritain howe-yer as Craigie pointed out 11 could do nothing by herself, 
which would incur the risk of war." It was of the greatest 
importance to take parallel action with America at every step, as 
Britain stood alone at Tientsin whereas at Shanghai she could rely 
on American support. 186 
The most serious threat to the conce.ssion came on 
1st September 1938 when the Japanese announced their intention of 
evacuating their own nationals from the concession, 187 and increased 
their restrictive measures. This they did because of the firm western 
-attitude over the .currency and silver issues. The. evacuation was slow 
at first, but although temporarily halted and excused with vague 
statements,it continued. By December 1938 it had been cornpleted.The 
Rritish foreign office recognized the "probability of a serious 
move against t.he Tientsin concessions", which would "be the first 
step in a carefully prepared programme for the destruction of our 
political position in China.n 188 On 13th December the Japanese 
declared that they had decided to erect barriers as from the 14th 
and the searching of Chinese to prevent anti-Japanese persons leaving 
the concessions. 189 They asserted that the measures were taken 
because of lack of co-operation on the part of the concession 
authorities. Ferries were stopped and the searching, even of 
foreigners, became rigourous. 19° At the request of the Japanese 
Britain permitted her subjects to carry passports for Japanese 
inspection, but further should would not go. 191 • 
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During January and February conditions deteriorated. Conciliation 
by the Tokyo cabinet did not mean a cessation of indignities by 
the Japanese army in Tientsin. 192 The British and French protests 
of 24th December193 had only resulted in a temporary relaxation 
of searching, and by March this had been re-enforced :• until Britain 
took up a position in conformity with the new situation in China. 194 
This would have included, amongst other things, the permission for 
the Japanese "police to be allowed to act freely in the British and 
French concessions which naturally we cannot agree to" 195 
But the question which v-Jas to arouse the most controversy was 
that of the internees. The British authorities had interned persons 
suspected of terrorist activi~s against the Japanese. Chief among 
these was Ssu Ching wu196 arrested at the end of September 193$. 
While the Japanese never produced evidence against him they had 
demanded that he be handed over to their local authorities which 
th.e British refused to do. An alternative solution that he be 
removed to Hong Kong or Shanghai197 was rejected 't;>y the Japanese 
in February. 198 Instead on 16th March 1939 they demanded the 
removal of Li Han-Yuan, the Deputy chief of police and four police 
suspected of anti-Japanese activities. 199 Thus the problem of the 
removal of political offenders became inextricably mixed with that of 
the composition of the police force, and later with the question of 
silver stocks and the currency issue. 
The British ambassador to China in a letter of 1st March to 
Mr.Jamieson the consul at Tientsin believed it advisable to shelve 
the idea of removing Ssu elsewhere as it would provoke the Japaaese.200 
But the British foreign minister in a letter to Clarke-Kerr on 
25th February thought that as the removal of internees had only been 
dependent on the bettering of conditions inthe concession (which had 
193. ibid.No.449. 
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not occurred) 201 Britain should remove Ssu along with the others 
regardless of Japanese wishes. 202 It would indeed have made 
little difference to the Japanese plan as they had decided to push 
the British out of Tientsin. The worsening situation· brought 
protests from the British on February ~8th and March 5th concerning 
the erection of barricades on 1st March, both of which remained 
unanswered. 203 
Chamberlain and Halifax had to hope that by keeping in constant. 
touch with the Japanese in Tokyo and China she would, by negotiation, 
lead Japan away from the ~e of force. Local meetings were in 
fact taking place during the period of increased Japanese pressure 
in March. 204 It was through these meetings that the Japanese placed 
their demands which led to the later talks in Tokyo. 
Talks did not however mean conciliation. It was the opinion 
of the Tientsin. consular authorities that the Japanese would hardly 
have gone to the expense of erecting costly fenc.es and customs 
. . 
houses around the concession if they expected any amelioration of 
.the situation.205 In order to try and lessen the tension the 
British began to think in terms of some form of compromise over·the 
question of Japanese gendarmerie intra-concession liason. The 
same point was under discussion at Shanghai and there was the danger 
that if the Shanghai municipal authorities agreed it would be hard 
for the consuiar authorities at Tientsin "to resist ••• application 
of these points in some fo~ or other." Tientsin, declared the 
British consul Mr.Jamieson, must "not be taken as a precedent for 
Tientsin.n206 At this stage the latter was in favour of a firm 
attitude, and believed that more Parliamentary speeches like those 
of February and March207 will make the Japanese think twice before 
· h th h · · d n208• carry1ng out w atever purpose ey ave 1n m1n • 
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The Japanese, however, made no effort to alter their course 
until Britain adopted a "new attitude in conformity with the new 
situation"·. 209 Consequently British protests concerning the 
s~arching ·of her nationals in IVIarch would have little effect. 210 
Craigie.believed that protests on national lines were bound to fail 
and in a letter to Halifax on 23rd March stated that "only locally 
will it be possible to bring about any real improvement .n 211 
The foreign office took/Nfs suggestion to send Piggott to Peking and 
Tientsin to try and ease the local situation. 212 . 
As it happened the Japanese stopped searching for old notes 
and consequently the plan which the British had been planning in 
consultation with the Americans and French was not made. 21 3 But 
the barricade remained, and the danger of a frontal attack over 
the British refusal to hand over political internees became more 
imminent, 21 4 when, on 9th April the first political murder occurred 
within the British concession, 21 5 and raised fresh Japanese demands, 
and fresh British problems, concerning the treatment of political 
·offenders. The victim was Cheng Lienshih the Chinese manager of 
the federal reserve bank. Four members of the Chinese route 
army were arrested as·suspects and two, when handed over to the 
Japanese confessed, but lat.er retracted their statements when returned 
to the British. 216 
The British ambassadorsin Tokyo and China had differing views 
on the question of political offenders. Craigie favoured expelling 
or handing over criminals,.21 7 while Clarke-Kerr, although he admitted 
Chinese actions had compromised the neutrality of the concession, 21 S 
objected because he was averse to being "hustled by the need for 
haste or by Japanese threats, and because he knew what their fate 
' 219 
would be in Japanese hands. 
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Jamieson, the consul general at Tientsin, however, pointed out 
that "granting asylum within the concession was inconsistent with 
strict neutrality," and considered that the Japanese were justified 
in believing Britain was helping the Chinese if she upheld her 
. 220 
attitude. The British foreign office attempting to steer a 
diplomatic course declared that it had no legal authority to deport 
the internees to Hong Kong, but agreed with the British ambassador 
to China that· Britain was compelled to suppress political terrorism 
within its concession. 221 Lord Halifax also stated that in 
' 
.existing cases persons should be expelled, and in future cases 
either expelled or handed over to the de facto authorities, according 
to the seriousness of their offence. 222 This did not satisfy the 
Japanese, who required the immediate handing over of the four 
. 223 
suspected assassins. Craigie and Jamieson agreed with their 
demands. 224 As a result and in order to gain time the foreign 
secretary declared that "the whole question of disposal of political 
agitators in the concession has been under review by the foreign 
office.n225 
Britain meanwhile sought Chinese assurances that terrorists 
would not ·cause the concessions any further embarrassment. On 
6th June the nationalist government gave their assurance, 226 adding 
that they hoped Britain would not hand over the internees. 227 
Halifax reminded the Chinese ambassador of their assurances of last 
July, and of the March 11th notification of His Majesty's consul 
general at Tientsin, 22g and declared on 7th June in a letter to 
Clarke-Kerr that the Chinese had no cause for complaint if Britain 
did give way. He added that "any action.by the Chinese government 
which might expose concessions to the risk of being taken over by 
the Japanese was most unwise since foreign concessions admittedly 
constituted one of the great.est obstacles to Japanese economic plans 
in China." Britain saw no reason why she should carry the can for 
220. ~:Nos.64 note,142 and 180. 
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the Chinese. 229 The Japanese, however, were not prepared to wait 
either for ~ British reconsideration of their attitude towards 
political internees or Chinese promises. On 1st June Jamieson 
reported that they had handed an ultimatum to the British authorities, 
which stipulated, that unless they received an answer in the affirmative, 
concerning the handing over of the four men, before 7th June they 
would assume a British refusal, and take appropriate action. 
Halifax, while he declared the British government were prepared to 
hand over two other men found in unlawful possession of bombs, 231. 
saw no reason to hand over the four men as he had "never been 
supplied with any evidence which would justify me in handing these 
men over to the Japanese or local authorities," and he dismissed 
the confessions made by the prisoners in Japanese hands as "no 
evidence.n232 The British foreign office were in fact far·from 
convinced that the situation was as dangerous as Jamieson "makes out, n233 
and in a proclamation of 7th June at Tientsin234 urged Japan "to reflect 
whether the attainment of a local objective by such means is worth the 
serious repercussions in a wider political sphere that it will cause.n235 
On 6th June Craigie saw the minister for foreign affairs in 
Tokyo giving him the British decision not to hand over the four men. 236 
The Japanese replied that this refusal would produce a serious state 
of affairs in Tientsin.237 They followed this up by ordering 
Japanese and de facto government employees out of the concession. 
TheY also declared all Japanese goods were to be removed, and .the 
Yokohama Specie bank was told on 7th June to remove its business 
from the ~ritish concession within one week. 23S Zero hour the 
Japanese declared was to be 14th June or 15th, and on that date all 
British ships and cargo were to be stopped and the ingress and egress 
of British subjects was to be denied • 
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Owing to the seriousness of the situation the B'ritish foreign 
secretary suggested irmnediate expulsion of the four accused as the 
blockade would make the±r departure more difficult. 239 He was not, 
he said to Jamieson. on 10th June, prepared to listen at this late 
date to the latters arguments for handing over the men to the de 
facto authorities. 24° · In a letter to Craigie on 13th June Halifax 
declared that Britain could not afford to follow "rigidly" the legal 
procedure with criminals of a political nature. 241 Britain had 
political and moral obligations not only legal ones. 242 Meanwhile 
Britain protested to Japan on 10th June through their ambassador 
in Tokyo,, but received a reply that the handing over of the two men243 
was regarded as a trick to draw attention away from the main issue. 
rhey added that the instructions given to the British consul general 
were ambigious, and concluded that there was little reason for 
continuing the talks "but to take such measures as planned. 244 
·The British were impressed with the Japanese action, and tried 
to forstall the Japanese by gaining.time. On 13th June the 
Briti.sh government informed the counsellor of the Japanese embassy 
th~new evidence concerning the four men had come to light which 
they were considering, and they hoped Japan would see fit to lift 
the scheduled.blockade. 245 The foreign office requested all 
information·concerning the accusations against the men, and the 
circumstances in which their confessions had been extorted. 246 They 
wanted to be certain of the me~e guilt before handing them over to 
certain death. Their legal attitude did not however change. In 
letter to .Craigie on 14th June Halifax declared .-~?hat ''\fuatever may 
e .the pos~tion.-vis-a-vis the Chinese authorities, the Japanese 
ave of course no.legal right to intervene in a crime committed by 
ne Chinese or another in the British ~oncession. 247 The British· 
. . 
onsul in Tientsin while he admitted that nthe confessions were 
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probably obtained under dure~s" ·did not.consider that political 
motives should stand in the way of what, in his opinion, the 
legality of the Chinese court demanded. At Shanghai, he declared, 
there would have been enough evidence to .hand the men over. It 
was not necessary he added to have prima facie evidence of their 
guilt· in order to hand them over, and it was "no concern of mine" 
what the charge was.248 But the British secretary of state after 
considering the information came to the conclusion that this "did 
not jus.tify any change in policy with regard to the men in question.n249 
While this recommendation of evidence was in progress the 
British tried to find some other way out of the deadlock by finding 
a solution acceptable to both sides presuming retaliation to be out 
of the q ue.stion. Consequently when Cla~ke-Kerr suggested on 10th 
June an ad hoc concession court tribunal, it was eagerly grasped. The 
court would consist of one British, o~e Japanese and a neutral judge to 
ascertain, not if the men were guilty, but whether there was enough 
evidence to warrant handing the men over.25° At the same time 
there was the possibility that America might act as a ~eqiator or use 
her good offices in the Tientsin dispute. The Japanese, on 10th 
June, had approached the Americans with the request that the 
United States consul general use hisgpod offices at Tientsin. 251 
The foreign office viewed this idea more favourably than the 
ribunal, provided " a suitable opportunity arises and without giving 
he impression that we look to the United.States of America to 
xtricate ourselves from our difficulties," and Halifax on 13th June 
equested the British ambassador in Washington to sound the United 
tates on the idea.252 
Meanwhile Britain stated her willingness "that a committee of 
ndepende~t and reputable-persons should be convened to study the 
uestion on the spot and ••• I ••• (Halifax) ••• would undertake to be 
48. ibid.Nos.180,200 and 205. 
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guided by their advice.n253 On the advice of Jamieson254 the 
suggestion was put in Tokyo on 13th June by the United States255 as 
' t;here seemed little point ·in trying to obtain the services of a 
neutral unless Britain knew that Japan would agree generally to the 
proposal. The United States gave permission to their consul general 
to act as·a neutral·on the proposed committee of. enquiry.256 Halifax 
had changed the tribunal to a committee of enquiry as it was not to 
exercise the powers of a court of Justice. It was also considered 
best not to have three professional judges. This was to meet 
Japanese objections and avoid a clash. 257. 
But the Japanese rejected the proposal on 13th June, and said 
that details of restrictive measures had already been given tto the 
press "'before the United States had declared their willingness to act 
on a committee. 258 They also said that they were not prepared to 
accept any outside interference as it was a matter "to be settled 
directly with the British authorities.n259 At the same time they 
disclosed their real objectives by widening their demands. 260 
On 13th June a Japanese military spokesm~ said that the blockade 
"certainly follo·wed the British refusal to deliver the four suspect 
assassins, which fact however only represents one side of the shield." 
~· 
.lie continued by accusing Britain of helping Chiang Kai-Shek and the 
Chinese currency,and non-co-operation with the Japanese.261 In view 
of what he said Halifax overrode Craigie's requests for cornpromise, 262 
and declared Britain's legal position to be clear, and that the 
e-examination of evidence was not likely to permit the surrender of 
he men ·without further evidence. 263 This the Japanese refused to 
As the Jap~ese had stated that the handing over of the men 
,.;.s not now enough, then there was little point in Britain. handing 
them over at all. British business interests at Shanghai, the 
253· 
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C in C Hong Kong, and the general officer commanding "consi.dered 
/the/ matter should now be made a test case and that we should not 
give way to reprisals.n 264 Halifax commenting on these new events 
in a letter to Lindsay on 15th June, said the Japanese appeared to 
have decided to concentrate on Tientsin as no direct American interests 
were involved, and that the Japanese v\fould not be pacified until 
Britain had changed her attitude towards Chiang Kai-Shek with all 
that implied. 265 
H 
BRITISH POLICY REGARDING THE SILVER STOCKS. 
The British government had refused to hand over the silver 
stocks stored in their concession vaults to either China or Japan. 
Both 1.vere anxious cone erning its future. The Japanese were anxious 
to prevent the silver falling into Chinese hands. Jamieson reported 
from Tientsin on 7th October that the Japanese were perturbed over a 
rumour that a British gunboat was to take the silver from Shanghai 
to Hong Kong. 266 The Chinese vvere likevvise anxious, as, if the silver 
fell into Japanese hands it would be used against them in the currency 
war •26 7 Britain oo ught to remove this source of irr-itation by trying 
to .,obtain the consent of both parties to the sealing of the silver in 
the vaults of the British and French concessions. 268 It vvas over 
the Japanese demand that the prior consent to the sealing of the 
owners of the silver was needed that difficulties arose. To whom 
did the silver belong? To the ChungKing government or the Japanese 
occupied p~ople of North China! Britain continued to favour her 
~riginal solution, which 11as to seal 
ment prior to deciding the ownership 
deciding the ownership. 269 
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During November 1938 the Japanese issued an.ultimatum expiring 
on 13th November to the two Chinese banks in Tientsin "that unless 
they agreed to co-operate with /the Japanese/ the Jap.anese military 
authorities would take matters into their own hands.n 27° By 
co-operation they meant allowing the Japanese to have the silver, -
and public co-operation with the federal reserve bank. 
with the British authorities the banks refused. 271 
In co-operation 
The Japanese began to realize that the British were determined 
to seal the silver and agreed in principle. But they ~ecame anxious 
lest any agreement on their part should destroy their claim t.o it. 272 
The British authorities therefore suggested in November the following 
formula in an attempt to get the Japan.ese to agree to sealing - "that 
sealing will not at all change Japanese views as regards silver 
reserves.n 273 Meanwhile Britain tried to obtain the consent of 
the Chinese national government to the silver sealing. 274 M.eanwhile 
the British authorities in Tientsin were instructed on 11th January 
to make arrangements for the sealing in the presence.of the Japanese 
consul gener~l. 275 The Chinese authorities,however, held up 
negotiations, 276 and any further progress was interrupted by the 
crisis at Tientsin. 
I 
THE BRITISH ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE NAVIGATION OF THE YANGTSE 
SEPTEMBER 1938-1939. 
The Japanese had rejected Britain's five demands concerning 
the Yangtse navigation on 8th September 1938. 277 During October 
the Japanese demanded that the British authorities send a shipping 
schedule to their military authorities. Britain refused to comply 
with this request however, and stated that this was only a neutral 
270. ibid.No.238. 
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attitude. 27$ Arita made it clear that Japan intended to 
monopolize such Chinese products and industries as she considered 
essential for her own economy. 279 As the United States and France 
were directly involved in this Japanese threat it became possible 
to address parallel notes to Tokyo on 7th November. The British 
note placed Japanese interference under three headings: 1. attempts 
to establish a system of trade permits; 2. direct interference with 
British trade; and 3. discrimination against British shipping by means 
of the intimidation of Chinese nationals. 2g0 These steps were in 
direct contravention of Japan's own statements of 26th August 1937 
and 5th September 1937, when Japan had promised that the principle 
of equality of commercial opportunity in Japan-occupied China would 
be respected. 2g2 Britain denied the Japanese right to restrict 
British trade which had been established by treaty.2g2 
The Japanes~ rejected the British note on 14th Novernber~$3 
Nevertheless the Japanese action on the Yangtse proved that when 
lCltter . American rights were involved ~thejffiight be expected to act. !roer~ca 
had previously stated their preference to make an oral statement to 
give themselves more time to gather further information on Yangtse 
trade di~crimination. 2g4 Britain had waited on her move, not want-
ing to push her farther than she was prepared to gp. Naturally 
therefore both the British and Chinese were delighted at the American 
action. It went to prove that the United States would go farther 
than expected if she was not pushed.2$5 
In fact the intrangient attitude on the part of Japan led to 
a stiffening of the western attitude. An American note of 
31st December denying the Japanese right to unilaterally abrogate 
treaties or establish a new order, 2g6 was followed by ~ British 
communication to Tokyo on 14th January 1939 referring more especially 
to the Konoye declaration of 3rd November and 22nd December. 2S7 The 
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French followed suit on 17th January. 288 On 10th April 1939 
Britain again protest~d, but Japan continued to control the Yangtse 
and use it not only for purely military ends. 289 By 12th May only 
two northern delta ports were open, ports on the south bank already 
having been closed. 290 As Halifax said in a letter to Craigie 
on 19th May Japanese actions formed a composite ,picture of trade 
discrimination in China. The Japanese had threatened the 
diplomatic quarter of Peking, and threatened to take direct action 
against the British concession at Tientsin. They had demanded 
changes in the constitution of the Shanghai municipal council. 
Japanese troops had landed at Kulangsu: and .they had intensified 
action against Br~tish shipping; as illustrated by the seizure of 
the Sagres·on Sth April and the Lolita on 27th April anti-British 
propaganda had also broken out throughout Japanese occupied areas~ 29 1 
Protests were likely to achieve little faced by the determi.nation 
of the Japanese army. 
J. 
BRITAIN: AND JAPAN'S FISCAL POLICY IN CHINA. 
MARCH-JULY 1939. 
On 2nd March 1939 the Japanese announced through the Japanese 
controlled authorities in North China that from 11th 1\llarch the 
greater part of the export trade abroad and to the rest of China 
would be by permit only. 292 There were three obvious choices 
·open to the British: Either they could acquiesce without demur. 
This however would only show Britain's weakness and provoke further 
demands~ . Or they could make a settlement of all outstanding 
questions between B.ritain and Japan at Tientsin a .condition of 
. . 
Britain's acquiescence. This was distasteful unless it brough~ 
a relazation of all impositions. Finally Britain could advise 
resistance to the Japanese measures, which in turn would paralyse 
~88. ibid. 
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British trade for some time. But the British ambassador in China 
was of the opinion.that resistance was better as "it seems to ~e 
that in the end they /the democracies/ will be forced to react,n293 
as whichever policy they chose Japan's attitude would not change. 
The French government favoured co-operation by the individual 
banks; 294 But the British foreign secretary declared that as he was 
far from convinced that· the Japanese plan to replace the old legai 
tender Chinese c~rrency by the federal reserve bank notes was going 
to be successful, he favoured resistance. Britain therefore ~dvised 
tha~ the ban~s should negotiate only through their governments,British 
policy being, that through resistance, Britain could assist the 
Chinese currency. 295 On this issue Britain was able to secure the 
support of the United States·, and on 10th March the United States 
and Britain made parallel protests to the Japanese government.296 
The Japanese reply denied control of the export and import trade, 
and stated that the new measures were only designed to make the 
federal reserve bank currency fulfil:. the functions of a trade 
currency. 297 
On 27th.April the Japanese announced to the British the 
inauguration, as from 1st May of the Hua Hsing commercial bank. 
This they declared was. in the same spirit as ·Britain's move to 
stabilize the currency. British banks however refused to co-operate~99 
Halifax poit:1ted out in a letter of 4th May to Craigie, "in view of . 
the effects, both on the Chinese currency and on Sino-Briti~h trade, 
which the establishment of the federal reserve bank has had, I see 
no reason why we should even contemplate any form of co-operation 
~ith the new bank which presents yet greater dangers to both currency 
stability and the continuance of aritish trade than does the federal 
reserve bank.n300 This bank was, in fact, partially responsible 
for the drain on the British currency stabilization loan and the later 
293.ibid. 300. ibid.No.42 and nos.53 and 108 
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crisis in Chinese finances. Britain therefore on 9th May 
"made it clear that His Majesty's government must r~gard the 
latter step as a ••• threat ••• ·to the economic structure of 
China.n3°1 
There was, however, a cabinet crisis in Japan over the 
anti-comintern negotiations. Halifax, at Craigies request decided 
therefore that Britain should go no farther than non-committal 
replies to the Japanese request for co-operation.3°2 The Japanese, 
in fact, assumed from the conciliatory British attitude that they 
intended to co-operate with the .new bank.303 They were,however, 
met with a refusal from London, 304 who hap been encouraged by 
American reactions conc~rning the Chinese trade and currency and 
the new bank. 305 On 9th June Britain rejected Japanese assurances~06 
This was followed by general French notes on 10th and American notes 
on 12th June respectively.307 The United States front came a~ a 
result of British requests to mobilize united resistance against 
the new Japanese measures. 30g Thus while Britian did not actually 
"obstruct ••• the bank's operations ••• we do not favour co-operation 
with it and ••• consider it important that foreign interests should 
co-operate as closely as possible.n309 
The British realized that the new bank could be used at any 
time "as the instrument for measures of exchange control inimical 
to all non-Japanese trade.n3 10 This fear materialized on 6th July . 
that 
when the provisional government issued a statement declaring/exchange 
control would be extended to all exports and increasing the power 
of the federal reserve bank as from 17th July.3 11 The French 
immediately suggested joint representations with the United States,312 
but Halifax wrote on 14th July,Britain while it"agrees in principle 
to the desirability of this /considered/ it preferable in view of 
the T-ientsin negotiations to confine your (Craigie's) action to 
301. ibid.No.50. 308. ibid.Nos.57,141 and 162. 
302. ibid.Nos.53,57,115 and 60. 309. Ibid.No.141. 
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supporting any representations your colleagues may be authorised 
to make."3 13 Britain it was obvious could not afford to aggra~ate 
the situation at that stage. 
BRITAIN'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE CHINESE MARITllvlE CUSTOMS 
. AUT-UMN 1938-1939 • 
The fall of Hankow and Canton in October 1938 increased 
Japanese pressure on all Chinese organs. 31 4 Not least of these 
was· the Chinese customs administration.315 The inspector general 
of customs had tried before the fall of Hankow to get the interested 
powers to address a note to Japan on the integrity of the customs 
administration. 316 But while Britain upheld the i"nternational 
character of the customs, and stipulated that the question of 
.increased Japanese representation could only be settled at a general 
peace settlement, both she and the United States of America refused 
to make a general statement until the event actually occur~3 1 7 
As Halifax pointed out on 10th November the Japanese were anyway 
legally entitled to greater representation on the customs. 
agreed during discussions in 1935 and 1936. 318 
The British attempted to find some basis for discussion which 
would extricate themselves from their difficulties. Allen the 
British consul at Shanghai suggested that the wind be taken out of 
the Japanese sails by getting the Chinese to agree to the principle 
of appointing more .Japanese in view of the international character 
of the customs. Britain co.uld then declare that what the Japanese 
demanded had been agreed in principle.31 9 Chinese agreement however 
proved a long time to.secure. Meanwhile despite these considerations 
the Japanese seized the Canton customs house on 9th November 1938.320 
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Shiratori the ambassador designate to Italy declared· on 14th November 
"the customs and the international settlement in Shanghai as 
being characteristic of Brit·ish preserves which would have to be 
relinquished·.n321 Britain protested against the seizure on 
24th November~ 322 and continued to back up theinspector general in 
resisting more Japanese demand~ ) 23 . 
-
The British ambassador in Tokyo saw the sapping of the internationaJ 
character of the customs as a direct result of the Chinese refusal to 
implement the Anglo-Japanese customs agreement of 3rd May. He wanted 
to. make any financial help to China "conditional upon immediate formal 
implementation of the Anglo-Japanese-arrangements or the acquiescence 
in implementation of this arrangement if necessary under protest by 
the inspector general." He considered ·this to be the only way of 
preventing further seizure, supposing of course that the Japanese 
would still accept such a proposal. 324 "It wouldn, Craigie.told the 
foreign office in November "give us moreover a 'locus standi' .for 
intervening on behalf of our own interests and those of China, and 
this aspect of the matter is necessarily unpalatable to the Japanese 
government. n3Z5 On 17th January Clarke-Kerr reported that the 
Japa~ese had promised co_operation if China agreed to, the implementa-
tion, but he also warned against placing too much reliance on Japanese 
promises. 326 It was in fact probable that the Japanese were less 
interested in the implementation of the customs agreement than in the 
seizure of the customs houses. (viz.Canton) 
Whereas Craigie and Jamieson were in favour of increased 
~ . 
Japanese :representation as the best means of preserving the customs 
integrit.y, 3Z7 Clarke-Kerr was strongly opposed to the idea. In a 
letter to Halifax on 22nd November he said-that Japanese actions had 
demolished "any hopes that by 'co-operation' .with Japan it may be 
possible to preserve our interests in China ••• (the) time has come 
321. ibid.No.251. 
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to show the Japanese that we have no faith in their assurances ••• 
and that we are going to back the Chinese.n3 2$ He also considered 
that it would. be most unwise for Britain in any way to condition 
any grant of financial assistance to the Chinese/f~plementation 
of. the Anglo-Japanese customs agreement.329 
This latter question was given added point by the increasingly 
urgent Chinese pleas for aid because of the recent Japanese advances. 
Early in Januari 1d~tang Kai-Shek had suggested that T.E.Soong visit 
London in order that Britain could discuss aid. 330 Brit a in he hoped 
would be more favourably disposed in view of the way the Japanese 
had taken the recent American credits 'lying downt}3 1 The British, 
however, hastily scotched this offer as it would have certainly 
been interpreted as an attempt to raise a loan, ·and the publicity 
given would have added to the political c·omplications. 33 2 of the 
loans alreaqy under consideration. 
Then on 15th January the Chinese declared their intention of 
repudiating foreign debts secured on the Chinese mar~time customs.333 
This rendered even more difficult the question of giving aid to China. 
The commercial secretary at Hong Kong Sir F.Leith Ross considered that 
the Chin~se customs policy was disastrous, 334 and Britain stated that 
the proposals for British aid to China would have to be reconsidered 
in the light of this new situation.335 Britain informed the 
United States that it had complicated the currency stabilization 
question, and that before Great Britain could agree to the latter 
she regarded it as essential to have adequate (commercial) security 
on her loans.336 This meant that the British proposal for parallel 
action. on the currency issue with America would be held up·. Britain 
finally declared at the end of January that "a grant to assist 
Chinese currency d-epends upon the maintainanc e of the. customs loan 
service which in its turn depends upon the implementation, in some 
328. ibid.No.266. 
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form or other, of the customs agreement.n337 At the same time· 
the s:riti.sh took great care to avoid definite promises of aid t9 
China for, as Halifax pointed out to Clarke-Kerr on 3rd February, 
Britain ttmight be placed in an at-kward position if the Chinese agreed 
to implement the customs agreement in hope of some support for their 
currency and His Majesty's government was finally unable to make 
contribution to currency stabilization fund now being considered.338 
But the Chinese continued to refuse to implement the customs 
agreement. In view, however, of the British threat to withhold 
aid they agreed to come to some sort of arrangement over the 
repudiation.339 Britain agreed to "make a reservation to the 
effect that their /Chinese/ acceptance of the arrangement should not 
be regarded as binding them to provide foreign exchange for the 
transfer of the quotas from occupied territories,n340 as it was the 
question of foreign exchange transfer which alarmed the Chinese. 
During the negotiations regarding the· repudiation of the customs 
loans, the inspector general of the customs had been under increasing 
pressure from the Japanese. He had received intimations that the 
Japanese would demand the appointment of a number of Japanese 
commissioners for work in the customs house in occupied areas. He 
informed the British authorities in March that he hoped· he would not 
be forced to give way, but if he had to he,de~d he would "endeavour 
to do so on a contract basis - not on a permanent basis.n341 
But the Chinese government refused to allow any form of 
compromise with regard to the employment of extra Japanese on the 
customs' staff."342 This put the inspector general in an impossible 
position as a policy of compromise was the only way to keep the 
customs under his nominal control and to obtain the opening of the 
Yangtse to general navigation. "Complete rejection of /Japanese/ 
337. ibid.No.457· 
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demands would result in independent Japanese action vllhich would 
jeopardize the integrity of the service at an early date. n343 On 
3td April Clarke-Kerr begged the British government to request 
interested powers to back him up il'lith the Chinese government .344 
Although the British and American sent requests in this manner 
the Chinese, while they gave their permission to engage foreigners 
on a wider basis, still resisted any attempt to come to ahy sort of 
terms with the Japanese.345 
L 
BRITJSH AID TO CHINA AUTUJ.I.!IN 193$-August 1939. 
Chinese resistance depended in no small degree on the outside 
assistance she could gain. Realizing Britain was unlikely to use 
force against Japan, she looked t·o her for financial assistance. 
During the ·spring of 1938 the Chinese had asked for Brit ish 
assistance in the shape of loans or credits totalling 20 millions. 
Britain did not hov>Jever, Sir John Simon declared on 14th July in 
the Commons, consider the security adequate enough, and decided 
she could give no ~1arantee which would involve a direct loan. 346 
The British government pad in the autumn of 193$ decided to 
advise themselves on.the possibilities of ~xport Credit Guarantee 
·cover. The problemof finding adequate security \'ias put into the 
hands of an Anglo-Japanese company. Britain gave no publicity to her 
decision as S1e felt "unwilling at this moment to take any chance · 
of provoking an incident with the Japanese which would face us with 
the choice of climbing dmvn or depleting our forces in European 
waters, for we are not in a position effectively to defend our 
interests in the F·ar East at the moment, and this situation is bound 
to continue, n until the naval situation ·was better .348 Britain 
343. ibid.No.592 note 2. 
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decided to keep the loan as a commercial transaction ·- again to 
avoid Japanese criticism that it was a political loan. 
The B'ritish government and ambassador in China, were constantly 
bombarded with Chinese blandishments, pleas and recriminations for 
a clarification of Brit ish po~icy towards helping Chi.na. 349 Up 
to the end of 1938, however'· the only satisfaction Britain had given 
was a promise to continue progress on the Burma railway. The:ir 
promise to keep the Hong Kong route open had of course proved a 
failure when the Japanese seized Canton. Halifax in fact blamed the 
Chinese themselves for hindering British help by agitating in 
Parliament • This was an embarrassment to the British government. 350 
However in December as the under secretary for state said in the 
Lords on 6th December "a nu.mber of proposals are now under examination 
for assistance to China in connection with export credits.n35 1 One 
of these was a loan for Chinese refugees which .was a useful way of 
cloaking British aid to China.352 The Chinese request for aid for 
the Alley scheme received no support from the foreign office as 
. . 
there was little chance of France or America being willing to 
"subscribe £10 million each to a scheme in which humanitarian objects 
~re mixed with avpwedly military ones .n353 A currency stabilization 
was finally favoured by the foreign office-, as it was considered 
better than a general .purpose loan because the Japanese could have 
castigated the latter as. a loan for military purposes.354 A currency 
loan would enable China to release her reserves. But both Halifax 
and Craigie wanted the loan to be conditional on the Chinese acceptance 
of the ~ustoms agreement.355 
Previous to December the B:ritish government had "no power in 
themselves to grant or guarantee a loan without special legislation.n356 
But on 10th December the government pushed through iegislation 
·349. ibid.No.142. 
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enabling the Board of Trade to give credits of up to £10 millions 
and giving the government greater responsibility over questions of 
commercial credits without having recourse to Parliament. 357 
An exchange of opinions, between Sir Robert Craigie and 
Joseph Grew American ambassador in-Tokyo showed that America-was 
' thinking along the same lines as Britain. In fact on 15th December 
a credit of ¢25 million was announced dressed up as a commercial 
credit for the American commercial corporation.35S Taylor of the 
United States Treasury suggested that while British and American 
action should not balance both should be kept informed of each 
others views. He also hoped that the American credit would be 
followed up by British aid in some form to China.359 This was 
followed later in the month by a similar enquiry by Hornbeck, who 
underlined the damage to British prestige in America if she failed 
to follow their lead.360 
Britain replied in January that she was anxiou~ to take this 
action but could not act alone. She was, she said, aware of the 
American purchase of silver and the recent $25 millions credit; but, 
that in view of Britain's recent allocation to China of £500,000 
earmarked for China,immediately after the United States credit, 
which would .become available when the Export Guarantees bill w.as 
passed "we think this should be regarded as our counterpart to the 
commercial credits guaranteed by the United States government last 
month." In reply to Hornbeck's query Britain declared that she 
had decided to assist the Chinese currency by a loan which would be 
used to stabilize it - provided the United States were prepared to 
take parallel action to support the currency at th~ same tirne.361 
Britain realized that she must do something "to demonstrate our 
sympathy with the present United States policy of assisting the 
357• ibid.Nos.327 and 331. 
358. Ibid.Nos.329 and 354. 
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Chinese ••• and not lag behind if only to quiet United States 
suspicion that we are doing nothing.n362 It did in the early months 
of 1939 appear that the time had come when action of this kind might 
have the maximum effect on the dictators with the minimum risk. 363 
There was also in the United States of America an increasing belief 
that the democracies were preparing to stand up for themselves.364 
The Chinese ambassador stated on 9th January to Halifax "how little 
casue there was to fea~ any dangerous reaction from any positive 
steps that we might feel disposed to take.n365 British moves to 
aid China did not go unnoticed in Japan. On 19th December she warned 
Britain concerning credits to China, and contended that it prolonged 
the :war.366 At the same time vituperation against Britain increased~67 
Japan saw the reasons for B.ritain' s policy as fundamental "since it 
aims at resisting the threat in the success of Japan·' s continental 
policy to British interests in China, and to Singapore,Australia and 
India. Britain may make advances to Japan but. this. is no more than 
strategy to protect her disappearing interests in China)t36$ 
Chamberlain took great care not to be rushed into action bY 
Chinese hopes on American action. Although the American credit 
. . . 
produced a more accommodating attitude towards the United States of 
America in Tokyo, the Japanese army's attitude towards Britain did 
not alter.369 The British had stated their vJillingness to co-operate 
with the United States of America in a currency loan but the latter 
regarded the British proposal with trepidation. They desired . 
Britain to help the Chinese: But they declared they could not enter 
into discussions proposing identical action regarding the ·currency 
stabilization loan. They would, however, declared the President· 
on 10th Januar~ continue to help the Chinese currency by silver 
purchase and would take parallel but ~ot joint action.370 
Amid this tangled skein of negotiations Britain attempted to 
362. ibid.No.479· 
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alone and guaranteeing £3 millions for 
Sir Robert Craigie doubted if a British 
,1 
currency loan would bring war with Japan, but '-ji*-·"~· the United States 
ambassador was not so sure. The foreign office believed that many 
influential Japanese supporters of the federal reserve bank thought 
that the stability of the Chinese dollar and currency was in the 
best Japanese interests. They hoped that Japanese resentment would 
• 
be less on account of this. They also believed the "resentment 
engendered by commercial credits would be greater than that to be 
expected from supporting the Chinese dollar. Would not the former 
be easier to represent as direct assistance to the enemy, whereas 
the latter would be legitimate measure of passive self-defence by 
'. ' 
His Majesty's. government, seeing that their action would be taken 
. 
primarily to help British interests in China, and secondly interests 
of all th.ose who have a ,stake in the country, advantage accruing to 
the Chinese government being incidental and not by any means prime 
motive • " 3 72 
Meanwhilt3, however, the Ameri.cans fearing that;. they had gone too 
far in their statement of 10th J·anuary to the Britis·h-government,373 
declared to the British ambassador in Washington that.they did not 
even want parallel action with regard to the stabilization loan. taken 
as a definite promise; They ~nderlined that what they had actually 
meant. was that if B'ritain decided to make a currency loan, and in the 
event of the American government deciding, after examining the 
possibilities to take a further step to assist the Chinese government 
then the United States government wou~d be prepared to make a 
simultaneous arrangement at the same time as Britain announced her 
currency loan. Hornbeck added, however, that it was not yet definite 
that the United States government wou'lc;l decide to take a further step. 
"What must be avoided at all costs is any hint of collusion between 
our two governments .n 374 
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Such were the difficulties faced by British policy in the 
Far East'. 
Despite the setbacks administered by the Chinese repudiation 
of foreign loans on the customs service,375 and the American attitude, 
the ·consideration, of commercial credits for China continued. · While 
the British government had agreed in principle by February "to ask 
Parliament for authority to give an indemnity to British banks 
concerned" they were still faced by technical problems.376 Chief 
amongst these was the need for a central purchasing body to represent 
the Chinese government. The Export Credit Guarantee department · 
emphasized that this was a matter for the Chinese government as it was 
in British intereststo avoid being entangled in commercial negotiations 
with the Chinese for political reasons.377 
Generally the British were very cautious over hen commerical 
loans. Her Export GuaraEees act, while it permitted £10 millions 
only envisaged £3 millions for China. Britain declared that she 
preferred "to await developments on the China-Burma railway before 
giving credits for this purpose." Their other reason for caution 
was that this "might stimulate Chinese efforts to provide a sounder 
credit basis than exists at present.n37$ This proved difficult to 
obtain, and Halifax declared on 25th August 1939 in a· letter to 
Clarke-Kerr, that unless Britain got security like the United States 
in woodoil and a guarantee of the bank of China, a difficult situation 
was bound to arise.379 Neither would Britain hand over to China· 
t:h.e unpaid portion of the Czech loan, or concert action with the 
league. Britain had to consider the state of her rearmament. pro-
gramme before granting loans.3$0 
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Concrete plans for a British contribution to a currency 
·1 
stabilization fund had been worked out by the beginning of March. 
The fund .w~s to be managed in Hong Kong and "to be used fo~ exchange 
operations to prevent undue fluctuations in the sterling value of 
the Chinese dollar." Its capital was tq be divided thus:-
£5 millions jointly from the two Chinese banks: £3 millions from 
the Hong Kong and Shanghai bank: and £2 millions from the Chartered 
bank. It was passed through. Parliament on 29th March and was to 
be in force for twelve months.38 1 
This, of course, raised Japanese fears that the Chinese currency 
was being managed by and printed in Britain. Craigie was told by 
Halif'ax in a letter of 8th l\1arch to "lay du:e ·stress on the precautl6ns 
taken to ensure that the monies guaranteed are used solely for the 
support of the currency. But I think your main line must be that 
the stability of the dollar is a British interest, that our interven-
tion in support of it has been rendered necessary by Japanese action 
n382 Britain refused to consider a Japanese proposal for "the 
• • • 
establishment of an internationa organization for the control of the 
Chinese currency in which the Japanese would doubtless claim a 
preponderant voice, but from which the Chinese. government would be 
excluded"3$3 
As it happened Japanese reactions to the British stabilization loan 
were suprisingly moderate. Craigie put this down to the "imminence 
of the serious problem of the fisheries dispute with Soviet Russia ••• 
/and also that the Japanese government/ ••• minimize the serious news 
of ••• the fund" because they wanted to hide from their public the 
fact 
that 
381. 
382. 
383. 
384. 
that hopes of an early peace had diminished. 
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Japanese actionagainst the Chinese economy had almost drained 
the currency stabilization fund by May, and the British government 
became anxious concerning China's unfavourable balance of trade.385 
· Rogers in a memorandum to Halifax on 30th May stressed that the 
outcome of the war would probably be decided by "currency warn.386 
As long, therefore, as the Chinese could maintain their currency 
the efforts of the Japanese military would be frustrated. Support 
from abroad was essential. But Britain, as Halifax pointed out 
on 9th June could not be counted on for further assistance "even 
in the event of a new international effort to help China ••• which ,. 
was remote." Parliament, he continued, would consirl er that it 
"had done its share by guaranteeing £5 millions.387 In any case 
the Chinese still refused to implement the customs agreement.388 
On 16th June Rogers reported that the fund was virtually 
exhausted, and requested immediate consideration of financial support 
to counteract Japanese moves in Tientsin.389 Britain however had 
other financial commitments to consider, and therefore, even in view 
of the recent Sino/Union of Soviet Socialist Republics commercial 
treaty of 16th June 1939, and the American agreement to postpone 
payments of interest and repayment of capital on cotton and wheat 
loans, China must not expect any increase in (the) contribution of 
His Majesty's government.n390 There was also no guarantee that a 
new loan would not disappear,as the last, in· three months.391 On 
29th August Halifax told the Chinese ambassador that there was "little 
prospect of His Majesty's government finding it possible to make any 
further contribution to the stabilization fund. n39Z 
The currency question assumed even greater importance during 
the Tokyo talks. The Japanese "concentrated,., their supreme efforts 
on the defeat of the currency as the main obstacle to victory. "393 
At the same time the Chinese still requested, on 18th July, aid to 
the tune of £5 millions from a bill which was in Parliament for 
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additional overseas trade.394 These new demarrl s and the impending 
signature of the Board of Trade arrl Chinese gove~ent regarding 
£3 millions allotment to China under Export Credit Guarantee 
Department cover of February,395 were ~mbarrassing to Craigie- in the 
Tokyo talks. Financial assistance, he believed, would have brought 
the .Japanese government down, and destroyed any likelihood of the 
talks being successful. "Further negotiations here on the Tientsin 
issue would in such circumstances become impossible." In view of 
this he coUnselled postponement of the signature.396 
But'Halifax, in a letter to Craigie of 31st July replied that he 
could not even·postpone the statement in Parliament about the 
imminent signature. He promised however that he would withhold the 
exact nature of the agreement from Japan; and state that it had 
nothing to do with the issues at stake in Tientsin, but was part of 
the general policy of the British government which Japan had said she 
would not raise _39? Clarke-Kerr was· also against any attempt to 
interrupt the credit as_,coming on. top of the fonnula,it would have 
had a very bad effect on China.39$ Such was the anxiety to preserve 
the talks in Tokyo however that the credit was held up to facilitate 
negotiations on the grounds of technical Export Credit Guarantee 
Department difficulties.399 
M. 
THE BRITISH ATTITUDE TO A CHINESE DECLARATION OF WAR. 
Throughout the conflict in China there was the danger of a 
Chinese declaration of war.400 This would naturally have rendered 
it impossible for B:'ritain to give loans to the Chinese. Britain, 
therefore did not encourage this idea, as apart from being 
detrimental to British interests it would also have been disadvant-
ageous to British interests. In a letter to Clarke-Kerr on 3rd March 
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Halifax pointed out that "The absence of a declared state of war is 
of assistance to China as it enables other powers to extend help of 
a character that might be incompatible with their strict duties as 
neutrals in a regular war. The American neutrality act has also 
to be considered in this connection. Similarly the present position 
has to some extent handicapped ~apanese action by giving other powers 
grounds for objection to acts which might be legitimate if war 
existed.n401 It also "enabled other powers to extend help to her of 
a character which might have been impossible, to~concile, with their 
strict duties as neutrals df a regular war had been in progress 
(This has incidentally helped us by enabling us to do more for 
British interests than would otherwise have been the case.)n4°2 
••• 
In 
actual fact, as Halifax said,a state of war already existed because 
of the Chinese invocation of articles 16 and 17 in the League, which 
could not be introduced without a state of war existing - ."a fact which 
had, however, fortunately been overlooked.403 
BRITAIN AND THE SINO-JAPANESE CONFLE T IN INTERNATIONAL 
AFFAIRS. 
In the simplest terms British policy in the Far East had to decide 
between China and Japan. To the Chinese it appeared that they were 
defending British interests against attack by Japan.404 They were, 
however,suspicious that Britain would do a deal with Japan at China's 
. . . . . . T. t . 405 expense, especlally durlng the negotlatlons concernlng len sln. 
But they buoyed themselves up with the hope that Britain realized 
this would ruin her interests in China in the long. run, "wreck all 
hope of active Soviet co-operation in League against the axis," and 
Britain's 11 fear of the reactions of American public opinion would be 
· n406 compelling enough to deter us. 
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M.eanwhile the situation in Europe prevented Britain from 
committing herself in the East.407 Consequently she would not 
accept Chiang Kai-Shek's offer of two hundred thousand men to 
protect Hong Kong,as this would have compromised her neutrality.40$ 
Neither would she give Chiang information about the Singapore 
conference for fear of the danger of leakage. 
British policy in the Far East in the event of a European 
conflagration depended, as Halifax wrote to Clarke~Kerr on 13th April 
"to a great extent on the attitude of Japan. So long as Japan remains 
malevolently neutral, we shall do everything possible to prevent her 
from siding actively with the enemy powers. To that end we shall be 
compelled to avoid t~open a collaboration with the Chinese government 
in their struggle with the Japanese. n409 
cr; 
BRITAIN: ANDTHE QUESTION OF RETALIATION AND SANCTIONS. 
In any consideration of retaliation or of imposing sanctions on 
Japan, BTitain had to assess her vulnerability to such methods. There 
was little doubt about one point: It was that Japan's chief creditor 
countries were Britain and America. (to the value of.£53 millions and 
£$5 millions respectively) 410 Moreover the great bulk of Japan's 
trade was conducted with the British Empire and United States. The 
figures, therefore, showed Japan's vulnerability to economic pressure~11 
They proved also that the maintenance of the export trade was the only 
means by which Japan could hope to purchase new raw materials needed 
to keep her factories at vvork.412 The Japanese strove to effect this 
problem by her tripartitebloc of Japan, Manchukuo and Japan which wouJd 
give her security like the British Empire. 4l3 The figures al&> bore 
out the British and French contention that sanctions would be of little 
407. ibid.Nos. 6 and 11. 
408. ibid. No.45 (note 2) 
409. ibid.No.6. 
410. srr-Robert Kindersley - Economic Journal 1937 and U.S.Dept of Commerce, 
411. R.I.I.A.Information Dept.Paper No.21. Report. 
412. o~.cit.No.18.p.59. 
413. T e Times . 1oth Febru~ry 1939. 
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use without American support.414 
On 13th December 1937 Eden stated in Parliament that Britain 
did not intend to ask for a meeting of the Far Eastern advisory 
committee on the defence of China.415 This remained her attitude 
until the autumn of 193$ with the renewed Japanese advance into 
Southern China. As early as 29th August the British foreign office 
were contemplating the possibilities of petty vexatibns.416 The 
British ambassador to Japan disagreed with this policy. In a letter 
to Halifax on 23rd October he said "Britain should be prepared to 
accept all the consequences of denunciation ••• in ~~0" before she 
resorted to action of any kind. In view of Britain's inability to 
accept such consequences and the fact tat denunciation might be 
indistinguishable from sanctions, he counselled conciliation, and 
putting up with the losses until Japan had bled herself to death in 
China.417 He was nevertheless in favour. of letting Japan know 
Britain possessed such a weapon.41S 
· On 4th November Craigie reported that he had raised the 
question of some form of retaliation with the United States ambassador 
Grew.419 The latter had mentioned to .Craigie that the United States 
was conducting "a careful review of their whole policy towards the 
Sino-Japanese dispute." Craigie in return mentioned that the risks 
of denunciation of the commercia~ treaty ••• would be enormously 
reduced if the United States were:to take parallel action ••• 
There was a natural reluctance on our /Britain's! part to take the 
initiative in such a matter im Washington.n420 · 
America had, it appeared, in her note of 6th October, her 
statement on 4th November. and her wheat loan, gone further than 
' B=ritain in considering retaliation. This was an incidence the Chinese 
414. B.D.Vol IX Nos. 35 and 237. 
415. 330 HC Deb.5s p.785 and B.D.Vol VIII No.161. 
416. B.D.Vol VIII No.57. 
417. ibid.Nos. 175,208 and 315. 
418. ibid.No.280. 
419. ibid.No.210. 
420. Ibid. and For.Rel.of U.S. 1939 Vol.III.pp.475-558. 
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never failed to point out to the British government.421 Despite 
these considerations however, and "although /the/ intentions of the 
Japanese government had ••• become clearer it ••• remained 
/the United States ambassador in Tokyo's/ view that even joint 
Anglo-Franco-American measures of the type contemplated would 
involve a serious risk of war ••• at present .n422 Because of this 
in December 1938 the British were still not quite ready to furnish 
considered views in regard to possible punitive measures.423 The 
American attitude, all important remained vague, and Hornbeck when 
he said on 5th December that recent developments had raised the 
distinct possibility of a stiffer United States policy refused to be 
drawn further, except to say they .favoured commercial credits.424 
At the beginning of 1939 therefore the British policy remained 
unchanged. There was, however, a realization that "the time has now 
come when it is no longer possible for Brit ish merchants by themselves 
to resist, without taking grave risks,the trading interference and 
restrict ions now being imposed by Japanese authorities. n425 And it 
did appear to t·he British government and their embassies in Tokyo and 
China that, with the Japanese army tied up in China, and the stiffer 
American attitude, the time had come to undermine "Japan's whole 
financial and economic structure" by any means at their disposal.426 
There was less risk of war than at any other time, and as Craigie 
pointed outitJapan would be "limited by the degree of resistance 
which they encounter· - and by nothing else," and "that risk of war is 
slight if properly handled.n427 Craigie stressed that the present 
Japanese policy was ~based on the assumption, to which they still hold, 
that in no circumstances will Britain or America be. able to take joint 
or parallel action in this matter."428 But he added that American 
support must be forthcoming, and that "a policy of counter measures 
should not be embarked unless /Great Britain/ are prepared in the 
last resort to pursue it to the end.n429 
421. ibid.Nos.260 and 261. 
422. ibid.No.285. 
423. ibid.No.313. 
424. Ibid.No.319,329 and 389 and 298 (note 1).For diplomatic correspondence 
between U.S. embassies in China and Japan and Washington in 1938 Vol.III. 
425. ibid.No.349. 423 "b"d N 45 426. i0Ia.Nos.382,384 and 385. • ~.~. • 0 • 3. 
427. ibid.Nos.384 and 453. 429· ~b~d. 
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Even supposing Rrit ain got America's co-operation, any demand 
to Japan to respect British interests would have to be backed up 
by force. This was of course the whole problem - wher~ did economic 
retaliation end? When would Britain have to use force, or Japan 
use force to prevent her own defeat as a result of embargoes? 
The Unit~d States could not be relied on the British foreign office 
believed, because of tteir refusal to take part in the negotiations 
of a customs agreement, the purely legalistic attitude -of their 
recent notes to Japan, and Hornbeck's reply to British peace suggestions 
in the unofficial exchange of views between Britain ~nd the United 
States of America in the spring of 193S. Reprisals, they concluded, 
would mean Japan turning on Britain.430 
As .. neither Britain nor America were prepared together or singly, 
for war, the British decided that "a policy of assistance to China 
is at present preferable to one of taking any measureof retaliation 
against Japan.n43 1 The policy they adopted was of hints about the 
application of counter measures.432 Neither was ~ritain prepared 
for league ac~ion. On 2Sth June 1939 Chamberlain, in a statement 
to Parliament, declared that Britain was "not disposed to consider the 
advisability of referring the dispute to the council of the league 
of nations.n433. This of course only urrlerlined the Japanese belief 
that in no circumstances would Britain take any action. 
430. ibid.No.5~8. 
431. ibid.Nos.465 and 479. 
432. Ibid.No.476. 
433· ~H.C.Deb.5s p.386. 
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PART III 
A 
THE BRITISH POSITION. IN TIENTSIN JUNE 14th 1939 -
JULY 15th 1939. 
The Japanese carried outtheir threat of a blockade at Tientsin 
on 14th June at 6.a.m. with a +ive wire barrier around the enclave. 1 
The British Prime Minister announced on 15th June in the House of 
. ' . 
Commons.,that Britain had made representations ,but it was clear 
"that the objective of the blockade is'to secure a much wider form 
of co-operation from the British authorities in North China, ••• 
demands far wider ••• than the question of the four men," including 
currency and the suppression of fapi within the concession. "Such 
demands would raise important questions of policy, in which other 
great 'powers are con: erned no less than this country, and the closest 
touch is being maintained with the French and American governments •2 
In any case as Halifax wrote to Craigie on 4th July"the avoidance. of 
a collapse of the Chinese currency is a cardinal point of our policy." 
The British protests took the form of a protest against searching 
and stripping of British subjects as other nationals were not subjected 
to this treatment. 3 The foreign office must, however, have been aware 
that "T.i_entsin is but symptomatic. The ma-jor cause of our trouble 
is •.. a vast clash of interests in China." In view of the grave 
situation Britain had hoped to be able to use the United States in 
pressing a committee of enquiry on the Japanese to settle the local 
incident.4 Although Japan had refused this pl·~, Britain was still, 
Halifax said on 15th June, prepared to move along these lines. 
Hoping to use Japan's attempted detente with the United States of 
America, 5 Britain still feared that her motives were to drive a wedge 
in the Anglo-American alliance. Nevertheless Britain could just 
not "turn down any proposal towards ensuring peace"6 
1. S~r.R.Cra~g~e op.c~t.p.73. 
2. B.D.Vol IX Nos.20B,225 and 210. 
3. ib~d.Nos.209 and 236. 
4. ibid.Nos.210 and 218. 
5· ibid.No.199-~ 
6. ibid.No.215: 
110 
America said Hull on 19th June was. not interested in the 
original Tientsin dispute or the four men, but were concerned 
"with the nature and significance of subsequent developments in their 
broader aspects coupled with other past and present acts and 
utterances in other parts of China." 7 To Britain they declared 
their intention of waiting to see what the outcome of Craigie's 
talks with the Japanese foreign minister would be.8 
Because of the ruthless blockade of the concession the 
B-ritish government decided that it was unwise to "surrender ••• the 
four men under the present military pressure," or "negotiate under 
threat."9 But they realized that everything depended on the 
attitude of the United States of America and hoped to be able to 
use the President's recent talk with the French ambassador in \\h ich 
he urged help to the Chinese to impress upon the Americans that 
they should side with the democracies. 10 At the same time the 
British claimed that the Japanese demands affected the rights of 
other powers, and were too far reaching to be settled by Britain 
alone. Japan replied in a press statement on 17th June which declared 
that the B:rit ish proposal for a joint committee was only a "British 
attempt to bring in third party intervention /which/ is quite 
unacceptable to Japan.n 11 
Because of .the grave situation and the neutral position adopted 
. by America it became obvious in London that some form of negotiation 
on a national basis would have to be carried out. This fitted in well 
1~ith the ideas of Sir Robert Craigie who had never been happy about 
the British attitude regarding the four men, or Britain's benevolent 
sympathy towards China. eraigie envisaged a stricter neutrality like 
.the American attitude. 12 He considered "that the only chance of :a 
peaceful issue lay in removing the venue of discussion from the 
. . 13 ' 
superheated atmosphere of Tientsin." He therefore suggested 
that the following proposals be put to the Japanese government:. 
7.Forei n Relations of u.s.& Ja an 1931-41 Vol.1.p.652. 
8.B.D.Vol IX No.232 Note 2 
9.ibid.No.219. 
1Q.i"'6iQ.No.223. 
11.Ibid.Nos.226 and 236. ~3.Sir.R.Craigie op.cit.p.73• 
12.ibid.No.227. 
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That blockade measures be withdrawn: That Britain would discqss 
all questions relating to Tientsin on the basis of a. British 
authority in the concession remaining intact, and b· A strict 
maintenance of neutrality: That negotiations be set afoot for an 
early settlement in Tokyo. 14 
Craigie was told on 19th June to put these proposals to the 
Japanese minister for foreign affairs as "Britain was impressed 
with the difficulty of retaliatory action,"·which was the only 
alternative, and wished to find a "settlement by negotiation." 15 · 
Tqe foreign office, however, stipulated that only points relating 
to the Tientsin dispute were to be made the subject of negotiations. 
Britain, they added, was prepared to modify the treaty rights, but 
she would only do so with multilateral modification with all the 
other parties concerned. 16 Putting these proposals unofficially 
to the Japanese minister for foreign affairs, Craigie mentioned a 
"formula ••• which would embrace the desiderate of both sides and 
form the basis of any discussion," but not mention wider issues. 17 
In short Britain wanted to localize the issues involvect. 18 
The British ambassador to China viewed the proposed talks with 
alarm. He believed that any truckling to Japan would lose Britain's 
good name in America, and the world, as well as destroy China. 19 
Moreover British support of China was pledged at Geneva. The British 
ambassador in ~IJashington supported this view. Referring in a letter 
to Halifax on 24th June to the recent action at Swatow when the British 
and American ships had refused to leave on a Japanese order, he 
declared that a compromise with Japan would forfeit future American 
co-operation of this kinct. 2° Clarke-Kerr moreover believed that 
Britain's continued resistance in Tientsin had frustrated Japan's aims 
in North China, and encouraged the Chinese. The Japanese were trying 
to bully Britain into departing from her usual policy in the hope of 
bringing to an end a war which had got out of their contro1. 21 
14. B.D.Vol.IX No.227. 
15. ibid.No.230. 
l~: ~~~~:No.229. 
18. Ibid.Nos.247 and 274 • 
19. ibid.Nos.258 and 231. 
20. ibid.Nos.258,264 and 270. 
21. ~b~d.No.231. 
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There was also another point to be considered. Whether G'ermany 
was behind Japan in the present case or not, was debatable: But 
she would certainly have taken advantage of any serious trouble in 
the Far East to take action against Danzig~ Japan would use s:ritain' s 
embarrassment in Europe to grab phina,and Germany would do the same 
in Europe. Sir P.Lorraine, the British ambassador to Italy wrote to 
Halifax on 21st June and said that not only would China see any action 
along the lines suggested by Craigie as surrender, but so would the 
fascist world. They wouldmil any compromise over Tientsin as a 
British humiliation. Lorraine therefore advocated a show of force 
amd determination to impress, in particular Italy. 22 Chamberlain, 
' however, also saw the dangers of any use of force which would have an 
equally damaging affect on Britain's relations with Germany. It was 
he declared "maddening to have to hold our hand in face of such 
humiliation, but, we cannot ignore the terrible risks of putting such 
temptations in Hitler's way," and on 2Sth June he announced to 
Parliament that conversations would take place in Tokyo. 23 
Meanwhile Hull in a speech on 19th June warned Japan that her 
actions were arousing American distrust. Lindsay reported on the 
same day that the under secretary of state had told him that the 
United States of America were "preparing a 'broad statement' on 
developments in the Far East ••• /and/ •.• the more the situation was 
examined the stronger his broad statement was likely to be ••• /and/ 
••• admitted that it might be representations of Tokyo .n 24 But in 
reply to a British request that if the currency question was raised 
America would let their ambassador in Tokyo take part in the negotiationf 
the Americans returned a refusal on 15th July, but wanted to be kept 
informed. 25 In any case Japan was convinced America would not 
intervene, and the .blockade continued. 26 
·22. ibid.No.244. 
23. K:Feiling op.cit. and 349 HC.Deb.5s p.386. 
24. B.D.~ol IX Nos 232 (note 2) and 235 
25. ibid.No.329. . 
26. ibid Nos.280,295,377 and 378;also see R.I.I.A.Docs.1939-46 Vol.I pp.531-547 
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The British consul at Tientsin was eager to hand over the four 
men demanded by the Japanese, as from the legal point of view "the 
Japanese were given to understand that the men would be handed over; 
lt was only a· question of the correct procedure .n27 The Brit ish 
foreign office considered this serious as in any refusal the Japanese 
could accuse the British of a breach of faith. 28 But they still 
ref~sed to hand over the men unless Japan produced any more evidence. 29 
They also declared that such a condition to any_ talks would ensure the 
refusal of Britain to_ negotiate. Britain also, in an attenpt to get 
the barricades lifted, warned Japan· that she would find it difficult 
to negotiate under pressure.3° Parliament and the British public 
demanded satisfaction for "these intolerable insults.n3 1 Halifax 
told Craigie on 23rd June that if nothing were done he would consider 
publication of the evidence of discrirnination.32 Craigie was opposed 
to this as he believed it would destroy all hopes of any peace,33 but 
did believe Japan should be warned against further a.ction. 34 
Britain could obviously not afford to make amelioration of 
conditions at Tientsin a condition of negotiations. But by some means 
she had to keep the force of her threats, and come to some agreement 
with Japan. The Japanese government promised on 19th July that the 
commencement of talks would bring relaxation of measures in Tientsin.35 
But they requested that Britain should not press for an official 
promise as it would cause them embarrassment with the army.36 Britain 
was not in a position to press for a cessation of atrocities.If she 
declared that she would not negotiate unless restrictions were with-
drawn it would put her in a position which might cause her to break of.f 
talks and eause a rupture. Atall costs, negotiations, once afoot, had 
to be~pt going,37 even though as Halifax said to Craigie on 4th July, 
there was "no real room for compromise" in view of the American attitude 
which favoured Britain as long as she made no sacrifice of principles. 
27. ibid.No.249. 
28. ibid.no.261. 
29. ibid.No.247,190 .. 
30. ibid.No.250. 
35. ibid.No.279· 
36. ibid.Nos.255,307 and 346. 
37. ibid.No.263. 
31. ibid.No.252. 
32. ibid.No.253· 
33. iDIQ.Nos.257 and 262. 
34. i1ll<I.No.248. 
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There appeared to be no half-way house between complete surrender 
and no concessions.3$ But one had to be found. 
Having agreed to the principle of negotiations on the 
understanding that they would not introduce wider issues the Japanese 
still continued /}0rcPcf:fl:~tf change in the British governments policy. 39 
There was in fact an attempt by the Japanese to get general discussions 
of policy discussed. 40 The B~itish realized that the more they 
acquiesced the more the Japanese would increase their demands.41 
Nevertheless they agreed on 12th July, on Craigies suggestion,'42 to 
discuss wider issues of policy through the ordinary diplomatic 
channels,at the same time trying to make Arita _stick to his original 
promise of only discussing local matters in the talks.43 At the 
same time Britain refused to comply with Japan's request that Britain 
make a public announcement concerning a future "stricter neutrality" 
towards the Sino-Japanese incident.44 The foreign office considered 
that a promise of neutrality would be tantamount to assuming Britain's 
past unneutrality and "we should not be prepared to make any admission 
of unneutral conduct. n45 Britain also feared that any announcement 
would be contrary to her League commitments, and would be used by 
Japan to refer to the whole of China and not this ~ecific local issue~6 
:B 
BRITAIN AND THE ANGLO-JAPANESE FORMULA OF 
24th JULY. 
On 15th July Arita submitted his draft agenda and formula to 
Craigie.47 It included, as a preliminary that the British government 
must recognize that the Japanese army was conducting large scale 
operations in China, should agree not to assist the Chinese in areas 
38. 
39. 
40. 
41. 
42. 
t~: 
ibid.No.283. 
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~.No.307. 
~.No.305. 
ibid.No.315. 
~.Nos.311 and 312. 
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occupied by Japanese forces, and not hinder the objectives of the 
Japanese army.4$ The British objected on the grounds that it 
related to the whole of China, and invited the British government to 
agree, in advance and without qualifications to any measures which 
the Japanese military authorities might take in what they termed 
'self-defence' .~9 The Japanese required in other words a military 
carte-blanche. It also implied that Britain had countenanced acts 
of terrorism previously.5° 
It was evident that it was impossible for Britain to consider a 
rupture, even as it was impossible for them to consider the 'carte-
blanche.51 Her military unpreparedness in the East depended upon the 
European situation which was worsening. British fleet movements-were 
difficult , and the prospects to British observers in Tokyo were 
dismal. They believed if the talks failed and the Japanese increased 
their pressure, retaliatory action by Britain would act as an 
incentive rather than a deterrent to hostilities. On the other hand 
the war office believed that Japan would prefer to exercise pressure 
by indirect means in view of her weak economic position. This did not 
however remove the fear that her military might push her into war. 
Halifax was in favour of meeting Japan half-way in the formula. 
But he refused to consider a carte-blanche.52 He was prepared that 
reference to third power interests and the question of general policy 
being disc~ssed through ordinary diplomatic channels be omitted from 
any statement if it meant sacrificing agreement because of them.53 
It was evident however that some general statement would have to be 
issued before the Japanese military would agree to await the result 
of the proposed conference,54 and because of the critical European 
situation5: · Craigie presented a counter-draft on 19th July which did 
not raise questions of third power interests such as currency. Japan 
refused this.56 Enquiries as to the reasons elicited the reply that 
48. B.D. Vol IX __ N.o.325 (Annex· 2) 
49. ibid.No.327. 
50. ibid.No.349. 
51. ibid.No.331. 
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B.D.Vol IX Nos.347 ana 355. 
13. 
116 
what Britain would agree to - so would France and America. The 
Japanese were trying to force Britain into acceptance, and use this to 
make France and America acquiesce in their domination of China. 57 
Craigie also asked Arita if he would have any objections to the 
inclusion in any proposed formula of "specific reservation of our 
right to object to any particular step or requirement of the Japanese 
military authorities."5$ Arita declared that Britain could object 
to particular measures, but did not vvant it written into any formula. 
As an alternative Craigie suggested that this could be included in a 
letter :to His Majesty's government. 59 
The British ambassador in Tokyo believed that Britain had given 
~ay as much as s~e.co~ceivably could. He cons~dered that.~ neggtiat-
J.ons br:oke down BrJ.taJ.n would have a good case J.n world op1n1.on. 
He suggested "the introduction of legislation" permitting restricti.ons 
on imports as suggested by Halifax earlier, to scotch the Japanese 
belief "that there is no limit to our . concTliation". 61 Fortunately 
for Britain things did not reach this pass. Aft.er exhaustive and 
detailed talks with the Japanese foreign minister Craigie was able to 
report on 21st July that he had reached a certain measure of agreement 
over the proposed formula. 62 Difficulties concerning anti-British 
acts in China, third power interests, and Britains right to object 
were hidden in vague phraseology which Halifax accepted on the 
following day. 63 
The British action was not so much a reversal of policy as a 
gradual withdrawal. Chamberlain and Halifax, preoccupied with the 
worsening situation in Europe, knew perfectly well they could not 
afford to break off negotiations in Tokyo without some very good 
reason or adequate support. They also realized that they must not 
give way completely as this .would damage Rritains prestige in 
America. It would also be hailed as a defeat in GBrmany and Japan. 
57. ibid. nos.326 and 336. 
58. ibid.No.347. 
59. ibid.Nos. 347 and 349 
60. I'bid.No.348. 
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Both countries would have used it as .propaganda material against 
Poland and China as further proof of Britain's sacrifice of her allies 
and principles. 
The Japanese cabinet were no doubt aware of Britain's stand in 
Europe and her guarantees to Poland. They must also have been 
apprehensive about the silence of America and Russia. It was not in 
their interests to drive them into alignment with Britain. Japan 
therefore no less than Britain was occupied on two fronts. She ·also 
had to mollify the army leaders who were in favour of a full-s.cale 
attack on British interests in the Far East. Brit ish diplomacy was 
• 
able to play·on these fears. Had America been as disinterested in 
the negotiations at Tokyo as Japan declared she was there is little 
doubt that Japan would not only have broken off the talks but never 
agreed to the talks in the first place. Britain was able to use 
japan's uncertainty to play for time. The formula was meant to mean 
as little - or as much- as either side required; hence its vague 
phraseology. 
If Britain's interpretation of the formula is accepted it cannot 
be called a retreat. If Japan's interpretation is accepted Britain 
certainly backed down. There is no doubt that China, Russia. and 
America feared she had. Paradoxically Britain was able to use 
America's fear to good advantage. When the Americansdeclared their 
mis-givings to the British government, and especially when they 
denounced their trade treaty with Japan, the Japanese believed;, 
rightly or wrongly, that in the event of a break in negotiations 
or war ,that America vvould side with Britain. It was. a fortunate 
assumption for Britain. 
Britainwas able to preserve her princip+es and treaty rights. 
Nevertheless. it must be admitted that she conceded more than Japan, 
. . 
and in the formula gave Japan anotherweapon to use against her. One 
must take into consideration however British naval and military 
unpreparedness in Europe and the East and the lack of effective 
11 g 
American support. With this in mirid there seems to have been 
little other alterntaive for Britain. If blame there is it must 
surely lie in the mistakes of the peace settlement of 1919, the . 
exclusion of Japan from the ~poils of her victory, America's non-
co-operation with the le9-gue, the failure to ~top the rape of 
Manchuria, the Rhineland, British disarmament, and the failure of 
collective .security. The appeasement of the 1930's left Britain· 
unable to make a stand. The formula was therefore an undignified 
expedient forced upon her by previous policies. 
The British foreign office agreed that the formula should not 
affect British representations to Japan, in particular cases; that 
although no reference had been made to anti-British acts the question 
would be raised at the talks; that the formula did not affect 
Britain's treaty obligations towards other powers and that no 
exaggerated claims be made about the formula. Halifax wanted to 
make a statement, to this effect, in Parliament on 24th July. 64 
The Japanese foreign office objected to the last point. Craigie 
suggested that any speech to Parliament shou~d merely state that he 
had represented to Japan "the great importance of discouraging ••• 
exaggeration of claims~65 and its context toned down to facilitate 
agreement. On the basis of the above negotiations the Prime 
Minister announced in the Commons on 24th July that a formula had been 
agreed on. between Great Britain and China.66 
The vague phraseology of the formula was at once used by the 
Japanese army. Their main objective had been t9 extract from 
Britain some admission or undertaking which they could. represent as a 
betrayal of China. 67 Any hope that Britain. could forestall Japanese 
distortion ·of the formula was dashed by the Japanese Prime Minister's 
interview to the press on 22nd July. He declared that matters of 
64. ibid.No.360. 
65. ibid~Nos.373 and 36S. 
66 .. 1]QQ.Nos.379 and 365 and 350 HC Deb.5s p.994. 
67. 'B'ifllol IX 356. 
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principle having been decided, local issues could be discussed· 
and added "the principle agreed upon applied to the whole of 
China, not to Tientsin only. Hritain he declared would in future 
have to refuse further credits to China. 68 This brouglt repeated 
calls from China) and Clarke-Kerr that a public statement be made 
denying these charges, especially that Britain might come to terms 
over the currency question.69 Cbamterlain·therefore made a statement 
in the Commons on 31st July in which he denied that there was any 
change in British policy, or any surrender of interests belonging to 
third powers. Britain, he declared, continued to ·stand by the 
nine power treaties and her note of 14th January. 70 The formula 
was intended by Britain to be merely a recognition of fact, involving 
no new commitment.s, Japan however, believed it did and gave it 
unwarranted propaganda.71 
The Chinese were not the only power perturbed by the formula. 
On 25th July Mr. Maisky the Soviet ambassador asked the British foreign 
secretary whether the formula "implied a recognition of the Japanese 
administration in occupied areas.of China." He also said that as the 
concessions had always been neutral he could not see what difference 
the Tokyo agreement had made. Lack of financial assistance to China 
by Britain, he warned, would be taken in foreign circles as a sign of 
change in British policy. He also considered that the British loan 
.of £5 millions was very small, and that although Halifax had said the 
British purse was not bottomless, these loans should be considered on 
their political merits as political subsidies2 and not as an economic proposition- a plea echoed by the Chinese.? 
The Americans had .also been vJatching the negotiations arising out 
of Tientsin with growing concern. While they refused to make informal 
approaches to the Japanese before the formula they had authorised 
68. ibid.No.372. 
69. Ibid.Nos. 369,370,389,395,401,436 and 437. 
70. ibid.No.451 and 350 HC.Deb.5s pp.2025-6. 
71. B.D.Vol IX No.384 and Sir R.Craigie op.cit.p.75· 
72. B.D.Vol IX No.390. 
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Dooman, their chargJ d'affaires, in Tokyo,to emphasize their 
concern on the same lines as Hull's statement on 19th June.73 
They were also apprehensive, for their own interests in China, 
which the British recognition of Japanese "special rights" and 
"special 1nterests" could place in jeopardy. Hull also considered 
it weakened Chinese morale. The American. answer to these events was 
the abrogation of the 1911 American-Japanese commercial treaty on 
26th July. 74 
C. 
BRITISH REACTIONS TO THE ABROGATION OF THE ~v~RICAN-JAPANESE 
TRADE TREATY. 
The American denunciation, effective from 26th January 1940, 
burst like a bomb. England, who had been unable to draw her into 
the currency issue over Ti,entsin, now hoped that, in this denunciation, 
America was evincing a desire for closer co-operation. This was not, 
however, the case. Hull told Lindsay in Washington that America 
viewed it entirely as a commercial gambit. 
There was more to it of course. America was disturbed over 
the shift of the balance of power in the east, and also more immediately 
over the Anglo-Japanese formula of 24th July. They seized this 
opportunity of correcting the balance by this method at their disposal. 
Lirrl say, however, declared "it would be rash· to assume anything of 
American policy" or to think that the United States were contemplating 
·an· economic blockade or drastic action. 76 It was Hull's favourite 
policy of keeping Japan from guessing. Lindsay believed that the 
United States hoped by their a9tion "to afford some relief to His 
Majesty's government in their present difficulties.n77 Their action 
did scotch the Japanese hope that by directing their attack against 
Britain they would split the alliance of the democracies.78 
73. Hull op.cit.p.635· 
74. ibid.p.G36 and For.Rel. of U.S.1939 Vol.III pp.558-636. 
75· Ibici.;p.637· 
76. B:D:Vol IX Nos405,431,488 and Hull op.cit.p.64o. 
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While the Japanese were shocked,the Chinese were delighted 
at this unexpected reminder of active western interest in the Far 
East.79 For Britain, however, it broughtthe embarrassment of 
increased pressure by China for Britain to take a similar step 
which as Chamberlain said on 4th August 1939 she was not in a 
position to do. 80 The British had been considering equipping 
themselves with legislation to place embargoes on goods of other 
powers. But even though Japan would not have been mentioned she 
would have realized that it was meant for her.. They had therefore 
come to the conclusion that as it was unlikely that America or the 
Dominions would join Britain, it was too dangerous, unless the 
threat would make the difference of success or failure of the 
negotiations. Craigie in a letter to Halifax on 5th August· 
believed that the denunciation coming as it did without any economic 
pres~ure or co-operation with Great Britain had helped the G,ennan/ 
Japanese alliance, and in fact the Tokyo militarists made great 
efforts to secure a German alliance.81 The B~itish foreign office 
considered that the Japanese would now realize the importance of 
nullifying the United States in order to secure a new. treaty with 
them: But that was no indication that they would change their policy 
until they saw how far the United States would go.82 
ANGLO-JAPANESE NEGOTIATIONS ON QUESTIONS RELATING TO PUBLIC 
ORDER IN TIENTSIN. 
Almost as soon as the talks began in Tokyo on 27th July it was 
decided to conduct separate negotiations on matters relating to public 
order within the Tientsin concession, and matters concerning currency 
and silver. 
79. -B.D.Vol IX No.424. 
80. 350 HC.DEb.5s p.2868 and B.D.Vol IX No.38§ 
81. B.D.Vol IX No.477 and Langer and Gleason- The Challenge to Isolation 
1937-1940 pp.158-159· 
82. ibid.No.567. 
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The Japanese demanded that a necessary requirement of their 
army in China included indepe.ndent Japanese police action within the 
concession, and the dismissal of undesirable elements in the British 
muni~ipal police force. 83 The British government refused independent 
police action, and the question of the latter was postponed. They 
also stipulated that any suggestions made by their representatives 
in Tokyo were only recommendations to His Majesty's government and 
the municipal council, and were not binding.84 
Craigie was able to report on 28th July that "negotiations 
regarding police matters have on the whole gone fairly well up to 
date and we have been able to preserve the principle of maintenance 
of full British authority in (the) concession."$5 By 1.10.p.m. on 
1 A h bl . 1 that . . · h 1 . st ugust e was a. e to report 1on quest~ons concern~ng t e po ~cy 
of the concession, provisional agreement had been reached - except 
in the number of gendarmes to be stationed in the concession.86 
'The Japanese demanded thirty gendarmes. Craigie hoping first to 
limit their number to five, eventually agreed to ten during the same 
afternoon. Halifax said he would only agree "with extreme reluctance" 
and wanted the agreement on the number renewed at the end of three 
months. 87 
By 10th August Britain was "in sight of agreement over police 
matters at Tientsin," which was "the ostensible object of those 
conversations."$$ Britain declared that in future cases she would 
accept the legality of confessions made to the Japanese gendarmerie. 
The Japanese police were also allowed to supply information about 
suspects, and be present when the municipal police took action 
against them. But the Japanese police were not to have the right 
of independent action within the concession.89 Britain also made 
it quite clear that any agreement was not taken to imply a 
recognition of the provisional (puppet) Chinese government.9° 
83. ibid.Nos.376 and 421. 
'84 •. ibid .No. 402. 
85. ibid.No.403. 
86. ibid.No.438. 
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·Ultimate agreement was, however, held up by the Japan~se 
insistence that it was impossible to "conclude a separate agreement 
on police quest ions. n 91 They also refused to li.f;t the .blo.ckade 
until agreement was reached over the currency and silv~r questions.92 
The force of thes-e threats was underlined by the riots over the 
silver and fapi questions in Tokyo on 18th July and 1st August. 93 
The Japanese had in fact failed to keep their promise to ameliorate 
conditions on the commencement of the talks, and anti-British acts 
continued. 94 There was the danger as a result, that if Britain 
continued the talks despite these riots_., the effect woulQ be bad 
for her prestige. 
threats. 95 
Britain would appear impotent in the face of 
On 5th August Halifax informed Craigie that he agreed to the 
internment of Ssu Ching-Wu and the expulsion ~f three internees wanted 
by the Japanese. He also agreed that Li Han~Yuan chief of municipal 
police should be sent to Scotland Yard on a special course. This 
would remove one cause of irritation and could also be represented 
as normal procedure rather than act~on under pressure.96 In view 
of Craigie's repeated requests, ~owever, reconsideration of the 
evidence arid their desire to conclude an agreement on.police matters, 
the British government finally agreed to hand over Ssu and the four 
men implicated in the murder of Cheng to the Japanese. 97 Britain 
also decided to make a public statement declaring her intention to 
give the men up.9S In this way sh~ hoped to prevent any suggestion 
that ·she was withholding the four men as a bargaining counter until 
conditions improved.99 Therefore, although both Craigie and Clarke-
Kerr disliked the idea and the Japanese government feared that it 
would be taken by the army as a manoeuvre to detract attention from 
91. ibid.No.442 and No.537. 
92. ibid.No.448. 
93. ibid.No.439. 
94. ibid.Nos.4o8,409 and 576 and Sir R.Craigie op.cit.pp.76-77· 
95. ibid.No.409. 
96. ibid.Nos.421 9 429 and 478. 
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the important issues, the British governrnent announced that the 
men w auld be given up on 1Oth August •10° 
The Chinese regarded the British decision to hand over the four 
men as tantamount to recognition of the illegal regime Britain was 
pledged not to recognise. 101 Britain categorically denied this in 
. 
a note to the Chinese government on 25th August, vlhich was also 
published in the press. 102 
But even though the British government had agreed to hand 
over the four men, which was one of the reasons the conference was 
convened at Tokyo, the Japanese refused-~ general agreement because 
of the currency question. This was merely an extension of their 
attitude over the police question. As it happened the British 
decision was not given immediate implementation because a writ of 
habeas corpus wa.s issued on the four men. 103 Their surrender was 
therefore deferred pending proceedings in the High Court, 104 
although the Japanese had declared their willingness to take the four 
men and intern Ssu. 10 5 
The habeas corpus proceedings proved to be a failure as the 
High Court declined to issue a writ. 106 The British government 
therefore informed their authorities in Tientsin to hand over the 
four men to the local Chinese authority. They were instructed 
to do so as quickly as possible in order to prevent renewed legal 
proceedings. Jamieson reported he would hand over the men on 
30th August. 107 
It was realized that the four men would be tried under Chinese 
and not British law, and therefore to many observers it appeared that 
they would not get a fair trial. 108 This was the opinion of the 
100. ibid.Nos.498,502 and China Association o.p.cit. p.43. 
101 •. BD.VoLIX No.523. 
j02. ibid.No.588 and China Association op.cit.p.43. 
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British ambassador to China {but not Craigie's) .• He consequently 
took the unparalled step of deferring the execution of the foreign 
office order believing as he did that the handing over of the four 
men was not ~nit unjust but a bad political move. In his view 
. the more one gave the Japanese the more they wanted. He was however· 
as much biased in favour of China as Craigie·was of Japan. The 
reasons he gave were technical and legal. The assistant judge had 
"granted a summons to the commander of Tientsin to show cause why 
the writ of habeas corpus should not be issued'! 109 The British 
ambassador in Tokyo in a letter of 2nd Sept~mber, regarded this as 
"incessant prevarication" on the part of Clarke-Kerr, and considered 
that it would destroy all Britain's attempts to renew the Tientsin 
110 
negotiations, when Britain had already promised to hand over the men. 
In view of this the foreign secretary eventually decided to hand over 
the four men and Ssu "for reasons of state. n 1'11 
Jamieson reported on 6th September that the four Chinese had 
been handed over to the District court; and on September. 12th that 
Ssu had been handed over to the representatives of the public safety 
112 . bureau. This pleased neither Clarke-Kerr or the Chinese, but 
possibly lessened the tension. 
ANGLO-JAPANESE NEGOTIATIONS RELATING TO THE SILVER AND 
CURRENCY QUESTIONS. 
The Japanese government, although they had promised not to. 
introduce wider issues into the talks at Tokyo did so. They demanded 
the surrender of the Chinese silver stocks in the concession to the 
pupp~t Chinese government, the co-operation of the British municipal 
'authorities in enforcing the use of federal reserve bank notes, 
109. ibid.Nos.610,614 and 616. 
110. ibid.No.612. 
111. ibid.Nos.614 and 615 China Association op.cit.p.43. 
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and the prohibition of fapi. 11 3 
In view of the deadlock that ensued it became imperative by 
the end of J/uly for the Brit ish government to obtain the support of 
the United States of America. 11 4 The latter were, however, unwilling 
to co-operate. They wished to retain their freedom of action and 
neutrality, and blamed Britain for relying too much on a Chinese 
victory, so that Britain had become identified, in Japanese eyes, 
with China. 11 5 Thus. when the British government request~d Lindsay 
on 25th July to ask the United States of America for a common bank 
policy regarding the federal reserve bank currency policy and the 
silver reserves, pointing out that it undermined Chinese resistance 
and American interests in China~ 116 the Americans would not commit 
themselves. They declared tothe British embassy in Washington 
on 31st July that they.had already expressed concern over the 
currency question, and were sending another note on the same lines, 
but said they were not interested in the silver question. Further 
than this they would not go. 11 7 ·As Kato remarked to Craigie on 
3rd August, the Americans "had made it clear thatthey had not the 
slightest desire to participate in the present conversations." 118 
Without American support Britain had to seek a compromise half-way 
between acquiescence ·in the elimination of British trade in China, and .. 
a complete refusal to contemplate any concession of principle. 
On both the currency and silver issues the Japanese denied the 
nece~sity of third power consultation. Both America and France had 
protested against this attitude. 11 9 Japan declared that they would 
discuss this matter with other interested powers once agreement had 
been reached with Great Britain •120 Their intention being of course 
to u~e Britain's acquiescence as a bargaining lever. 
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The solution of the Tientsin question was inseparable from the 
currency question. 121 Britain contended that the application of 
Japan's currency requests by Britain would be unneutral· conduct. They 
emphasized the necessity of third power consultation and declared that 
the basis.of the difficulties in North China was the federal reserve 
bank currency and not the fapi. The British ambassador in Tokyo 
believed he might be able to "induce the Japanese government to 
withdraw proposals for the prohibition of fapi," and thus wanted some 
satisfaction given to the Japanese on the silver question. 122 In 
any case he considered the British stand to be of doubtful legal 
value!23 He considered it unlikely that the Japanese would leave the 
conference table empty-handed on both issues, and thus regarded the 
on1y alternative to agreement to be the use of force by the Japanese 
army. 124 On 15th August Craigie informed Halifax that Kato had 
threatened to break .off the talks as ''no acceptable compromise on the 
economic question is likely to be forthcoming.n 125 The silver 
question was therefore "the crux of the whole matter.n 126 
The Japanese wanted the British to hand the silver over to tbe 
provisional government and the district court. But as Britain denied 
the legality of both these bodies she could not authorise relinquish-
ment of the stocks to either. 127 All she would say was that the 
stocks would not be used for purposes inimical to Japan - a proposal 
whXh the Japanese rejected. She also felt the greatest reluctance 
to compromise over the fapi and prohibit its use in the ~oncession. 
In any case Britain did not recognize the competence of the Peking 
government to rtake possession of fapi an offence. 128 The fo;eign 
secretary doubt,ed if Britain's security would be enhanced by such an 
agreement. In any case the· fapi gave Britain a lever into Chinese 
trade without which she would have been driven out. 
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Craigies pleas for compromise were not completely accepted 
by the British foreign office. Unlike Craigie they believed that 
the best way to help the moderates in Japan was not to make 
concessions, but to show them that the forces now dominant in Japan 
were not invincible: In other -v·wrds by a firm attitude. , As the 
foreign office pointed out on more than one occasion there was no 
guarantee that if Britain did not exert political and ~anomie 
pressure Japan would "be more moderate or less offensive than if we 
take measures against them. Is there ••• any ground ~o:r ai3suming 
that if we take only gentle measures they will correspond.ingly diminish 
their pressure'?" 129 Conversely _Japan ,v"Jas vulnerable to economic 
pressure and v'ias unlikely to risk war~ Britain, hol!Je:ver; had to 
be careful also to do nothing vvhich would drive her into conflict 
with Japan, in view of the political strains in Europe in the late 
summer of 1939. But most indicati.ons appeared to show that Japan 
would stop short of action likely to irreparably embroil her with 
Britain. She had for example backed down over the Hai 13° ships and 
the Circala and Robin incidents. 131 . Her threat therefore to 
throw in her lot with the Axis was to some extent bluff. 132 
The strength of the British attitude naturally dep.ended upon the 
Americans. Halifax continued to hope for a United Statesnote on 
. both fapi and silver issues. This would have enabled Britain to 
refuse to agree because of third- power interests, or if forced to 
sign, claim "force majeure". 133 The United States refused, however, 
to go any further than tell the Japanese in early A~gust that they 
would not recognize the validity of a unilateral agreement. 134 
Whatever the degree of American support however the British 
government were alive to the fact "that, no satisfactory solution 
can be found that does not recognize some 'new order' in Eastern Asia 
129. ibid.No.508 and ibid.Memorandum on Brit.Foreign Policy in the Far East. Appendix I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~=-~~~ 
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in which Japan plays a dominant part , " 13 5 and in her ·note of 
14th Ja1uary had admitted that treaty rights were not eternal. 
Within this framework British policy was a desire to avoid a breakdown 
of the talks and a "recognition that there is a point beyond which we 
cannot go -- by reason of our obligations towards third powers or to 
China," and the necessity of checking anti-British agitation. 136 
Japan had no wish to break negotiations but wanted to force 
Britain to concede to her wishes over the currency and silver 
questions to mollify the army. Britain likewise had no wish to 
break off negotiations. But they had no·; intent ion of compromising 
over the currency. This is the clue to Halifax's decision of 
17th August to discontinue the talks failing agreement over the 
currency and silver issues. 137 It was obvious to the Brit ish 
government that the negotiations were not likely to be successful 
unless they made a concession of principle which they were unwilling 
to do. It was Halifax's view that .the dangers of retaliatory action 
by Japan were far outweighe~ by the loss of prestige especially 
in America if Hrit ain comprom~sed. It was not moreover thought 
in B-ritish circles that Japan was ready for a full-scale war and that 
the army would be checked by the influence of financial and naval 
circles. Moreover Japan would be wary of provoking America so 
shortly after their treaty denunciation. At the same time Japan was 
engaged in a full-scale border skirmish with Russian at Nomonhan, 
and was anxious lest.the Anglo-Russian conversations should lead to 
a treaty directed not only at Europe but also the East. (Russian 
military strength in the Far East had been increa.aing for some time). 
In fact Britain did not ·want a military or eastern alliance with 
Russia.These considerations made Halifax conclude that the risks 
of war were less than at any other time. 
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The British "declared their intention of discussing these 
matters with the other interested powers before proceeding further 
in the matter.n 138 A~reement would have meant recognition of.the 
puppet Chinese, a denial of the nationalist government's claim to the 
silver, none of which Britain could agree to. Neutralization 
of the silver, proposed by the French as an alternative solution 
was not considered practical as Japan would never agree if Britain 
proposed it alone, and-American co-operation was unlikely. As 
Halifax said if America wanted to co-operate they would already have 
done so, and Britain must not appear to be trying to reinterest 
them in a problem in which they have already declined interest. 139 
On 17th August H-alifax informed Craigie that the Brit ish 
government intended to publish a statement giving reasons for the 
collapse of the Tokyo talks. 14° Craigie informed the Japanese 
on the following day. The Japanese still however refused to come 
to any separate agreement over police questions independently of the 
economic question. But they did not want Britain to publicize her 
policy over the silver question as it would worsen the situation. 141 
The British foreign secretary stuck to his decision so that 
America should be left in no doubt about Britain's reasons, and also 
to show that "the responsibility for the continuation of the 
negotiations now rests with the Japanese government. 
In reply to a Japanese request as to how long third power 
consultation would tcke, Britain declared that the intention of their 
decision "was not to secure more time for us to consult other powers. 
It was to inform the Japanese government that no discussions of the 
economic issues raised are likely to lead to a useful result if 
pursued on a purely Anglo-Japanese basis and ••• /Japan' s/ failure 
to implement the /police/ agreement now within reach must inevitably 
138. Sir.R.Craigie op.cit. p.76 and B.D.Vol IX No.535. 
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give rise to the impression that they were merely a pretext for 
the introduction of far wider issues.n 142 Britain remained, a 
foreign office memorandum of 21st August declared, perfectly willing 
to negotiate a local settlement, but was not prepared to let this 
reverse her decision of 17th August or let it imply that Britain would 
change her general policy. On 20th August the Toky talks adjourned 
sine die and the Brit ish government publicized the stand it had 
taken on 21st August. 143 It described the history of the talks; the 
agreement over police questions, and their collapse on the currency 
and silver issues. The reasons for discontinuation were given a~ 
the repercussions on third power interests, ·~imidation by Japan, 
and the introduction of 1JI7ider issues. 
F 
THE NAZI-SOVIET NON-AGGRESSION PACT OF .23rd AUGUST 
The Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact of 23rd August, which 
freed Russia for action in the east, completely changed the complexion 
of affairs throughout the world, and not least in the Far East. If 
British policy received a setback the same was true of Japanese policy. 
First had come the American denunciation of the commercial treaty, 
forcing her to reassess her policies~ Meanwhile the incident at 
Nomonhan had been continuing with the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics; the fishing dispute and the trouble over oil and coal 
concessions in Sakhali·n :: Next British talks with the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics: and then the breakdown of Anglo-Japanese 
talks. Alarmed the moderates had listened to the advocates of the 
German alliance. Consequently the final blow had been in the 
Nazi-Soviet pact which turned everything upside down. 144 
The British government had been aware that negotiations were 
in progress between Berlin and Moscow at the same time as the 
142. ibid.No.556. 
· 143. ibid.Nos.549 and 568 and The Times 21st August 1939. 
144. Ibid.No.·6o6. 
132 
Anglo-Russian conversations. The Japanese also knew but discolUil..'te d 
the idea of a military alliance. The pact removed any possibility 
of Japanese retaliation over the cessation of talks and the 
publication of the British reasons, and also destroyed for the 
present the danger of a Japanese-German military alliance. 
The British ambassador in Tokyo wanted to make use of this new 
circumstance to detach Japan from Germany and facilitate com~romise. 1 4~ 
The foreign office were in agreement that Britain should avail herself 
of the present opportunities, on the basis of agreement with the silvei 
sealing and cessation of the blockade. They also were prepared to 
use the federal reserve bank currency within the concession if the 
Japanese dropped their fapi proposals. 146 Speed of course was 
essential as the British government feared that Germany was working 
for rapproachement between Japan and Union of Soviet Solialist Republic~ 
which might eventuate in a Russian offer to Japan of a non-aggression 
pact. 
While they agreed that any peace settlement must take into 
account the Japanese position in North China the British :felt that 
they could not officially propose a deal over North China,as Craigie 
had suggested on 25th August, in view of world opinion. They were 
however prepared to consider a continuation of the Eden-Yoshide 
talks of 1937 for a world wide Anglo-Japanese economic arrangement ~47 
But the Japanese on 26th August requested that the question of 
silver sealing be shelved for the present in view of their own 
cabinet crisis. 148 The Japanese ambassad.or in London and the 
Japanese in Tokyo also declared that Japan i'lould never enter into 
collective discussions concerning the future of China. 149 Meanwhile 
a British feeler to the United States of America to discover their 
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attitude to the use of the federal reserve bank currency notes 
in the concession, and.to _comprorilise over the economic issues at stake 
in China,met with a rebuttal on 1st September. 15° America considered 
that the only way to prevent Japanese domination was by military 
defeat and if Britain "imagined that by reaching an agreement with the 
Japanese over Tientsin we were going to placate them and help the 
moderates to overcome the extremists we were mistaken." In 
Horneck's opinion there was "nothing to be gained by offering sops 
and by signing agreements with Japan." He was not therefore in 
favour, ·either with the silver sealing, or in the use of Japanese 
controlled currency. 151 In fact the currency and silver question 
lapsed for the time being as well as the immediate danger of 
Anglo-Japanese conflict because of the Nazi-Soviet pact and the fall 
of the Hiranuma · cabinet. 
G 
WAR IN EUROPE: BRITAIN'S POSITION IN CHINA. 
While these discussions were in progress war in Europe broke 
out. The Japanese remained neutral as the British government had 
hoped. 152 But the root cause of the trouble remained. Noreover 
Britain remained alone at Tientsin. America was strictly neutral, 
and France had settled the police and their othermfficulties relating 
to the French concession locally at Tientsin. 153 
In view of the breakdown of the talks and outbreak of war, 
Britain had to consider her future policy. She could denounce the 
Anglo-Japanese trade treaty of 1911 and impose econom~c reprisals. 
Infact she did consult the Dominions with this in mind, but refused 
to make a public statement on these negotiations •. The British 
government believed that denunciation and evacuation of the concession 
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would interest the Americans who might believe that Britain was 
"clearing the decks for action." They consider?d that such a 
policy was better "than a policy of co-operation, however limited, 
in the Japanese exploitation of China on its present lines." 154 
If J9-pan found that threats produced results they would intensify 
them, and Britain would a:)..ienate America by her surrender. At the 
same time however Britain, v.Jhile pursuing a firmer attitude might 
open up British colonial markets to Japan. This would have removed 
Japan's critic ism of vmrld economic blocs, and also destroy the basis 
for Japan's policy in China. 155 The deciding factor was however 
that action such as this might very well lead to war. Mutterings 
about sanctions and abrogation of treaties would only strengthen 
the ·Japanese belief as to the necessity of their own economic bloc 
in East Asia. 
The Japanese government realized that she could use her 
non-involvement in the European theatre as a bargaining counter 
to winkle the west out of China. On 3rd September Japan advised 
the troops of all belligerents to leave China. As Germany did not 
possess any troops there this "friendly advice" was meant for 
Rritain and Fran~e. 156 
Britain turned to America for support in view of the danger 
of war or a Russian-Japanese pact. The American administration, 
still prevented by isolationist sentiment from aligning with the 
Democracies firmly in the Far East, informed Britain on 7th 
September that they had told the Japanese ambassador that Japan v.,ras 
trying to force the western powers out of China. 157 Hull advised 
that.the British return no reply to Japan, this being· his favourite 
policy of 'keeping them guessing' . 
Such action had obvious disadvantages for Britain and she 
154. B.D.Vol IX No.568. 
155· ibid. 
156. ibid.No.618 and The Times 7th September. 
157. Hull op.cit. pp.719-20 and 723-4. 
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therefore told the United States on 19th September that unless 
she obtained United States support sh~ would withdraw her 
garriso~ from Tie~tsin. America would give no such assurances. 
Rritai.n,therefore, decided to give way to the Japanese demands. 
On 3rd October they announced that five of the British gun boats 
on the Yangtse would be withdrawn, officially stating that they 
could be used elsewhere. 15S She informed America on 24th 
that most of.the British forces would be withdrawn from Peking 
and Ti~ntsin, though not from Shanghai. "Hull declined to 
comment upon this action of which he clearly disapproved." 159. 
In November the British and French governments announced that, save 
for toke~ forces to preserve their rights under the Boxer 
protocol, they were evacuating their forces from North China. 160 
In reply to an American request that aid be still given to China, 
Lord Lothian the British ambassador in Washington replied that the 
Burma road would be kept open. 161 
The British government realised that a compromise solution 
was necessary to salvage British interests in N9rth China before 
German influence regained its prestige in Chinal and while Japan 
was impressed with British command of the sea. 1 2 During November 
and December 1939 therefore the British and French governments 
approached the United States of America again with suggestions for a 
compromise in the Far East. But Hull would still not consider 
such a policy. Neither would he sign a new trade treaty with 
Japan despite Nomura's conciliatory approaches, ·caused by Japanese 
apprehension when thirty-one United States warships sailed from 
. San Diego to Pearl Harbour in October 1939. 163 On 7th March, 1940 
America granted ChungKing a further credit. 
America however was not involved in war. Britain could take 
no such action because she feared a simultaneous onslaught in the 
158.The Times 3rd October 1939· 
159.F.C.Jones op.cit. p.154. 
160.The Times 13th and 14th November 1939. 
161.Hull op.cit. p.722. 
162.Grew op.cit. pp.262~3· . . . 
163.Hull op.cit. pp.725-8 and S1r R.Cra1g1e op.cit.p.101. 
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East as well as the illest. Fortunately the Yonai cabinet continued, 
Nomura's policy of pacifying advocates of an alliance vdth Germany. 
Thus the crisis over the Asama Maru affair,in January 1940 was 
settled peacably. 164 The dispute arising, however from Tientsin 
and the blocl_cades remained., Britain attempted to conciliate 
th~ Japanese, at the same time refusing to recognize Wang Ching-
Wei~ regime in China on 4th April. Indeed had affairs continued 
as they had been during the'phoney war' Anglo-Japanese conciliation 
might have been possible for Japan feared a full Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics-German alliance as much as Eritain. But 
Hitler's attack on the Low Countries brought the menace of the 
pro-German elements to the fore again, and agreement thus became 
even more important for Britain. 
On 19th June 1940 the British government announced that 
agreem~nt had been reached in Tokyo on the issues concerning the 
silver, currency and police, affecting the British concession of 
Tientsin. "One teQth of the silver was to be sold and the proceeds 
devoted to the relief of the distressed among the Chinese population 
caused by the floods in the Tientsin area in 1939. The remainder 
was to be left in the vaults of the Chinese bank of Communications 
in the British concession under the consular seal of the parties 
concerned, pending a decision as to its·ultimate disposal. The 
circulation of fapi {Chine~e nationalist notes) in the British 
concession was to continue, but stringent measures were to be taken 
to prevent its misuse for purposes of gambling or smuggling.Federal 
reserve bank notes were to continue to circulate side by side with 
the fapi. The police arrangements provided for closer co-operation 
~etween the British municipal authorities and the local Japanese 
authorities in cases against persons in whose criminal activities 
the latter were interested. It was emphasized that in such cases 
164. Sir R.Craigie op.cit. pp.82-84 and F.C.Jones op.cit.and Saiozgi Harada 
Memoirs : of W.N.Medlicott - The Economic Blockade Vol.I pp. 3-11 
for Anglo-J~panese talks during March-June 1940 on the preventi@D; 
of war materials reaching Germany. 
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the necessary action would always be taken by the municipal police 
·and that the administrative ·integrity of the British concession was 
fully preserved." 
"The British government. said that they had consulted the 
Chinese ·government 1 at all the material stages' of the negotiations 
over the silver question. They had, they declared, obtained the 
assent of the Chinese government to that part of the Tientsin 
agreement relating to the disposition of the silver. But the 
Chinese government protested to Britain concerning the currency 
and police arrangements. 
In consequence of this agreement the Japanese army ended its 
long-continued blockade of the British municipal area, and the 
Japanese authorities in North China undertook 'to do everything 
in their power to suppress anti-British action or agitation in 
regions under their control." 165 The British ambassador in Tokyo 
considered that Britain "finally gain~d our objective without 
sacrificing any fundamental principle' any British right, or any 
vital Chinese interest." He added also that force was out of the 
question in view of the dispositions of British forces awaiting 
Germany's bid for world do.mination. 166 
Having gained a certain measureof succ~ss at Tientsin the 
Japanese turned their attention on British material help to 
China. On 24th June they demanded that the Brit ish government 
prevent the supply.of war materials. to China by way ofthe Burma 
road and Hong Kong, and massed troops along the Hong Kong border. 167 
In view of the fall of France,and her naval struggle in the 
Mediterranean and home -v-..raters, Britain was compelled to reassess her 
policy of endeavouring to re·ach agreement on local issues. su~h as 
Tientsin - but of standing v-Jith the United States of America, in 
rejecting Japan's new order in China. On 27th June 1940 Lord 
165. F.C.Jqnes op.cit. p.164. 
166. Sir.R.Craig~e op.cit. p.78. 
167.The Times 25th and 27th June 1940. 
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Lothian told the United States that there were two alternatives 
as Brit a in could not face aggression on two fronts. America · 
could "increase pressure on Japan either by imposing a full 
embargo on exports to Japan, or by sending warships to Singapore" 16S 
which Britain would make available to her. The second alternative 
was for Britain and America to join in making proposals for a Far 
Eastern peace settlement. Britain suggested tha ~ terms should 
include respect for Western interests in the East, Chinese 
independence and Japanese neutrality in the European war. If 
Japan were to concede these points Britain and America would offer 
her economic assistance. The future of extra-territoriality was to 
be left until after the restoration of peace in Europe and Asia. 169 
But the United States refused to send their fleet to Singapore 
as it would leave America unprotected, and informed Britain of the 
Grew /Nomura/ conversations which had collapsed on the French 
defeat. Hull declared hlinself unwilling to make concessions at the 
expense of the third powers as America had nothing tangible to 
offer Japan in the Far East •. American policy was to make no 
sweeping concessions to Japan, nor to take action which might 
provoke her to war. 17° 
This was in fact a rejection of both British suggestions, 
and America was asking Britain to take a great risk which was to 
stand firm on the assumption that the Japanese were only bluffing 
when they threatened war. Britain unfortunately had to face the 
possibility of the Japanese falling upon t~em in the East without 
incurring American intervention controlled as it would be by 
isolationist temper. 
Nevertheless the British did not give way immediately to 
Japanese demands. But on Sth July the Japanese refused a reply 
168. Hull op.cit. pp.896-7. 
169. ibid. 
170• Ibid.pp.897-9. 
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concerning the Burma road and demanded a reconsideration. 
Meanwhile the Japanese Press was full of war threats. Forced 
by this Britain ·gave way, and told America that the Burma road 
would either be closed for three months to any larger freight 
than had passed over it in the previous_year; or be stopped to 
the transit of v-1ar materials completely, and the interval used to 
try and settle the Sino-Japanese conflict. Hull expressed his 
"regret and disappointment" at any such course. 171 
On 14th July Chamberlain announced in Parliament that an 
agreement had been reached over the Burma road closing it for 
three months to all war materials. 172 This provoked a statement 
from America on 16th i~ which they declared their interest in 
trade routes generally, 173. and from Chiang Kai-Shek on 17th. 174 
In fact, however, the effect of the agreement was slight as 
the closure of the road coincided with the rainy season in Burma 
and Yunnan during which traffic was naturally reduced anyway. 175 
For Britain the chief value of the agreement was that it 
weathered another dangerous Anglo~Japanese crisis. Although 
Japan, and her navy in particular, was not ready for war it could 
have followed from a British rejection of the Japanese demands either 
by a military coup in Japan or action by the army in China. 176 
As it was Britain was allowed valuable breathing space. During 
these crucial three months the Battle of Britain was fought which. 
proved to many Japanese that Hitler was not invincible. "Further, 
this precious time was bought at the price of relatively minor 
concessions to Japan thanks in part to the continuance of internal 
strife over domestic and foreign issues in Tokyo.n 177 
In mid-October on the expiration of the agreement, the 
British government refused to renew it and traffic flowed along 
171.ibid.p.900. 
172-~HC Deb.5s pp.399-400. 
173.Hull op.cit. p.901. 
174.China Association Annual Report 1940-1 p.5. 
175.F.C.Jon~s op.cit. pp.168-171. 
176.Sir.R.Craigie ot.cit. p.88. 
177.F.C.Jones op.ci • pp.170-1. 
140 
the Bur.ma road again. Jap~n did not raise the question 
to the issue of a crisis again as the army leaders believed 
they could close the road themselves by bombing from 
North Indo-China. 17S 
178. Sir.R.Craigie op.cit. pp.88-9. 
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CONCLUSION. 
During the 1930s Britain was o~ the defensive against 
attacks on the structure of the peace treaties of 1919. These 
· attacks increased as the prospect of collective security diminished. 
By 1937 t~e League was discredited through its impotence over 
Manchuria, the Rhineland,Spain, and Abyssinia. Each power had 
independently to defend its own interests. The inability of 
British leadership in the 30s to see the dangers of appeasement 
and the 'Anglo-German naval treaty of 1935 rendered Britain virtually 
incapable of defending her own interests. Unfortunately for 
Britain Japan chose these· years to systematically attack British 
interests in the Far East. 
or 
Any prospect of a counter-attack/of giving direct aid of a 
military nature t.o Chima - or stepping up British military and 
naval power in the East was out of the question. Ttis was not 
only b~cause Britain did not have the power.to do it, but because 
she could not rely for support from America, and because of the 
threat of Hitlerite Germany. This latter danger increased rather 
th~m diminished. Thus although British armament output increased 
and her naval preparedness increased it had to contend with two 
fronts not one. The War Office considered that there duty lay 
in Europe. and-refused to consider channelling of£ the fleet to 
protect British eastern interests. "British diplomacy was there-
fore geared to complete inability to back their words by any kind 
of force. 
Consequently British policy in the east did not change very 
much between the years 1937 and 1939. This is always the case 
when a power is o·n the defensive. Britain had to save as many 
of her interests as possibl:e (not only economic but interests 
such as prest.ige) and keep out of entanglements and war. Besides 
these twin desires league commitments dwindled to insignificance. 
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Any expedients were used and the policy o£ Chamberlain and Halifax 
towards the China incident in reality differed little from Eden's. 
All these sought American support. Failing to achieve it rendered 
any definite policy unthinkable. 
The characters of the personnel involved in British policy 
during these years was less than the situation in which they found 
themselves. They were not asked to formulate definite policies, 
rather to negotiate continually in the knowledge that a conclusion 
was a remote possibility until British annaments and American opinion 
became more favourable. It was nardly their fault but the fault of 
those who had gone before them. British policy in the East depended 
on the. results o£ British policy in Europe. It was the appeasement 
of the 1930s and particularly o£ Chamberlain which rendered Britain 
inactive in the east. 
Chamberlain and Halifax, in receipt of the entirely divergent 
views of the British embassies in China and Japan steered a middle 
course between two impossible alternatives. Each situation had to 
be judged according to its merits. Hence the quest ion of the 
four men was different from the situation in Shanghai; the currency 
question dissimilar £ram the Customs question. Clarke-Kerr in 
China saw the only way to stop Japanese attacks on British interests 
as a finn attitude and support of Chiang Kai Shek. Craigie however 
saw the situation differently. Believing that the danger of a 
pro-Axis alliance was a perpetual possibility he ·counselled 
moderation and compromise. Both ambassadors were to an extraordinary 
degree pro the country in which they held their post. This was an 
unusual situation but which was paralleled on the Japanese side by 
Oshima and Ott in Berlin {one must of course not forget Neville 
Henderson in this respect). Their judgements consequently suffered. 
as a result. Chamberlain and Halifax could see both sides from a 
European and international context but could favour neither ambassador. 
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Apart from wanting to save her interests in the east the 
British government ·;w.as also anxious to prevent any coalition of the 
totalitarian states against her. During 193g-39 this became more 
urgent as the danger of European war drifted closer and Britain 
became more than ever preoccupied with Europe. The question 
became one of preventing Japan aligning herself with Germany and 
involving Britain in a war on two fronts. Hritainsaved many of 
her interests in China for so long because Japan did not enter the 
European war. The reason Jbr this was Japanese fear of America 
and Russia and the Japanese distaste for European entanglements. 
America was interested in preserving the stability of the 
east and viewed Japan's ambitions with distrust. The isolationist 
temper of her people however prevented the administration from 
voicing.the disproval too openly, and from taking joint action with 
Britain. Nevertheless Japan was aware that she must not too openly 
attack the open door policy in China or destroy all western interests 
because she valued American friendship. Her attempts to drive a wedge 
between the United States of America and Great Britain however ended 
in failure. Simply by her inaction America brought a measure 
of relief to Britain for example at the international settlement of 
Shanghai. Japan had to be careful in her attacks on British interests 
to avoid annoying America. 
Japan's interest were purely eastern. She had no interest in 
Europe except in that British involvement in Europe would prevent 
her from resisting Japanese ambitions in China. This is what, in 
fact happened. Japan was able to benefit from Britain's European 
embarrassments both before and after the war. She found she could. 
gain as much by keeping out of European affairs as by entering them. 
Her decision was hardened by fear of America and Russia and cemented 
by the abrogation of the United States-Japanese trade treaty and 
the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression pact. It was extremely lucky for 
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Britain that Japan's avowed policy was to keep out of Europe, 
and that Anglo-American relations on a government level were cordial; 
The latter is in no small measure due to Eden's diploma~y. Had 
this not been the situation little could have prevented Japanese 
seizure of British eastern interests. 
As it was Chamberlain and Halifax were able to grasp at these 
straws and draw a precarious support from them. Joint action being 
out of the question they strove whenever possible to conce~ parallel 
action with ~erica and avoid individual stands. It was a policy 
of expedients, conciliation and tactical withdrawals. But it gave 
the British government time to prepare for the next attack. One might 
say that Chamberlain's policy of appeasement was right for the 
wrong reasons. Britain could afford to.take not decisive action. 
Such action as there was·came from Japan. Great Britain rather 
reacted to the actions of others than acted herself. 
It is e~sy to blame Chamberlain.and Halifax for constantly 
drawing back, Eden certainly does so, and on certain occasions in 
early stages of the China incident Chamberlain was at fault for not 
following up American initiatives. But this criticism fails to 
realize that Britain could not afford to take action unless secure in 
American support.. If American friendship enabled Britain to 
take.a stiffer attitude in the east than in Europe and prevented 
Japan from.attackiDg British interests it is also true that feam 
of American reaction if she compromised made it impossible to be too 
conciliatory. ffrit a in was hence in a cleft stick and refused to be 
drawn into the struggle but continued to hold the key to British 
·action. 
There was no other way out for Britain but of constant 
negotiation with Japan on the principle that words prevented action. 
By skilful diplomacy the British government managed to draw the 
Japanese into negotiations first locally at Tientsin and then at 
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Tokyo and by doing this managed to localize the dispute. At the 
same time they avoided threats and responsibilities, rearmed and 
kept Anglo-American relations on a cordial basis. 
ed 
Increasingly as 1939 progres~/the two unpalatable alternatives 
were forced on the British government. While they could not afford 
not to take note of Japan's complaints neither could they sacrifice 
China because of repercussions on world opinion. Britain eventually 
decided to make a stand by their treaty rights and broke off the 
negotiations in Tokyo. The reasons for the stand are complex. 
There was little doubt that the way negotiations were going Britain 
would have been forced into a sacrifice of principle. The loss 
of world opinion consequent upon the desertion of China meant more than 
the temporary respite which would have been gained by a compromise. 
At a time when the powers were aligning for war Britain could not 
afford to.lose allies by deserting China. Fortuitously Japanese 
reactions, which could well have been of considerable d~nger were 
swamped by the Nazi-Soviet_ Non-Aggression.Pact, and Britain's only 
decisive action brought no loss. Indeed it probably helped the 
British cause in America and the dominions. 
Japan did not enter the war in Europe in 1939 but this must not 
be solely attributed to the ~uccess of British diplomacy. Japan's 
pre-occupation with the east, her fear of America and Russian 
prevented her from making an all out attack on British eastern 
interests, even if she had been ready for a full-scale war which she 
was not. In any case she.realized she could gain as much by staying 
out of the war. Moreover, if she was apprehensive of the Anglo-
Russian.talks she had much more to fear from the German-Russian 
entente. 
The British foreign secretary, the two ambassadors in China and 
Japan did the best they could. They dealt with each situ~ion as 
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it arose, kept out of trouble and rearmed. 
attained the achievement of marshalling world 
not only in .Europe but also in the. far east •. 
At the same time they 
opinion behind .. them 
Carefully they laid 
the burden of re-negotiating on the Japanese' as they were able to 
lay the blame on Hitler for disturbing European peace after Munich. 
Altogether a remarkable balancing act signalized British policy 
between the years 1937-1939. 
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